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BY T. E. JESSOP
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"The Chancellor Dunning Trust lecturer for 1948 was Professor T. E. Jessop, head of the department of Philosophy and Psychology in University College, Hull, England. The three public lectures which he delivered are printed in this book. They represent only a part of the contribution which Dr. Jessop made, for his visit was by no means leisurely. He stimulated profoundly to thinking and he was the focus of discussion when he was at Queen's and for weeks thereafter. The timely theme with which he dealt in his lectures was clothed in philosophical thought so arresting, and expressed in a quality of language so satisfying, that all who heard him, and many who had not that privilege, will be grateful for the opportunity of the printed page. What Dr. Jessop had to say will repay the most searching analysis. This is a tract for our times."—R. C. WALLACE, *Principal, Queen's University, in the Foreword.*

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Being the first Lectures on the Chancellor Dunning Trust, delivered at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, January, 1948

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FOREWORD

It was a very gracious tribute to the Chancellor of Queen's University, Honourable Charles A. Dunning, when a donor who desired to remain anonymous made available a generous sum of money "to promote understanding and appreciation of the supreme importance of the dignity, freedom and responsibility of the individual person in human society." The Trustees of the University decided that for the first three years there be invited to Queen's University each year a scholar of repute who would interpret to men and women of the University the responsibility of the individual in the modern world. It was felt that the end would be achieved through a series of public lectures, and through formal and informal discussions with groups of students and of staff during a leisurely visit of three or four weeks to the University.

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R. C. WALLACE.

The Principal's Office
Queen's University.

PREFACE

The privilege of being invited to open the series of Chancellor Dunning Trust Lectures has brought me a twofold pleasure. The first is that of being allowed to give a public expression of my faith in the dignity of the ordinary man and in the possibilities of his freedom. The subject is congenial to me both as a practical moralist and as a teacher of philosophy. In the first capacity I am angered by the contemptuous view of human nature underlying contemporary political propaganda, and am distressed by the way in which human misfortune is being made the reason for political measures which are bound to increase it. I am jealous that whatever we do in our troubles we should preserve and expand our humanity. In the second capacity I am concerned with the fascinating problem of defining wherein our human nature consists. Man can study nothing more interesting than himself, and if I have managed to throw even a candlelight on the deeper recesses of his nature I shall be content. From these two points of view I have surveyed the present social and personal confusion, regarding only its basic causes and the basic way of removing them. I have not the omniscience to lay down the thousand and one technical steps by which the moral solution is to be worked out in practice. That is inexorably a co-operative task.

The second pleasure is that of being admitted to the fellowship of Queen's University, in which I received

more than the little I was able to give. To the staff who took me as one of themselves, to the students who let me share their board and their dens, and to the Principal, who smoothed my way at every point, I am more grateful than I can express with restraint. Even the cold grey walls of the campus, and the cold white snow between them, and the bare maples rising out of it, and the glimpse beyond of the great icy lake, now kindle a warmth in the unphysical part of men. It would be negligent not to thank also the citizens of Kingston who proudly mindful of what it means to have a university in their midst, showed a generous interest in the lectures.

To the Chancellor of Queen's, in whose honour the Trust was founded, I respectfully offer these lectures, glad that it is in some such way, and not by facile eulogies, that the work of a distinguished public servant of Canada is to be kept in memory.

T. E. J.

Kingston,
January, 1948.

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With the Compliments

of

The Chancellor and the Trustees

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Queen's University

I

THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM

I SHALL BEGIN the great theme of freedom with a sweeping glance over history in order to do two apparently opposite things—first as a discipline, to keep our thoughts tethered to the field of human fact, and secondly as a liberation, to give our thought the ample space of tens of centuries to move in. For history has both these functions, and when it is not exercising them it is—specialist considerations apart—being either badly taught or badly learned. If ideals are to be possibilities, beckonings to future fact, it is idle to form a settled theory of what sort of life our generation should strive for without considering such intimations and admonitions as past fact can give: and such considering would only be misleading if we narrowed our attention to a little area only of the past, forgetting how wide, how sheerly spacious, the field of human fact has been. We need to be reminded of these two points because, with more of the past behind us and far more knowledge of it available to us, we seem nevertheless to be becoming less historically minded than our recent forebears were. Indeed, we are trying to run away from history, to shake ourselves loose from the events that have largely made both of us and the circumstances we are set in. The attempt is, of course, bound to fail. Even if, as we often wish, we could wipe the slate perfectly clean and start afresh, we should be

expunging what has been written for our profit along with what we read with pain. Further, we should not be able to write anything new or better on the slate, for we should have to learn everything over again from the beginning. We should begin unburdened, but unequipped, since we cannot by any stroke of wish or will make what is disagreeable in our inheritance vanish as though it had never been, destroying its power to go on producing effects, and leave the excellent rest solid and substantial, magically persisting in isolation from the agonies and tragedies that helped to produce it.

