



Operating in tandem? assessing the linkages between anti-Americanism and Antisemitism in France

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Abstract

This article explores the argument that antisemitism and anti-Americanism in France are linked to each other in a causal manner. Specifically, it addresses the oft-encountered suggestion that the two prejudices move in tandem with each other, and in such a way that the anterior one (antisemitism) effectively “causes” the latter one (anti-Americanism) to emerge—a suggestion made inter alios by Markovits (J Israeli History 25 85 105 2006). We argue that while there certainly appears to be a correlation between antisemitism and anti-Americanism in France, there is no evidence of contemporary antisemitism being a constitutive feature of the former. While antisemitism may arguably have been part of what propelled anti-Americanism during certain periods of the twentieth century, recently it appears as if “causal” vectors have been reversed, with anti-Americanism contributing to the rise of a “new antisemitism” in France motivated by anger toward Israel and America’s support thereof.

Keywords Anti-Americanism · Antisemitism · Israel · Jews · United States · France

Introduction: French “Antis” revisited

More than two decades ago, during France’s *rentrée* preceding the outbreak of the Iraq war, two books appeared in print, bestowing upon the ending of the summer holiday season of 2002 a politically charged intellectual élan. Jean-François Revel’s, *L’Obsession anti-américaine*, and Philippe Roger’s, *L’Ennemi américain* zeroed in on what has been a recurring feature in debates over French identity for decades,

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namely the role played therein by the attitudinal and policy dispensation known broadly as “anti-Americanism” (Revel 2002; Roger 2002). Their publication stimulated renewed discussion over whether the French cut a singularly different figure in their dealings with the United States. Were they, among the Western European publics, the most anti-American, and if so, why (Mead 2003; Kuisel 2004)? As well, discussion turned to whether there was a meaningful link to be drawn with a second assumed French tendency toward heterostereotyping, such that the country’s mooted anti-Americanism and its antisemitism could be said to move in similar channels and might possibly be so intertwined that neither posture could be independent of the other.

Not surprisingly, the charge that French public opinion could be characterized by both anti-American and antisemitic tendencies—and in such a way as sometimes to lead the two tendencies to be considered synonymous—drew heated responses, not least of which being one by Jean Daniel, editor of *Le Nouvel Observateur*, who retorted that France was *not* anti-American, and that if any attitudinal orientation could be said to characterize the national identity, it was the “galloping Americanization of the French” (Daniel 2002). As for antisemitism, Daniel declared that France had never been *less* antisemitic than it now was. Within a few months, however, the outbreak of the Iraq war would envenom relations between the US and France. The Franco-American clash over Iraq stirred emotions regarding Israel and the Middle East in general, leading many to wonder, pace Jean Daniel, whether anti-Americanism and antisemitism really were nothing but two sides of the same prejudicial coin.

During this particularly strained interlude in Franco-American relations, it was becoming easier for scholars to suggest there might indeed be a significant connection between both “antis” that seemed to be sweeping not just France but all of Western Europe (Sweig 2006; Naím 2003; Hertsgaard 2003). At first blush, it might seem odd for anyone to imagine that there should be any noteworthy connection between anti-Americanism and antisemitism, especially given that the former had as its referent object a state in the international system, and the latter an ethno-religious grouping. Yet, for reasons we explain in these pages, not only were some analysts positing just such a connection, but they were doing so in a way that made it appear that a causal relationship existed, such that one of the two heterostereotypes could be held to have, at least in part, given rise to the other. Some thought it was antisemitism that was the anterior prejudice, helping to generate anti-Americanism. In the words of one observer of the Franco-American relationship at the time of the Iraq War, “[t]hat congenital French suspicion of Jews, especially American Jews, . . . is a central root of French anti-Americanism” (Chesnoff 2005, p. 69). Such a postulated causal linkage between antisemitism and anti-Americanism had been made during the Second World War, when America’s intelligence community, especially its newly formed Office of Strategic Services, was reporting that a large part of anti-Americanism—albeit not in France but in Latin America—had to be laid at the doorstep of antisemitism (Haglund 1984; Fortmann and Haglund 1995).

Much more recently, some analysts have descried a Europe-wide causal linkage between the two “antis.” Prominent among them has been the political scientist Andrei Markovits, who considers antisemitism to be “one of anti-Americanism’s



most consistent conceptual companions, *perhaps even one of its constitutive features*" (Markovits 2006, p. 86). There can be little doubt about the companionship of anti-Americanism and antisemitism in Europe, and not just over the past couple of decades; nor was there anything particularly novel in Markovits's detecting this trend. But his suggestion that antisemitism might be one of the "constitutive features" of anti-Americanism *was* intriguing—so intriguing that we have made it the analytical centerpiece of our article.

In what follows, we seek to determine whether antisemitism might be construed, to use Markovits's adjective, as a "constitutive" pillar of anti-Americanism in France, and if so, how? By this we mean to ask whether antisemitism might be mixed up with anti-Americanism in such a way as to represent one of the "necessary conditions" of this latter orientation. Of course, it must first be established that talking about anti-Americanism in France is not an idle pursuit, a claim sometimes made by those who believe the concept to be utterly devoid of meaning and thus dispensable, even—perhaps especially—when applied to France. In the latter country, according to Pascal Ory, the concept has never yielded a coherent policy agenda and is only a vague, omnibus label obscuring far more than it reveals (Ory 1990). This is what we seek to investigate in the following section, in which we introduce the debate about anti-Americanism in France.

Following that section, we turn our attention to the related debate about French antisemitism, past and present, to probe the credibility of the postulated link between our two "antis." We conclude by remarking that if there *is* something to the link hypothesis, it is not because antisemitism is a constitutive feature of anti-Americanism in France, but rather, at least insofar as concerns today's ("new") antisemitism, the reverse. Anti-Americanism, we suggest, has become a supporting element, though hardly a constitutive feature, of antisemitism.

Anti-Americanism in France: genus and species

In a thoughtful analysis of French anti-Americanism published in 2007, at a time when the Franco-American animosities that had been generated by the Iraq war were beginning to abate, Sophie Meunier cautioned Americans against overreacting to what so many of them were assuming was France's fundamental and implacable anti-Americanism. Between 2003 and 2005, America had experienced a rare and sharp flare-up of "francophobia," for a short time raging at fever pitch and causing widespread lampooning of France in American media, to say nothing of the boycotting of French culinary imports and even, for a time, the renaming of French fries, "liberty fries" in some restaurants and cafeterias (Miller and Molesky 2004; Timmerman 2004; Chesnoff 2005; Serfaty 2002; Vaïsse 2003a; Vaïsse 2003b; Lando 2003).

