Netherlands

1. CONSTITUTIONAL, LEGISLATIVE OR PARLIAMENTARY AFFIRMATION OF MULTICULTURALISM AT THE CENTRAL AND/OR REGIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEVELS AND THE EXISTENCE OF A GOVERNMENT MINISTRY, SECRETARIAT OR ADVISORY BOARD TO IMPLEMENT THIS POLICY IN CONSULTATION WITH ETHNIC COMMUNITIES

    No.

Evidence:

• While the notion of “pillarization” had historically been popular in the Netherlands—referring generally to elite cooperation among religious and ideological communities—it began to lose favour in the 1960s. While not explicitly replaced by a discourse of multiculturalism, the Minorities’ Policy, which was passed in 1979, allowed for parallel institutional arrangements and could be considered “multiculturalist” (Entzinger 2006).
• Such policies began to decline, however, with the focus shifting in the mid-1990s to integration and assimilation. After the 1994 election, the Christian Democrats replaced the Dutch Minorities Policy with the Integration Policy. This shifted Dutch policy away from the recognition and maintenance of cultural diversity. The Integration Policy focused heavily on the socio- economic incorporation of immigrants (Bruquetas-Callejo 2007, 17; Entzinger 2006, 183; Vasta 2007, 717). However, the introduction of the Integration Policy was not, at that point, a refutation of multiculturalism per se, but rather a reaction to unemployment, poor educational outcomes, and social disadvantage among immigrants. The former Minorities Policy was criticized for not adequately addressing these challenges (see Koleth and Castles 2013).
• Since 1998, with the passing of the Law on Civic Integration for Newcomers, new immigrants have been required to take an integration course (Entzinger 2006, 9; Vasta 2007, 718). As Mattei and Broeks (2018, 24) describe, this shift “marked a new policy trajectory focused on learning the Dutch language and taking civic classes.” Since 2003, naturalization has been conditional on passing a civics exam (Klave and Ode 2009, 8).
• In 2006, the Dutch Minister of Culture introduced a cultural Canon of the Netherlands (van Hamersveld and Bina 2013).
• In 2007, the New Civic Integration Act broadened compulsory integration programs to all foreigners from outside of the European Union (Klave and Ode 2009, 6).
• In 2011, the then Interior Minister Piet Hein Donner presented a 15-page action plan on integration. The plan noted that “The government shares the social dissatisfaction over the multicultural society model and plans to shift priority to the values of the Dutch people. In the new integration system, the values of the Dutch society play a central role. With this change, the government steps away from the model of a multicultural society” (cited in Kern 2011). The report also noted that future integration policies would “not be tailored to different groups” (Ibid).
• By 2013, the then Minister of Social Affairs and Employment presented a “new vision” of integration, which “shifted the responsibility of integration on the newcomer who needs to undertake the necessary steps to succeed” (Council of Europe 2019). This included the costs of integration courses and exams (Fischler 2014). ;
• A 2017 coalition agreement emphasized the importance of newcomer integration and participation in the workforce (European Commission 2019d; Government of the Netherlands 2017). The agreement highlights issues pertaining to migrants’ dependence on social assistance benefits and outlines consequences for newcomers who fail to integrate effectively (Government of the Netherlands 2017).
• Most assessments suggest hardline assimilation policies were only readily apparent after the 2002 assassination of Pim Fortuyn, although certainly in the period between 1994 and 2002, there was some movement away form a multiculturalist orientation. While integration policies do retain some of the influences of multiculturalism—particularly at the local level—there is no explicit affirmation of multiculturalism nor any separate ministry or agency to implement the policy. While there are some ethnic advisory bodies, these are far less powerful than they were in the past (Entzinger 2006; see also van Selm 2005).

2. THE ADOPTION OF MULTICULTURALISM IN SCHOOL CURRICULUM

    Permitted but not required. Adoption is uneven and declining.