As a generation we are running away from history because the majority of us—and in these days it is the majorities that count—have made little effort to understand it. We tend to read it as annals, as just one thing happening after another. Then it is boring. Or we take it in little bits and pieces, and then find that it looks like a clutter of petty futilities, with only here and there a ground for pride and a pointer to finer possibilities; we see little incipient glories smothered under a mass of commonness and evil. All we manage to collect is a depressing state of the utter insignificance of man's doings. This depressing sense, the fruit of a lame education, has been aggravated by the experience within the span of a single lifetime of two cataclysmic wars and of the seething violence that has followed each of them. We might have pulled ourselves up sharply by asking ourselves how it was that in both wars the side that won was not the side that was promoting evil but the one that was resisting it, so that with all our troubles we are in a far better state than if history had taken the other turn. Although, however, we have not reflected, or reflected enough, on the possible significance of the repeated victory of democracy, we have

learned one lesson, namely, that history is not simply something to be read about but is also something we are caught up in, not a distant set of extinct events but an active reality that thrusts itself grossly into our present experience. We now know that while we may please ourselves whether or no we become spectators of history, we are now perforce agents and patients in it, feeling and living it unmistakably. We don't like this experience; it is giving us a distaste for the whole past; so that the one lesson we have learned has been learned badly.

In all this we are doing despite both to our forefathers and to ourselves. We are defiling the past, and are undervaluing the energies it has given us for the shaping of the future. When we cease to conceive history in the terms of this sorry moment, or to read it as a monotonous sequence, or to take it in artificial fragments, and instead reconstruct it intelligently and see it imaginatively as the slow emergence of new forms and values of living, we shall find it not a burden on the whole mind but a delight to the heart, a light to the brain, and a prodigious prod to the will—an instrument of both personal and social advance—for we shall then recognize that the human race has gone very far, we shall learn the reason, and with this knowledge we shall be able to make it go farther.

Standing back, then, and looking at history as a whole, what pattern, direction, meaning, purpose, worthwhileness—call it what you will—reveals itself to redeem the long affair? What large tendencies are discernible in it? Its having produced creatures that have the good sense to require it to justify itself, and the mental ability to formulate the conditions of justification, is the most remarkable tendency of all, but I had better lead up to this instead of starting from it, since it sets the deepest problem of philosophy. We may make the question about

tendencies a little less vague by asking which of the admirable qualities in modern man that distinguish him from the cave-man—for we are shackling thought if we do not go back so far—have been built up through a long process of development. This way of putting the question is intended to preclude our reading into the past too much of the present. Technology, for example, the scientific mastery of the forces of Nature, is one of the things that starkly distinguish the contemporary from the primitive man; but it also distinguishes him, and almost as starkly, from medieval man, indeed from man up to near the end of the eighteenth century. It had to await the emergence and assimilation of scientific physics and chemistry. It came suddenly, and it came very recently. Since Watts and Stephenson the clock of industry has ticked only a few seconds. We cannot say, then, that the mastery of Nature is one of those large ends which history suggests we were made for, since it has not been operative over large stretches of time. It might be objected that there are ancient anticipations of it, for example among the Egyptians and Babylonians and Romans, who might be called the engineers of antiquity; but their performances, by the measure of the whole career of our race, were spasmodic, and by the measure of contemporary standards, feeble. Besides, they are evidence not so much of man's power over Nature as of some men's power over other men, since they were made possible much less by insight into natural forces than by unlimited supplies of slave-labour ruthlessly exploited. When a pyramid was built to house a dead Pharaoh, many a poor wretch perished before the Pharaoh in the building of it. The pyramids, the towers and irrigation-channels of old Mesopotamia, and the roads and walls and aqueducts of the Romans, were

monuments partly of skill but chiefly of monstrous oppression.