Meunier urged a cooling of tempers, and she disputed that the French public was an outlier from broader opinion trends in Western Europe concerning attitudes toward the US (Meunier 2007). She claimed that France's public was no more anti-American than any other European public. Moreover, Americans were overlooking the proclivity of the French to oppose *other* states' policy initiatives just as much






Figure 1 Threats and violence motivated by antisemitism in France, 1994–2022. *Source:* CNC DH 2023 “La lutte contre le racisme, l’antisémitisme et la xénophobie. Année 2022,” Direction de l’information légale et administrative, Paris, 2023

as they opposed America’s. This proclivity stemmed, she argued, from an innate French tendency to be oppositional. These are a people given to glorifying the heroics of Astérix, the fictional warrior celebrated for fighting the good fight against the Roman bully during the Gallic Wars of Julius Caesar, and thus the embodiment of a national exultation of defiance. The French have “a rebellious, grumpy character, and a high propensity for opposition.... [They] are very distrustful in general – of each other, of their government, of politicians, of America, and so on. The French just like to be ‘anti,’ especially when the disruption of French society created by the phenomenon in question is strong” (Meunier 2007, pp. 155–56).¹

Much has changed in respect of the topic of anti-Americanism in France. The attitudinal tremors triggered by Iraq have long since vanished, due in no small measure to Americans’ own reassessment of the wisdom of the 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq. And while it can be maintained that the first ascension to power of Donald Trump in January 2017 triggered anew a passionate polemic against America in Western Europe, France cannot be said to have been at the forefront of that polemic. Trump-inspired critiques of America were less intense there than in any other Western European country, if for no other reason than that French opinion, never having counted upon America as much as other Western European publics in the decades following the Second World War, was less disillusioned by this American president who seemed to delight in unsettling the transatlantic alliance (Haglund 2021). Besides, Trump’s raising doubts about America’s commitment to NATO during his first two years in office was considered by some in Paris

¹ In a similar vein, see Duhamel (1985). This same point was made earlier, minus the reference to comic book heroes, by a Spanish historian and diplomat who rooted French oppositional tendencies in a Cartesian mindset emphasizing the analytical separation of object from subject, in contradistinction to an English (and American) tendency said to blur the boundaries between the two. See de Madariaga (1969, pp. 62–66).



to be potentially beneficial for France's well-advertised quest to construct a more "autonomous" European defense capability (Belin 2018) (Fig. 1; CNCDH 2023).

No one would accuse that country's current leader, Emmanuel Macron, of being anti-American, notwithstanding his championing of the autonomy goal, and despite a well-publicized comment on the status of NATO in late 2019, when he famously diagnosed the alliance's "brain death" in an interview published in the *Economist* (Economist 2019; Haglund 2022). Quite the contrary, he is considered one of the least anti-American leaders that France's Fifth Republic has ever known (Tiersky 2018; Drozdiak 2020). Admittedly, he too seems to be unable to shake the suspicion that something inherent in "Anglo-Saxon" (read: American) political and cultural values may upset France's political tranquility and that imported multiculturalism might result in "breaking the republic in two" (Onishi 2021; Dryef 2020). Yet few worry that this French president represents the second coming of Charles de Gaulle, the quintessential anti-American leader since the Second World War.

Similarly difficult to detect, among France's political elite, are vestiges of the kind of antisemitism that at one time did figure so largely in the country's politics (Byrnes 1950; Mehlman 1983; Marrus 1972; Malino and Wasserstein 1985; Birnbaum 1992; Benbassa 1997; Sternhell 2000). But while elite-level, and even state-sanctioned, antisemitism can be said to have disappeared from French political culture, things are different when it comes to grass-roots sources of France's "new antisemitism," discussed later in this article. Even if anti-American tendencies are more muted than they once were, they never lurk very far from the surface in French political debates, especially when those tendencies become swaddled in anti-NATO rhetoric, given how the alliance serves as a useful surrogate for the articulation of anti-Americanism. So while Macron may have recently formed a new, and improved, diagnosis of NATO's neurological health, it is obvious, judging from the strong showing made by anti-NATO parties of both left and right in France's 2022 and 2024 parliamentary elections, that traditional anti-Americanism continues to inspire elite-level debate in a way that traditional antisemitism may no longer do (Economist 2022, 2024).

While anti-American tendencies in France are much more subdued than they were two decades ago, obituary notices for French anti-Americanism would be, to quote Mark Twain, as "exaggerated" as was the news announcing the famous humorist's own demise more than a dozen years before it actually happened (Petsko 2018).² For sure, the debate about anti-Americanism has fluctuated a great deal over the past hundred or so years. At times, the country's mood has looked so bilious in respect of the US as to presage an impending collapse of the transatlantic West (Davis 2003; Fonte 2002; Kupchan 2002; Glucksmann 2003). At other times, the image of the two being "old allies" remains very much alive. Those occasions when animosity characterized Franco-American relations have garnered the greatest amount of attention,

² To an English correspondent for the *New York Journal* who contacted him in early June 1897 following the publication of news that he had died, Twain quipped that "the report of my death was an exaggeration." Quoted in Petsko (2018).



probably because they correlate with emotion-laden wars (global or otherwise) and the peace settlements ending those wars.

As a result, there have been four periods when anti-Americanism has been at its most ebullient in France: (1) the interwar years; (2) the immediate post-Second World War years; (3) the Vietnam War decade (1959–69) when Charles de Gaulle was president; and (4) the era of “unipolarity” of the post-cold war years (from the early 1990s until the mid-2000s), when an America-inflected “globalization” appeared unstoppable (Guéhenno 1999).

Interspersed throughout these same years were periods of relative calm, occasionally even something approaching bonhomie in the bilateral relationship, leading commentators to pronounce the death of anti-Americanism in France. One such period was the early 1980s, when it looked as if a hardening French position toward the Soviet Union was about to usher in a lasting era of Franco-American entente. This was symbolized by the remarkable intervention made by François Mitterrand into the German debate whether to accept the controversial deployment of NATO intermediate-range nuclear (INF) systems—American Pershing 2 and ground-launched cruise missiles—on German soil (Weisenfeld 1986). Many saw this intervention as sounding the knell for whatever remained of elite-level anti-Americanism in France (Pinto 1985; Lacorne and Rupnik 1990).

The entente of the 1980s proved to be short-lived, but that it existed at all should remind us that the discussion about anti-Americanism in France is a complicated one. And since we are going to investigate Markovits’s suggestion that antisemitism might constitute an ideational pillar of anti-Americanism, it behooves us here to stipulate what we consider the “pillars” of this attitudinal disposition. To recall, Markovits was primarily discussing *Western European* anti-Americanism. To determine whether there is a specific French variant at all, it would be useful to begin with a list of generic qualities so often associated with anti-Americanism in Europe.

For starters, it is worth pondering Kenneth Minogue’s wise caution against the analytical temptation to conceive of anti-Americanism as representing a single thing rather than multifaceted, and thus bound to be elusive (Minogue 1986, p. 43). Still, at certain times the concept has attained the status of what two scholars call the “master narrative of our time,” by which they mean “an international rhetoric of rejection that binds politics, economics, and ethics into a common story about how the world works and why it doesn’t,” with the principal target being the United States (Judt and Lacorne 2005, p. 13).