Evidence:

• Dutch school boards have jurisdiction over their own curriculum and thus may decide the extent to which multiculturalism is included. While Entzinger (2006) notes that multiculturalism has been included in some ethnically diverse schools, in general the curriculum focus tends to be on integration rather than multiculturalism. In particular, emphasis is placed on Dutch language acquisition and programs that will facilitate immigrant children’s integration. However, with school choice policies in the Netherlands, some evidence suggests that there is some degree of racial segregation in schools (Montero-Sieburth and Alhadi 2015), which may suggest that diversity training and inclusive learning in Dutch schools could be increasingly diminished.
• Because school boards are not required to include multiculturalism in their curriculum, application has tended to be uneven. As Leeman and Reid (2006, 65) note “since the 1970s school regulations insist teachers pay attention to intercultural education—that immigrants as well as the Dutch have to change in order to co-exist in a multicultural society … However, the content and pedagogies of intercultural education are not officially prescribed. Schools and teachers have considerable freedom in the way they bring intercultural education into practice.” Moreover, they suggest that “intercultural education is not a priority subject.”
• Indeed, in a review of Dutch integration and education policies from 1970 to 2002, Rijkschroeff et al. (2005) note that there has been a precipitous decline in the extent to which cultural individuality is in encouraged in the school system. They distinguish between the socioeconomic, emancipatory, and sociocultural dimensions of education policy, noting that while the sociocultural dimension (including education in a student’s “own culture and language”) was viewed to be important throughout the 1970s and 1980s, “the notion of ‘preserving a group’s own language and culture’ has disappeared: one’s own culture is at most something private and must not stand in the way of integration” (Rijkschroeff et al. 2005, 424). They note, further, “this point of view has recently become more radicalized. Learning one’s own language and ‘preserving’ one’s own identity is now viewed mainly as an obstacle to successful integration” (Rijkschroeff et al. 2005, 425). The cultural components of programs targeting ethnic minority pupils in education have been replaced by programs that speak to socio-economic disadvantage (Rijkschroeff et al. 2005, 424).
• In more recent years, the shift from intercultural education toward citizenship education has also led to a dearth in diversity training for teachers (Leeman and Pels 2006; Montero-Sieburth and Alhadi 2015; Leeman and van Koeven 2019). Since 2014, there has been a greater emphasis placed on targeting radicalization and extremism in schools (Mattei and Broeks 2018). A 2014 government report, “Integrated Approach toward Jihadism”, sets guidelines for schools on how to address potential threats, and supports further training for teachers and school staff to identify youth at risk of radicalization (Mattei and Broeks 2018).

3. THE INCLUSION OF ETHNIC REPRESENTATION/SENSITIVITY IN THE MANDATE OF PUBLIC MEDIA OR MEDIA LICENSING

    Partially.

Evidence:

• Two policy documents, one on Minorities (Minderhedennota) and the other on the Media (Medianota), were released in 1983, and both signaled the lack of minority representation in the media. Several local experiments with minority media followed, and broadcast time was reserved for minority programming on the Dutch National Broadcaster (Bink n.d., 3). Mira Media, a national organization that brings together migrant associations to provide advice on minorities in the media, was founded in 1986. While not a broadcaster, Mira Media works in cooperation with media outlets to improve the representation of minorities in the media (Mira Media 2010).
• Although the public broadcaster and media licensers do not explicitly include ethnic representation or sensitivity in their mandates, various religious and ideological associations are allocated broadcast hours on the national public broadcaster; this is an artefact of the pillarization policy (Entzinger 2006). While none of the groups are specifically ethnic minority associations, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish and Muslim organizations are allocated some broadcast time (Ibid.).
• There is also a production company called MTNL (Multicultural Television in the Netherlands), which produces television programs for the country’s four largest minority groups (Surinamese, Antilleans, Moroccans and Turks), as well as a radio station called FunX, which caters to ethnic minority urban youth (van Hamersveld and Bína 2008). MTNL, however, ceased to exist on January 1, 2013 after major to public broadcasting and diversity programming (Multicultural Television Netherlands Foundation 2016).
• Furthermore, as Entzinger (2006) notes, there is still some distancing from multiculturalism in the Netherlands’ media policy, with the government discontinuing a previous policy that required a proportion of broadcasting time to focus on multiculturalism. Around 2006, the Netherlands stopped dedicating broadcast time towards ethnic minority targeted programs (Entzinger 2006, 182). In 2008, the last ethnic group targeted programs on the public broadcaster were replaced by a Dutch language program. This program attempts to reach all ethnicminorities. as a whole (Awad and Roth 2011, 401).
• Additionally, in 2010, the national public service broadcaster, NPO, shifted toward targeting “Lifestyle Groups” rather than specifically appealing to specific segments of the population based on sociodemographic factors; in effect, Engelbert and Awad (2014) argue that race and ethnicity have been largely sidelined by these alternative categories. The NPO mandate does not address cultural, linguistic, or ethnic diversity (Cullen International 2019).