If we are to flatter ourselves that it is in this age of technology that man has found himself, has come at last to the fruition of his destined genius, we shall have to find the reason of our boast elsewhere than in history. When we look back over all the centuries, what they show to be a natural, a suitable, a distinctively human part of the life of man is not the devising of machinery but something less external, less utilitarian, more intimate —such things as holding together in families beyond biological or economic requirements, inventing new forms of grouping (of which the political is one), following moral and religious ends, creating beauty of many kinds, and seeking knowledge for its own sake. The educative plan of history could be sketched out interestingly in terms of these. It is not these, however, that I am at the moment directly concerned to bring out, but something deeper than them all, because conditioning and expressing itself in all. In a brief survey we must leave the several departments of our humanity and aim at their common root. When the long tale of our race's life is viewed most broadly, the feature that most stands out is the emergence of the ideal and fact of freedom. This is the most remarkable because when we come to the study of man from below, from the science of the animal antecedents of history, we find no ground for it: below man there seems to be nothing but the inexorable operation of natural cause and natural effect.

If authority be demanded for the claim that what puts the human stamp on our past is the appearance of freedom, I could refer to Lord Acton, whose ambition it was to write the history of freedom (conceived as "the deliverance of man from the power of man"), and who

failed to do so because he saw that it meant writing virtually the whole of history, which he was too great a scholar to attempt. As we shall see in the second lecture, there are other reasons than Acton's for holding liberty to be an essential feature of the life of humans, but it is suggestive to have the support of one of our most distinguished historians. I shall say, then, that the chief function of history, as inferred from what in fact the past has been doing, is to teach men to be free.

Another generalization may be ventured because it is closely, indeed inseparably, bound up with the first. It is that the function of history is to produce that which is individual or unique. The emergence of individuality is as large a fact as the emergence of freedom. To appreciate its remarkableness, we have to go behind history in the narrow sense in which this is distinguished from pre-history, for by the time when peoples began to record their memories and document their doings a fair degree of individuality had already set in. Fortunately for the science of man there are extant peoples that are still at the prehistoric stage. They enable us to see roughly what all peoples once were—close tribal groups bound by unquestioned and unquestionable custom, each member living wholly for the group as well as wholly in it, and doing so not because he lacked the courage to think and act for himself—cowardice can survive only in civilization—but because, in the absence of precedent or any other stimulus, it never occurred to him to do so. In this half-human, half-herdlike life, there was that bare individuality that made the members distinguishable from one another, but little more of it than is to be found in a flock of sheep. What has happened most plainly in the course of time, and most plainly of all in the West in the last three thousand years, is not simply that men

have passed from barbarism to civilization—for, under strict enough control, slaves can do that—but that they have risen out of mere massness into individuality, from sameness to difference, from being passive spouts of the tribal consciousness to becoming independent and unique centres of thought and action. This last way of expressing the matter shows that the process of individualization has gone step by step with freedom. Our view of the past will go awry at many points if we do not always bear in mind that in fact the mass comes first and the individual last. Society was not contrived by and out of men who had any individuality prior to it, but generated individuals in its own slow development. Distinctive persons did not produce the group, but were differentiated out of it. Individuality was not a birth-gift but an achievement, and any society that hinders that achievement is thwarting one of the outstanding trends of our whole past. Taking this trend as our clue we can, then, give a second formulation of the meaning of history: we shall find this meaning not, as Carlyle and Nietzsche would have it, in the upheaval of a few big men to dominate the rest, but in the steady production of deeply distinguishable and effectual individuals throughout society.

A glance at the outstanding stages of the twin development of freedom and individuality will show us where our individuality lies. These two qualities first meet us in a developed form in fifth-century Greece. Perhaps they needed the small city-state for their encouragement. There, what the Greeks themselves fitly called the "liberal" life unfolded itself in a precocious splendour. It is an enormous step that takes us from anonymous pyramids and colossi to the individualized and signed creations of Hellas in the fine arts, philosophy and science, and from despotism to the earliest democracy.

The distance of the step may be illustrated in one interesting particular, namely, the invention of comedy. This could not have arisen in the older civilizations of Egypt and Mesopotamia. Aristophanes would not have been punished there, for he could not even have emerged there. To make public and elaborate fun of authority and manners is impossible without a considerable degree of freedom on the side both of the comedian and of his audiences, and without rich individuality within the society that is being ridiculed. That this amply differenced liberty of mind and action was restricted even in the democratic days of Athens to probably less than half the inhabitants, being the fruit of a leisure made possible by the forced labour of others—that is, resting on a wide substratum of slavery—is not surprising at so early a date. This restriction of liberty had something to do with its eventual eclipse, for the culturally fertile eccentricity of the Greeks would not have collapsed politically at the touch of Macedon, and again under the heavy steps of Rome, if it had had some practical elements in it. Before Rome in its turn fell, it bequeathed with its senile hands the carefully worked out conception of liberty through law, a Stoic suggestion that was given body by the Roman sense of discipline, which resulted in more emphasis being laid on law than on liberty—one of the reasons why Roman Law never took root in England.