Let us consider anti-Americanism in its generic sense as applying not merely to France but to a cross section of European lands. In those lands, anti-Americanism has been said to manifest a set of attitudinal characteristics whose wellsprings have been an eagerness as well as a psychological need to construct negative images of the transatlantic Other. As such, these characteristics do not necessarily constitute a critique of American foreign or domestic policy behavior on more or less reasoned grounds—the kind of critique Paul Hollander calls “rational” anti-Americanism (Hollander 1995). Instead, these attitudinal characteristics represent, in Josef Joffe’s words, “the obsessive stereotypization, denigration, and demonization of the country and the culture as a whole,” in which images of a “Yahoo America” consistently find their counterpart in images of a “Superior Europe” (Joffe 2006).



American students of this sort of heterostereotyping provide four hallmarks of such anti-Americanism, namely (1) systematic antagonism toward an America held to incarnate evil; (2) deliberate exaggeration of the country's shortcomings coupled with a denial that it might possess any merits; (3) sustained misrepresentation of America for the purposes of advancing a political agenda; and (4) constant misperception and ridiculing of American society (Rubin and Rubin 2004; Katzenstein and Keohane 2007).

Some of these generic characteristics might not betray any particular French provenance, while others do have a French inflection. One of these is the civilizational critique subsuming at least three of the above four rubrics. As the Iraq-inspired bitterness showed, demonization can come more easily in France than elsewhere in Europe, a stunning exemplification of which was the impressive sales volume racked up by a particularly virulent diatribe insisting that the 9/11 attacks (at least the one on the Pentagon) were a hoax perpetrated by the "military-industrial complex" seeking a reason to invade the Middle East (Meysan 2002).³ Nor have other French America-watchers been shy about sounding the civilizational theme, with its accompaniment of near-constant ridiculing of American ways. This theme has been a staple of French critiques of America and is also one of the ways in which an ideational linkage might be established between anti-Americanism and antisemitism. As we will show later in this article, the linkage is to be found in one of the myths that buttresses both of these heterostereotypes: the myth that America as a society and Jews as a people are each strongly identified with the notion of "property," with the latter, property, said to testify to an obsession with getting more than what one presumably is entitled to. In short, hold the two "antis," America is a grasping society, and Jews a grasping people. Grasping, according to this way of looking at the matter, is said to be antithetical to French republican "values." We return to this postulated linkage below. Here, we simply note that there has traditionally been no clear difference between right-wing and left-wing critiques that focus upon property's presumed sinister impact upon those republican values, for historically it has proven easy for extremes on both poles of the ideological spectrum to assail capitalism (hence, "property") as being at the root of what troubles France's existence (Sternhell 2000).

Although the civilizational critique of America first started to pick up steam in France (and elsewhere in Europe) during the latter part of the nineteenth century (Noël 1899; Ribet 1905), it only came into its own during the interwar period, which saw the appearance of Georges Duhamel's best-selling indictment of America, the English translation of which bore the revelatory title of *America the Menace* (Portes 2000). Writing a mere dozen years after American and French soldiers perished as comrades in arms against the same German foe in what used to be styled a war for civilization (Cowper Powys 1914), Duhamel was despondent regarding France's, and Europe's, chances of retaining independence in a world that would increasingly

³ Revel (2002, pp. 258–59) commented wryly, apropos the immense readership enjoyed by this book after its publication in March 2002, that it spoke volumes about the credulousness of the French and inspired perplexity about the intellectual qualities of a people often declaring themselves to be "the most intelligent on earth."



be an American one. “[N]o one can be in any doubt,” he prophesied, “that America’s civilization is well along the road to vanquishing the Old Continent” (Duhamel 1930, pp. 18–19).⁴

Still, the civilizational critique of America was hardly unique to France at the time, as the case of France’s existential enemy, Nazi Germany, makes clear. Indeed, compared with its neighbor across the Rhine following Hitler’s ascension to power in 1933, France could even look pro-American, notwithstanding that in so many ways the 1920s and 1930s really did constitute what Roger calls the “golden age” of its anti-Americanism (Roger 2002, p. 282).⁵ But even if France did not have any monopoly over the civilizational critique of America, there were two dimensions in which French criticisms of America have stood out, and continue to stand out, from the European pack.

One of these is the oft-postulated connection drawn between the United States and some mysterious entity labeled the “Anglo-Saxons.” This ostensibly ethnic ensemble has frequently been held to be at the root of troubles for France that, presumably, would be nonexistent in the absence of those Anglo-Saxons. In a way that sets French anti-Americanism apart from other variants of transatlantic anti-Americanism, Anglo-Saxonism has been put into service as a handy ontological device for distinguishing what is good about French values from what is not so good about American values. Invocations of the Anglo-Saxon “Other” continue to enjoy widespread circulation in France down to the present, where they do yeoman ontological service (Hayward 2007).

Added to the aspect of Anglo-Saxonism is that other French specificity, represented more by a structural than an ethnic symbol. This second symbol bespeaks near-mythical beliefs about the structure of the international system and can be captured in one word, “multipolarity” (Haglund 2023, pp. 189–95). In this article’s next section, we ask how, if at all, these two French specificities might provide clues about the postulated connections between anti-Americanism and antisemitism. Before we get to that discussion, though, a further word is in order, which we offer more as a comment upon consequence than upon cause. Notwithstanding that Nazi Germany was obviously far more anti-American than France in any “civilizational” sense, it is reasonable to argue, as William Keylor does, that the French critique of America played a part in bolstering American isolationism during that decade, making it more difficult than it might have been for Americans to identify with the country that seemed to harbor so many hostile observers of the American way of life (Keylor 1998).

Sustaining Keylor’s logic was the flood of provocatively titled books emanating from French publishers between the world wars, the constant theme of which was

⁴ What Duhamel had been for the interwar period, Baudrillard (1986) aspired to become for the postwar decades, with a similarly acclaimed civilizational critique of the United States.

⁵ For Roger, the interwar years, “that golden age of anti-Americanism,” would set the enduring pattern of for what was to come, as the new anti-Americanism commencing in the early 1920s evolved into a “discourse that was at one and the same time reactive and resigned – a discourse of those who had already been defeated and colonized. The hatred of America took its nourishment from virulent self-contempt” (Roger 2002, p. 359).



the dastardly manner in which postwar France was being treated by the country's erstwhile "old ally."⁶ Some of this critique was reasonable, having been inspired by postwar wrangling over war debts and the failure of Washington to agree to a trilateral alliance between the US, France, and Britain subsequent to the failure of the Versailles treaty to be ratified by the American Senate.⁷ Much of the criticism, however, was unreasonable, and some of it, we argue below, could be linked, *mutatis mutandis*, to antisemitism.