4. EXEMPTIONS FROM DRESS CODES (EITHER BY STATUTE OR COURT CASES)

    No.

Evidence:

• Up until 2018, policies related to dress were typically set by schools, employers, and other private institutions. Religious headwear wasgenerally permitted, although some schools had banned the niqab, citing security concerns (Entzinger 2006; The Economist 2003).
• A motion to ban the wearing of the burqa in public was passed by the Dutch Parliament in 2005, and the Immigration and Integration Minister announced in 2006 that the government would introduce legislation that would forbid the covering of one’s face in public (BBC 2006). After a series of failed initiatives throughout the mid-2000s and early-2010s, the government passed a ban on face coverings in 2018, which prohibits individuals from wearing religious veils, such as the niqab and burqa, in public buildings and on public transit (Open Society Justice Initiative 2018). Those in violation of the law face fines between €150 and €415. The legislation came into effect in 2019 but questions remain about its enforcement (Boffey 2019).
• Since the mid-1990s, courts and the Equal Treatment Commission have ruled that headscarves can only be banned from public places on narrow grounds (Barnett, 2013). In 1998, the National Committee on Equal Treatment decided in favour of a teacher who wanted to wear a headscarf in school (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2004).
• In 2000, the Commission ruled that police uniform policies that prohibit headscarves were discriminatory, although because the Commission has no powers of enforcement the ruling has typically been ignored (Entzinger 2006). Police organizations argue that “‘alternative headgear’ should not be introduced because a uniform should be ‘sober and express independence’” (Verhaar and Saharso 2004).
• In 2008, the Equal Treatment Commission ruled that prohibiting a female officer from wearing a headscarf while on duty was a breach of equal treatment, although the Commission did consider in the ruling that the officer had limited contact with the public (Holtmaat 2012, 24). However, in another instance, the Commission sided with a school that had prohibited three female students from wearing the niqab, arguing that eye contact is necessary in an educational setting and that this concern overrode freedom of religion (Commissie Gelijke Behandeling 2003).

5. ALLOWS DUAL CITIZENSHIP

    Although dual citizenship is technically not permitted, it is, de facto, allowed.

Evidence:

• While the Minorities’ Policy of the 1980s provided immigrant minorities with several rights, the acquisition of Dutch citizenship continued to be largely discouraged. In 1992, however, a policy allowing those who acquired a Dutch passport to retain dual citizenship was adopted, although it was rescinded just five years later as a result of the government’s concerns over conflicted loyalties (Entzinger 2006; see also De Hart 2004). After 1997, there was a mixed period in which dual citizenship was not allowed but largely tolerated.
• At present, “the Dutch government wants to limit dual nationality as much as possible” (Government of the Netherlands 2021). Someexceptions are granted, however; these include refugees, immigrants who marry a Dutch citizen, and those whose countries of origin prohibit renunciation, among others (Government of the Netherlands 2021; see also Entzinger 2006 and Niessen et al.2007).
• Nonetheless, Howard (2005, 709) notes that while the Netherlands de jure requires foreign nationals to renounce their citizenship in order to acquire Dutch nationality, there is a “de facto common practice of allowing naturalized citizens to maintain their prior citizenship.” The Kingdom Act on Dutch Nationality of 2003 reinforced this practice.