But there was one instance that serves as a caution against the conclusion that anti-Americanism and antisemitism must always be two peas in the same stereotyping pod, with the latter somehow representing the anterior sentiment. This was the tragic case of Isaac Kadmi-Cohen, the author of one of the shrillest anti-American polemics published during the interwar period (Kadmi-Cohen 1930). The title of his 1930 book said it all: *L'Abomination américaine*. The French political journalist set out an argument that in later decades would recur within French policy circles, regarding the urgency to create a more "autonomous" Europe. Achieving this, Kadmi-Cohen was convinced, required a tight bonding between the French and the Germans, for only an alliance between the two could endow the Old Continent with the means of warding off its transatlantic enslaver. "A United States of Europe!" he exulted. "These words are on everyone's lips, they spring from the hearts, fire up the imagination, of all! The time has come to put an end to the intolerable American oppression!" (Kadmi-Cohen 1930, p. 263).

Kadmi-Cohen's stirring paean to "Carolingian" reunion was not so much deranged as it was woefully and—for him as so many other French Jews—disastrously premature; for in July 1942 he was rounded up along with thousands of other Jews and sent to Auschwitz, where his fantasized German allies put him to death in 1944 (Klarsfeld 2001). The pathetic case of Kadmi-Cohen might suggest that anti-Americanism and antisemitism are fundamentally unrelated. But are they really? It is to this question that we now turn in our bid to see whether there may well be something to the contention that antisemitism *is* a constitutive feature of anti-Americanism.

Antisemitism in France: old and new

The example of Kadmi-Cohen instructs us that we should be extremely wary about any presumed identity between French anti-Americanism and French antisemitism. Not only was the author of *L'Abomination américaine* Jewish, he was also a militant Zionist. That being said, it would be difficult to deny certain commonalities between the two prejudices. In this section, we highlight those commonalities against the

⁶ Along with the above-cited work by Duhamel, the flavor of "golden age" anti-Americanism is expressed in Chastanet (1927), Romier (1928), and Aron and Dandieu (1931).

⁷ On the significance of the war-debt controversy, see Homberg (1926), Artaud (1978), Schrecker (1979), and Rhodes (1969). For French bitterness over the lack of an American security guarantee following the war, see Tardieu (1927), Clemenceau (1930), and Martin (1999).



backdrop of a discussion of past and current tendencies in French antisemitism. The place to start the analysis is with a brief summary of the current state of debate over France's experience with antisemitism.

In assessing this debate, we have relied on elite interviews as a proxy for opinions on antisemitism and possible connections with anti-Americanism. Interviews were conducted with twenty-two founders and directors of Jewish-community and Israel-advocacy organizations, directors of human-rights and anti-racism organizations, and professors, academics, and journalists specializing in Jewish life and politics in France or popular perceptions of the United States in France. Our interviewees included leaders of ELNET-France, a lobbying group which aims to strengthen relations between government ministers, journalists, and security specialists in Israel and France and which advocates for European Union parliamentarians in Brussels to take positions toward this aim; a leader of the American Jewish Committee's European office in Paris; a director of *Alliance israélite universelle*, a longstanding educational and secular Jewish institution, and in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries very active in providing French language and culture instruction to Jews throughout the Middle East; a director and a former director of the *Conseil représentatif des institutions juives de France*, known as the CRIF; France's central umbrella Jewish organization; and leaders of other Jewish-community or Israel-advocacy organizations in France such as the *Union des étudiants juifs de France*, France's largest Jewish student union; *Judaïsme en Mouvement*, France's liberal Jewish movement, and liberal-Zionist, left-leaning, and leftist Jewish organizations and movements critical of Israel such as J-Call France, *La paix maintenant*, *Une autre voix juive*, and *Union juive française pour la paix*. ELNET France and J-Call France might be considered to be French equivalents, respectively, of America's politically right-leaning America Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the relatively left-leaning JStreet.⁸ We also conducted interviews with high-level administrators at the *Délégation interministérielle à la lutte contre le racisme, l'antisémitisme et la haine anti-LGBT*, known as DILCRAH, an inter-ministerial institution established in 2012 to combat discrimination which reports to France's prime minister, and the *Ligue internationale contre le racisme et l'antisémitisme*, a longstanding human-rights institution; and with professors and scholars at Sciences Po focused on antisemitism, anti-Americanism, and contemporary Jewish life in France. The interviews took place in Paris in late 2021, and follow-up interviews were conducted with several participants between January and March 2022.

Our goals were to examine the overall experience, perception, and interpretation of antisemitism among Jews in France and anti-Americanism broadly.

⁸ AIPAC (the American Israel Public Affairs Committee) and JStreet are Washington D.C.-based advocacy and lobbying groups which promote their preferred policies on US-Israel relations among the White House and members of Congress. Broadly speaking, AIPAC is hawkish and insists that the US has no business applying pressure to Israel to limit settlement-building in the Occupied Territories or to negotiate with Palestinian leadership toward a resolution of the Israel-Palestinian conflict. JStreet, which describes itself as "pro-Israel, pro-peace," advocates and lobbies for the US to pressure Israel to end the occupation and negotiate a "two-state-solution" with Palestinian leadership—both of which it holds to be congruent with America's best interests.



Although leaders of Jewish-community and human-rights organizations represent a small portion of the community, these institutions do constitute the most important claims-making actors and architects of the political debates pertinent to this community and other minorities in France. Thus, they function as a bridge between the French state and minority communities, in particular France's Jews.

Elite interviewing is a sound methodological approach when seeking to gather generalizable information about what a group of people think or how they interpret an event or series of events—such as, for our purposes, antisemitism and anti-American attitudes in France (Aberbach and Rockman 2002; Goldstein 2002). Directors and other leaders of the organizations mentioned above, and scholars, have spent much time examining the core concern of French Jews. They know a great deal about the characteristics and attitudes of the general Jewish population and thus have an advantage in discussing antisemitism and anti-Americanism over the mass public and Jewish-community members. Speaking with these interviewees thus allowed us to gauge subtle aspects of elite views of the world, as well as to grasp the contours of more generalized opinion. We are aware of methodological concerns with elite interviewing. Broockman and Skovron (2018) demonstrated how relying solely on elite accounts of public opinion risks obtaining skewed or incomplete understandings of societal issues. In their study of almost four thousand surveys between 2012 and 2014 of state legislators in the United States and candidates to state legislatures, they found that politicians from both major parties consistently overestimated their constituents' preference for conservative policies. Distorted views can arise from elites and politicians being in echo chambers among their peers and colleagues, a reliance on anecdotal evidence, or overexposure to the positions of lobbying and interest groups.

While there is much survey evidence since 2000 on the topic of antisemitism, there is no public opinion survey we are aware of which asks about aspects of anti-Americanism as well as antisemitism, and conducting one was beyond our means. Thus, we studied the opinions of leaders of Jewish-community and advocacy organizations, and experts on Jewish life and politics in France and French attitudes toward Americans while aware of the potential risks of elite opinions.

France has the largest Jewish population in Europe. At an estimated 446,000 in 2021, its size trails only Israel and the United States, in both absolute and proportional numbers; Jews make up close to 0.7 percent of the total French population (DellaPergola and Staetsky 2021, p. 21). Slightly more than half reside in the greater Paris region (Fourquet and Manternach 2016). Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, a fear of being insulted, threatened, and assaulted has become a feature of everyday life for many French Jews, particularly those who wear or carry visible signifiers of being Jewish (Fondapol and AJC-Paris 2022; UEJF and IFOP 2023; Fourquet and Manternach 2016; Knobel 2013, 2016). For the past quarter-century, in the wake of increasing attacks against French Jews and Jewish institutions, there has developed a widespread sense of insecurity and anxiety about the future of Jewish life in France. The murders of Ilan Halimi in 2006, Sarah Halimi in 2017, Mireille Knoll in 2018, the killing of seven people at a Jewish school in Toulouse in 2012, and the attack on the Hyper Casher grocery store in 2015 remain collective traumas for France's Jews. They were a few



among the several hundreds of incidents of threats and violence against Jews in France every year.

According to the *Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'homme* (CNCDDH), a program of the French government which compiles reports of incidents of threats and violence reported to the police each year and deemed by the latter to be racist, antisemitic, or xenophobic, after a steady decrease in antisemitic incidents throughout the 1990s, hovering between 80 and 100 a year, there was a dramatic uptick beginning in October 2000, with 75 occurrences in the first two weeks of that month alone (CNCDDH 2001, p. 35; CNCDDH 2018). By the end of 2000, 744 incidents of threats of violence reported to the police were deemed to be antisemitic. The number of violent and threatening antisemitic incidents has generally remained within the 500 to 700 range in the years since then, with particularly bad years witnessing between 800 and 950 such cases (EUAFR 2014, p. 28; EUAFR 2019a, p. 38, 42; CNCDDH 2024). There were more than a thousand such incidents in October and November 2023 alone—immediately after Hamas's 7 October attack on Israel and in the early period of Israel's retaliatory invasion of Gaza. The total number of incidents in 2023 was 1,676, or a fourfold increase over 2022 (CNCDDH 2024: p. 13).

For certain years, threats and violence directed at Jews represented up to 70 to 80 percent of *all* racist incidents, according to the police, and for most other years they accounted for about half of all racist attacks (EUAFR 2014, p. 28; Reynié 2014, p. 7; Druetz and Mayer 2018, p. 8). Surveys conducted between 2015 and 2022 by the *Fondation pour l'Innovation Politique* (known as Fondapol), the American Jewish Committee in Paris (AJC-Paris), and the *Fondation Jean-Jaurès* indicated that almost all French Jews had been harassed at least once in their life for being Jewish (Fondapol and AJC-Paris 2019, 2022; Fourquet and Manternach 2016). A 2022 survey by Fondapol and the AJC-Paris found that 74 percent of respondents had experienced at least one antisemitic act in their lifetime, and 20 percent had been physically attacked—similar to the 2019 version of the survey. In addition, 68 percent of respondents had previously been mocked or insulted for being Jewish—an increase of 5 percent from 2019—and “repeatedly” so for 50 percent of the total figure (Fondapol and AJC-Paris 2022, p. 7, 10). These incidents reflect the tenor of a “new antisemitism” in France, so-called because of a widespread perception that, broadly, incidents of anti-Jewish threats and violence follow flare-ups of violence in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, and are most likely perpetrated by French people of Muslim and Arab background, inspired by anger and hatred toward Israel (to be discussed below).

Evidently, an intense concern for the future of communal and public Jewish life preoccupies French Jews today. Among our interviewees, the issues of top concern in their social networks tended to be riveted upon antisemitism, a sense of physical insecurity as Jews in France, the future of Jews and Jewish life in that country, Israel, and moving to Israel. Interviewees included scholars and political commentators specializing in anti-Americanism and in other manifestations of ethno-heterostereotyping, scholars of contemporary Jewish politics and life in France, and founders and directors of governmental, non-profit, and advocacy organizations focused on human rights in France, Jewish life in France, and Israel–France relations. Survey data compiled over the past decade by the



EUAFR, Fondapol, the AJC-Paris, and the *Institut français d'opinion publique* (IFOP), corroborate what the interviewees told us. Among respondents to the 2022 Fondapol and AJC-Paris survey, 85 percent believe antisemitism to be “widespread” in France, and almost three-quarters think it is increasing (Fondapol and AJC-Paris 2022, p. 12). Ten years earlier, a EUAFR survey of Jews in twelve EU countries found that French Jews expressed *by far* the highest level of fear: 85 percent thought antisemitism in France was a “major problem” (vs two-thirds in the general sample) and almost 90 percent believed it had gotten worse in the previous five years (vs three-quarters in the general sample) (EUAFR 2013).

In terms of fears of specific actions, EUAFR’s 2019a, b survey found that the majority (60 percent) of French Jews worried about being insulted and harassed, and nearly as many (58 percent) feared they were likely to be physically attacked during the next year for being Jewish (EUAFR 2018a). This reflected little change from the EUAFR’s comparable study conducted in 2012 (EUAFR 2013). The 2018 study also found that among the nearly 40 percent of French Jews who, at least sometimes, wore clothing or carried items that could identify them as Jewish, there was a growing wariness about continuing the practice, with some 82 percent of respondents signaling their intention to avoid displaying signs of religious orientation (EUAFR 2018a; EUAFR 2018b, p. 5). That is not surprising given the 2022 findings by Fondapol and the AJC-Paris, which indicate that about 40 percent of French Jews who wear distinctive signs of being Jewish have been threatened with physical aggression, and 70 percent have been insulted “often” (Fondapol and AJC-Paris 2022, p. 7). And an IFOP survey of Jewish students conducted in September 2023 found that almost half (45 percent) of respondents had been insulted for being Jewish in their educational institution, and 7 percent had been attacked physically (IFOP 2023). More than a third (36 percent) said they hide their Jewishness, and about a tenth (9 percent) said they avoid going to campus altogether due to fears of antisemitism.

One clear indication of this sense of anxiety and urgency many feel has been the high number of Jews quitting France for Israel. As one younger interviewee told us, the main question in their peer group upon graduating from high school was, “When are you making *aaliyah*?” Approximately 45,000 French Jews did just that between 2000 and 2016, representing close to 10 percent of the country’s Jewish population, a much higher proportion than elsewhere in Europe (Fourquet and Manternach 2016, p. 182; CNC DH 2018, p. 98). More recently, a 2019 Fondapol and AJC-Paris study found that 21 percent of French Jews were considering emigrating to Israel for reasons primarily related to their being Jewish. What is more, the share of Jews considering emigration was double the percentage of French people broadly who were considering emigrating to anywhere that year (Fondapol and AJC-Paris 2019, p. 33).