6. THE FUNDING OF ETHNIC GROUP ORGANIZATIONS OR ACTIVITIES

    No longer available.

Evidence:

• As early as the 1950s and 1960s funding existed to assist some immigrants with settlement. By the 1970s, the funding was being extended to help ethnic minority groups preserve their identity (Oostindie 2010, 40-41).
• While funding for ethnic minorities was widespread in the 1970s and 1980s, the practice has declined precipitously in recent decades. Entzinger (2006) notes that funding for so-called intercultural activities was still available in the early 2000s, support was generally not provided to initiatives that involved a single ethnic group. Moreover, organizations had been encouraged to become more financially independent (van Hamersveld and Bína 2008).
• Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Netherlands’ largest ethnic minority groups received state funding to establish advisory bodies. Government departments were obliged to consider the advice of these ethnic advisory bodies. While some of these organizations continue to exist, they are far less influential (Michalowski 2005).
• The MIPEX previously found that some public support was given to immigrant organizations that were involved in public consultations at the national level (Niessen et al. 2007). These were not, however, organizations specifically tasked with furthering the goals of ethnic minorities; rather, the funding supports their provision of advice to the government.
• The European Commission (2019d) notes that “Immigrant civil society in the Netherlands has recently lost state support, as part of the current government's decision to mainstream integration and cut all targeted support. Bodies must survive on their own and must compete with other sectors to make integration a priority and have their voices heard. Local consultative bodies continue to come and go and several local authorities have moved from immigrant consultative bodies and subsidies to mixed bodies and project funds for the participation of all groups.”

7. THE FUNDING OF BILINGUAL EDUCATION OR MOTHER TONGUE INSTRUCTION

    No.

Evidence:

• In 1974, immigrant minority language education was introduced for a large number of primary school students (Entzinger 2006, 180; Vermeulen 1997, 79).
• Mother tongue instruction was one of the cornerstones of the Minorities’ Policy, which was passed in the early 1980s, and the 1985 Primary Education Act gave legal status to mother tongue teaching in the major immigrant languages (Baubock 2002).
• However, mother tongue education teaching began to disappear in 1994 with the shift from the Minorities Policy to the Integration Policy (Entzinger 2006, 183). Mother tongue instruction became increasingly viewed as detrimental to integration.
• In their review of Dutch integration and education policies, Rijkschroeff et al. (2005, 425) note that while mother tongue language instruction was provided throughout the 1970s and 1980s, it “became marginalized in the curriculum in the course of time, ultimately vanishing altogether.” This reflects the view, which has increased in prominence in the Netherlands, that cultural maintenance is an obstacle to integration. Integration policies thus focus increasingly on learning Dutch, participating fully in society, and addressing socioeconomic gaps between native-born and immigrant populations.
• Funding for mother tongue education officially ended in 2004 and little progress has since been made to assist migrant students with cultural or linguistic maintenance (Kuiken and van der Linden 2013). The only initiatives to support such learning exist outside schools, offered primarily through local cultural organizations or mosques (Kambel 2014). Some foreign language courses are available in secondary schools but generally do not have official curriculum status (Palmen 2016) and are not widely available.

8. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR DISADVANTAGED IMMIGRANT GROUPS

    No.

Evidence:

• Under the auspices of the Minorities’ Policy, a number of employment programs were introduced throughout the 1980s; these targeted disadvantaged groups, including immigrant minorities (Entzinger 2006). In 1994, these projects were formalized in the Act on the Promotion of Minority Groups in the Labour Market, which required employers to report on the representation of immigrant minorities within their workplaces (Nieuwboer 2004). However, no formal quotas were set, and many employers simply opted not to file reports. The law was rescinded in 2004 (Entzinger 2006, 191).
• Also passed in 1994 was the Equal Treatment Act, which included provisions for the creation of the Equal Treatment Commission. The Commission has the authority to investigate allegations of discrimination in employment and the workplace, although a 2004 report decried the lack of government-sponsored initiatives to encourage private employers to adopt codes of good conduct (Commissie Gelijke Behandeling 2004).