Accompanying the acute sense of physical and existential security among French Jews since the start of the current millennium have been scholarly analyses suggesting a connection, causal in nature, between the anti-Americanism discussed in our previous section and antisemitism in France (Macdonald 2008; Foot 2004; Revel 2002). As noted, Andrei Markovits detected a strong linkage between the two, the earliest signs of which he says well predated the appearance of the “new antisemitism” in France (Markovits 2006). Pierre-André Taguieff has similarly adjudged



both antisemitism and anti-Zionism to be encapsulated within a “wide-ranging demonization of America” (Taguieff 2004, p. 5).

Are they correct? We structured some of the questions put to the two dozen interviewees specifically to ascertain whether the experts to whom we spoke perceived a link between the two attitudinal predispositions. What we found supported claims that there is indeed a tight conceptual link to be made between our two French “isms.” Among statements to this effect was one foreign policy expert’s assertion that antisemitism and anti-Zionism were “very real” prejudices in today’s France, and that both were accompanied by aspersions directed against the United States.⁹ In their opinion, a “long tradition of anti-Americanism in France is a product of historical rivalries—of competition between both countries: The French Revolution vs. the American Revolution. Was the American Revolution even possible without the French philosophers? This sentiment is aggravated by the fact that when France was a great nation, America was a small republic, and when the US was a great nation, France is no longer a great nation.” Another political commentator told us “there is a very deep-seated tradition of paranoia and resentment toward the United States which more often than not tends to include the Jews,” suggesting that it might be anti-Americanism that exacerbates antisemitism, rather than the reverse.¹⁰ And so it went with all interviewees to whom this question was posed; all detected connections between anti-Americanism and antisemitism in France. A former director of the CRIF told us that all major terrorist and anti-Jewish attacks in France since 2000 have been statements against both the United States and Israel, if not directly then indirectly.¹¹ A director of ELNET France remarked that the two seemingly oppositional dispensations “are the same, and someone who is anti-American will also be antisemitic and anti-Zionist.”¹² Their comment was echoed in similar terms by a regional director of the *Ligue internationale contre le racisme et l’antisémitisme* and one founder of JCall-France.¹³

The comments of a local leader of the American Jewish Committee’s (AJC) European office linked the stereotypical perceptions of the U.S., Americans and Jewish organizations they encounter—some of them negative—as coming from the same people. They said that they often come across signs that as both an American and Jewish organization, they are “often viewed as a powerful lobby.”¹⁴ They added, “there is also a more or less diffuse anti-American sentiment in the French diplomats’ world. They are often condescending toward the U.S., seeing Americans as having black-and-white views of world affairs. They also view us as automatically strongly connected to Israel, sometimes as if we were representing the Israeli government.”

⁹ Interview, 18 November, 2021.

¹⁰ Interview, October 28, 2021.

¹¹ Interview, November 8, 2021.

¹² Interview, November 15, 2021.

¹³ Interviews, November 9, 2021; November 16, 2021.

¹⁴ Interview, November 2, 2021.



But if there seems to exist a basal consensus regarding the general claim of linkage between the two “isms,” what does this tell us about Markovits’s stronger suggestion that antisemitism is a constitutive feature— that is to say, a necessary condition—of anti-Americanism? To the extent we can identify one clear, general connecting element between our pair of “isms,” it is expressed in the perception that there are objectionable qualities shared by the United States and Jews, and that these qualities are suspected of degrading France’s political culture and its republican values. Let us take a closer look at what are included in this index of offensive qualities, with a view to relating them to what we argued above were those two traits distinct to French anti-Americanism.

As we intimated earlier in this article, one of the two traits has been and remains the specification of Anglo-Saxon values as constituting a threat to both France’s culture and its republican virtues. At first blush, it might seem odd in the extreme to suggest any obvious affinity between Anglo-Saxonism (whatever it is supposed to mean) and antisemitism. After all, during the peak of Anglo-Saxon racist theorizing in the transatlantic world, from the mid-nineteenth century until the 1920s, it would have been unusual to discover enthusiasts of this brand of theorizing who were inclined to include Jews within their own ethno-racial “community” (Horsman 1976, 1981; Painter 2010; Grant 1919). Just the opposite, which is one of the reasons that Horace Kallen, among others, could insist during the 1920s on the basic incompatibility of Anglo-Saxonism with multiculturalism (or as he called it, “cultural pluralism”) (Kallen 1970). Yet, when one unpacks the contemporary understanding of Anglo-Saxonism in France, today’s concept refers not so much to ethno-linguistic attributes as it does to political values associated with *liberalism*; in short, the former becomes code for the latter. And since one of those liberal values is the right to property, liberalism has made its way into discussions of both antisemitism, old and new, and anti-Americanism in France. The connection of note here, to rephrase a point made earlier, is *capitalism*.

The criticism of Jews having sinister connections to capital dates back centuries (Marrus and Paxton 2009, p. 19). France may have been the first European country to accord full civic equality to Jews, but hostility against them formed part of the anticapitalist and anti-bourgeois mindset of the mid-nineteenth century socialists and royalists alike. Their ire was concentrated against those whom they believed to be exploiting credit, namely the merchants and moneylenders including, of course, the eponymous Rothschilds. As noted by one interviewee in France, Anglo-Saxon tropes would provide the means of fusing anti-capitalism, anti-Americanism, and antisemitism into the same heterostereotyping alloy. In their words, “[t]here is a feeling that the Jews are a part of an empire of money, and the empire of money is Anglo-Saxon.”¹⁵ Surveys conducted by the CNCDDH in November and December 2023 showed that 60 percent of the general French population thought that Jews have a particular rapport with money—broadly consistent with results from CNCDDH’s previous regular surveys on racism, xenophobia and antisemitism (CNCDDH 2024, p. 239).

¹⁵ Interview, October 28, 2021.



The implicit deal the French state offered to Jews in 1791 was that in exchange for citizenship, Jews' religious and cultural particularities were to play no part in their participation in civic matters. Over the ensuing century, France became a major haven for Jews leaving Eastern Europe and Russia. Accompanying this migratory influx, however, was a growing antisemitic movement portraying Jews as a threat to the republic, culminating in the Dreyfus affair at the end of the nineteenth century (Brown 2011; Kedward 1965; Begley 2009). The case crystallized anti-Jewish rage among a following from the republican left to the anti-republican clerical right, and in 1898, demonstrations, speeches, and newspaper pieces even in provincial cities with small Jewish populations denounced Jews as bent on the destruction of France (Begley 2009).

The public appetite for antisemitism and xenophobia abated by the start of the new century, only to resurge during the 1930s, when France received more Jewish refugees in proportion to its population than any other country. In the context of France's economic contraction, near-constant parliamentary deadlock, erosion of its military supremacy in Europe, and a weakened overall sense of its culture, it was not difficult for many French to blame foreigners, especially Jewish foreigners, for all that was going wrong (Marrus and Paxton 2009, p. 24).

Then came the Second World War with its short-term disastrous consequences for France, during the four years separating its defeat by and subsequent liberation from Nazi Germany. But if the wartime experience would have the consequence of ratifying in the minds of many antisemites the imagined connection between the Anglo-Saxons and the Jews, it also brought into high relief bias of France-inflected traits of anti-Americanism. To recall, there is a *structural* bias of France's anti-Americanism that sets it apart from other Western European critiques of America—a bias holding that America's power menaces France's interests. The corollary is that “balancing” this power will effect a return to a “multipolarity” that is, paradoxically, assumed to be beneficial for France—notwithstanding the empirical record of previous “multipolar” eras having been so terrible for French interests (Haglund 2003).

Here, the linkage between anti-Americanism and antisemitism turns on twinned condemnations of American “imperialism” and of Israel. This is significant for our argument, because while we accept that there is a correspondence between these two “antis” that seem so often to move in tandem, our basic thrust is to query the contention that today's antisemitism forms one of the necessary conditions of anti-Americanism. We think it is more the reverse, and while we are sensitive to the challenge of converting correlation into causation, our inclination is to imagine that anti-Americanism has some “causal” bearing upon today's antisemitism.

This is why Charles de Gaulle looms as such a seminal figure in our analysis. Starting in the 1960s, simmering convictions of France's geopolitical “decline” being caused by America's increased power were aggravated by the view that Israeli aggression in the Middle East was itself another manifestation of American power. De Gaulle's *politique arabe* was seen as one means of minimizing the American threat to France. Throughout the period spanning the lead-up to the 1967 Six-Day War and the War itself, the 1973 Yom-Kippur War, and the beginning and growth of settlement-building in territory acquired by Israel during those wars, Israel came to



be regarded increasingly in France as an American satellite, which aided and abetted the same American power that troubled so many in French elite circles.

Thus, whereas earlier in the twentieth century French Jews could be arraigned as running dogs of Anglo-Saxons (and by extension of liberal anti-republican values), starting in the late 1960s they could be criticized for aiding and advancing American imperialism in their support for Israel. Criticizing Jews for supporting Israel was all the more attractive due to French Jewry having become significantly more public and vociferous in their support for Israel since the late 1950s (Ghiles-Meilhac 2014). This development, conspicuous given the French societal context, was due firstly to the recent large influx of Jews from Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco who, broadly speaking, were uninhibited, vocal, and enthusiastic in their support for Israel, unlike France's Ashkenazic Jews; and secondly to the surge of support for Israel in advance of the Six-Day War among French Jews more widely (Ghiles-Meilhac 2009).

De Gaulle transformed French policy toward Israel in the early 1960s. While he always opposed and sought to counterbalance the accretion of American power, following the establishment of the State of Israel and into the late 1950s, French leaders of the Fourth Republic, along with French public opinion, had supported good relations with the new state (Béziat 1997; Béziat 2003; Newhouse 1970; Rossi 1993; Viorst 1965; Shipley White 196; Reynié 2021; Jauvert 2000). Within a few years of the State of Israel's establishment, France had even become Israel's primary diplomatic ally, a leading source of its arms, and an important partner in its nuclear-energy program (Hecht 1998). In fact, prior to de Gaulle's U-turn on Israel, it was common for Israel to be conceptualized in France as fashionably anti-American in its own right, such that Israel and France could be regarded, in the words of one of our interviewees, "as partners against the US bully."¹⁶ During its first decade, Israel could even be styled as a Middle Eastern replica of France, namely a secular, social-democratic paradise that stood as the negation of the earlier association of Jews with money, trade, and banking. The same interviewee characterized the prevailing French mood prior to de Gaulle's turn as an admiring one. Israel represented a "a totally unexpected incarnation of French values. Israel was seen not as a Jewish country (associated with those negative attributes), if you can believe, but as a Hebrew country. On top of this, Jews were creating their own country, and they were admired for it."¹⁷

The French perception of Israel shifted during the closing years of the 1960s, with troubling implications for France's Jews (Wolf 2004; Goldstein and Shumacher 2010). In a speech in November 1967, de Gaulle accused Jews of acquiring land in Palestine through dubious means and of being an elite, aggressive, and domineering people (Wolf 2004). The speech was shocking to French Jews because de Gaulle's hostility to Israel, begun a few years previously, never included overtly targeting the *French* Jewish community (Isaacson 2017). It is reasonable to expect that part of de Gaulle's suspicion was that they identified too much with another state that was widely perceived as a symbol of American

¹⁶ Interview, October 28, 2021.

¹⁷ Interview, February 24, 2022.



power, and not enough with France. Thus, American power, Israeli foreign policy, and France's Jews were lumped together to suggest tight correspondence between anti-Americanism and antisemitism— notwithstanding that the shaper of French foreign policy, de Gaulle, was generally not regarded as antisemitic (Jackson 2019). De Gaulle's insistence that "structural" reform of the international system was necessary for France's reclamation of its rightful place in the balance-of-power (its *rang*) informed his government's *politique arabe*, an approach that would continue into the 1990s and beyond (Müller 2013).

The sentiment of American-backed Israeli imperialism and aggression still mostly resided at the elite level, though the French public would soon catch up. That public had largely continued to support Israel as a young country in need of backing from its friends, including in advance of the 1967 Six Day War (Goldstein and Shumacher 2010). However, the widespread student and workers' protests of 1968 —against de Gaulle!—contributed to a new tendency to regard Israel as a proxy of US global power, and thus part of the problem of imperialism that protesters were denouncing. It became increasingly popular to view Israel, Zionism, and Jews as colonialists and imperialists, and therefore minions of American imperialism (Taguieff 2004, p. 4).

As noted earlier, over the past twenty years, scholars of antisemitism have referred to the post-2000 increase in threats and violence against Jews in France as a "new antisemitism" (Peace 2009; Taguieff 2002; Wieviorka 2005; Ghiles-Meilhac 2015, p. 221; Mayer 2004, 2005; D ruez and Mayer 2018; Caldwell 2009; Drai 2002; Attal 2004; Giniewski 2005; Finkielkraut 2003). Broadly, two distinguishing and related features relevant to our examination of the links between antisemitism and anti-Americanism in France distinguish this "new" antisemitism from the older antisemitism.

First, whereas antisemitism in France during the decades leading up to as well as during the Second World War was perpetrated by, or at the very least associated with, ideological factions—political conservatives, the far right, the far left, and the French state itself under Pétain—a scholarly and popular consensus has emerged that anti-Jewish prejudices, threats, and violence since the start of the new millennium have been associated disproportionately with the rising share of the French population of Muslim or Arab background (Fourquet and Manternach 2016). Since the post-2000 surge in antisemitism, Jews in France are more likely to regard people of Muslim or Arab immigrant background as the principal vectors of antisemitism, rather than activists of the far right or far left (Fourquet and Manternach 2016; D ruez and Mayer 2018, 40; Fondapol and AJC-Paris 2022; Reynié 2014). Many interviewees confirmed this perception, stating explicitly that French residents of Arab or North African background have been predominantly behind today's threats and violence to Jews or Jewish institutions, and have been since the beginning of the Second *Intifada* uprising in Israel, dating from September 2000. The sentiment is shared at the elite level. Presidents of the CRIF, France's primary Jewish institution, regularly single out political Islam and Islamists as the leading dangers to France's Jews and to the French republic itself in their speeches at the institution's annual dinners, in front of many of France's most important government leaders at the national level who attend the famous yearly event (Kalifat 2019, 2021; Arfi 2023).



Public opinion surveys lend support to the claim that French people of Muslim background harbor views of Jewish “control” over finance, media, and government at higher rates than the average population in France (Fondapol and AJC-Paris 2022; Teinturier and Mercier 2016; Reynié 2014). The annual CNCDDH reports identify the ethnic origins of those committing antisemitic acts; tellingly, for a couple years in the early 2000s, the reports specified police services’ estimation that between 27 and 41 percent of antisemitic attacks in those years originated from the “*arabo-musulmane*” community (CNCDDH 2004, p. 10; CNCDDH 2006, p. 12).

The second marker of the new antisemitism is, of course, an issue that is key to the question motivating our inquiry in these pages. That issue is the connection between the post-2000 consistently high levels of violence against Jews in France to which the “new” refers, and flare-ups of violence and wars in Israel and Gaza. The initial spike in anti-Jewish threats and violence followed immediately, as noted above, upon the heels of the outbreak of the Second *Intifada*, in September 2000. Later surges in threats and violence followed in the wakes of the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, the “Battle of Jenin” in April 2002, the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, and Israel’s military operations in Gaza, first in September–October 2004, and again in July–August 2014 (Druez and Mayer 2018). To this we add the aforementioned incidents in the aftermath of the Hamas attack on Israel of October 2023 (CRIF 2023). It is inconceivable that proponents of the new antisemitism have failed to discern a connection between French Jews and America’s backstopping of Israeli security. In other words, events occurring *outside* of France have become further goads to an anger directed at both French Jews and the US, for its support of Israel. Many in France who have followed the evolution of the new antisemitism understand this connection to be real, and consequential.

From our perspective, the facts that violence against Jews in France increased after the September 2001 attacks, and again after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, coupled with popular perceptions of that invasion as having been prompted mainly if not exclusively by the goal of bolstering Israel’s security, are additional indications that post-2000 antisemitism in France has been conflated with anger toward the United States, stemming mainly from its growing military involvement in the Middle East in the post-9/11 years (Waxman 2009, p. 10; Benbassa 2003; Jarreau 2003; Vernet 2003; Hertoghe 2003; Mayer 2004, 2005). This perception was widespread in France, specifically in mainstream political discourse, as well as in anti-war protests, although there were also many French critics of the invasion who appeared to believe, bizarrely, that it was primarily motivated by a lust for oil.

Conclusions

We have made two major claims in this article. The first is a restatement of what others have observed over the decades, namely that there looks to be an interesting linkage between anti-American and antisemitism, the two variants of heterostereotyping covered in these pages. The odd exception such as Kadmi-Cohen apart, there clearly has been a correlation, in France, between the two oppositional dispositions, such that they can be said to move in tandem with each other. But of course, correlation



is not causation, and this, in turn, inspired our second major claim, which is that contrary to some analysts, we have not detected any sign of antisemitism's being a "constitutive" feature (i.e., a "necessary condition") of anti-Americanism in France. We find it hard to believe that had there never been any Jews in France, there would never have been any anti-Americanism in the country.

Indeed, if there *are* any causal arrows (and there may be none), they rather point in the opposite direction, such that it is far easier to demonstrate that anti-Americanism fosters antisemitism than it is to show the reverse. It has even been maintained by some that the "tandem" thesis itself is so spurious that anyone trying to establish a meaningful correlation between the two dispositions, no matter the direction of the putative causal "vectors," is simply wasting time and energy. For instance, an argument has been advanced that the new antisemitism in France has nothing to do with American power and cultural imperialism, but instead has its roots in the differential manner in which France treated Jewish and Muslim populations in its North African colonies, nowhere more so than in Algeria, as well as in France itself. According to Maud Mandel (2014) and Ethan Katz (2015), contention between France's Jewish and Muslim communities has to be traced to inequalities in the social and political inclusion experienced by Jews and Muslims in Algeria— inequalities that became reproduced following mass immigration to France post-independence and resulted in the differentiated distribution of resources allocated by France to Jewish and Muslim immigrants from the Maghreb *once in France*; the former continued to be treated favorably, the latter not so much. In addition, Jewish immigrants from North Africa had the benefit of an existing network of Jewish institutions France— decimated since the war but in the process of being rebuilt (Wolf 2004). This disparity in the welcome Jews and Muslims found in France in the 1960s, it is maintained, has had a tremendous impact upon the fortunes of community-building efforts undertaken by both groups, with the institutional difficulties of Muslims fueling a sense of relative deprivation that has greatly contributed to the new antisemitism (Mandel 2014; Katz 2015; Weitzmann 2021).

Our own approach, while not denying the abovementioned disparities, has had us injecting far more of an American presence, hence our dubiety regarding claims about antisemitism having been, in no small way, a contributing factor in French anti-Americanism over the years. We have argued that it is rather the reverse, with anti-Americanism giving comfort to a prejudicial mindset that lends itself to heterostereotyping on the part of communities whose initial predispositions had been whetted by ontological struggles against a menacing "Other," which is how America has so often been styled in French debates over the past century or more.

But if the two "isms" we have covered in these pages can be said to move along parallel tracks, they are not identical, either in their inspiration or, much more significantly, their *consequences*. It is a fact, not a mere hypothesis, that antisemitism is significantly more present in France today than is anti-Americanism; it is perpetrated and experienced in real ways that anti-Americanism is not. The latter may be a broad, and somewhat ephemeral worldview that feeds the prejudices; the former, on the other hand, has immediate and sometimes deadly consequences. It is antisemitism, not anti-Americanism, that has been propelling Jews to leave France in recent years. Anti-Americanism may be, as we have argued, one more reason for those who



hate Jews to act upon their prejudices. But this is a far different matter than to claim that antisemitism is a constitutive feature of anti-Americanism, whether in France or elsewhere in Europe.

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