In the meantime, a new fount of aspiration and principle had bubbled up in Palestine, and spilled over into the broad spaces of the Roman Empire, becoming the life of Europe when the fount of Rome dried up. With its idea of a new divine dispensation of the world, offering the prospect of a radical spiritual freedom through redemption, it became an immeasurably powerful, individualizing force, because its Gospel ran that God

is concerned not with Humanity but with men, not with nations but with their members severally, and with every one of them, irrespective of whether they be high or low. Incidentally, it brought into Europe a new type of eccentric, namely the saint, and reproduced it outside monasteries as well as in them. It is true that those liberating ideas worked very slowly, but we have to remember that after the fall of Rome the people to be coped with were raw barbarians, so that the Church had to spend more of its efforts in taming and ruling and civilizing them than in evangelizing. It was circumstance rather than principle that compelled it to put, like the Roman Empire whose authority it inherited, law before liberty. As the taming work advanced, the ideas of freedom and individuality came more to the fore: the Church as a body opposed the tyranny of princes, some of her theologians formulated the beginnings of Christian democratic doctrine, and warm images of how those ideas should and could be embodied in the social order shaped themselves in the minds of such pioneers as John Wycliffe and John Huss, who campaigned for both liberty of religious thought and emancipation from secular masters. Then the Renaissance opened up again the long-closed wells of Greece, and their waters irrigating prepared soil, gave to the culture of the western world the qualities that first made it modern. Greece meant, of course, not a country but a language, and this, re-learned with labour and then read and savoured with deserved delight, gave living access not only to the versatile mentality of the classical age but also to the New Testament in its pristine form and to the finely spiritual commentaries on it of the Greek Fathers, who had long been obscured by the Fathers of the Latin Church. Thus the Renaissance and the Reformation that followed on

its heels had a partly common origin and, having some affinities amid their diversity, a common or concurring influence. In the later days of the Reformation, at any rate in the non-Lutheran areas of it, a vigorous democratic note came to be sounded: the free citizenship of heaven, it was said, required free citizenship on earth, no child of God being subject by right to the dominion of another. It was this Christian outlook, not the classical one, that brought the democratic Puritans and Quakers to America, that nerved the middle classes of England to break the power of the aristocracy, and that inspired the revolts of the English workers against the political and economic power of the middle classes. The fact that in English social history the surge from below has been motivated religiously still distinguishes our democracy, despite the decline of that motivation, from the later democracies of the continent of Europe which, beginning with that of France, have been secular in both origin and direction.

From the Reformation onwards until today, or rather until yesterday, the idea of freedom has been a powerful factor in our civilization, in some places—notably Switzerland, Britain and Holland—as a steadily directed pressure, in others—notably France—as an explosive force. Since it was the British who carried it to the ends of the earth, it was right that the first effective fight for freedom from external rule since the seventeenth century should come from America, and natural that it should find strong—though not strong enough—support in the Parliament at Westminster. There must be something essentially right in the Britain that gave so many of her sons the sense to run away from her and, when they had settled, to insist on being allowed to order their own affairs. Colonization was a characteristic expression of British freedom, and so also was the eventual attainment

by the colonists, through their own struggles, of independence, self-rule, self-reliance—these, and not an airy irresponsibility, being the content we have always given to the notion of freedom.

The advancing river of freedom and individualization reached its flood-level in the nineteenth century, and kept there until about 1918. Nations that had long been familiar with the great idea but had not desired the reality of it enough, began at last to shake off the yoke of alien domination, or to loose themselves from the bonds of their own autocrats. There was a large-scale redistribution of authority, a busy scrapping of out-of-date political machinery, and the multiplication and enjoyment of new rights. A tonic spirit charged the air. Peoples that were still unfree began to shake off the past as a burden that had kept them prostrate, to stretch their limbs, shake their plumes, and rehearse in gesture the thing that free men do. After the gestures and rhetoric, the reality of freedom came to some peoples in sudden doses, causing an intoxication in which the demand for liberty was distorted into a lust for revenge and power, into the evil delight of inverted oppression, proving the weakness of the original inspiration that made all oppression whatever immoral. Nevertheless, on the whole the ferment was healthy. The world, for all its age, was no longer feeling old; it had, apparently, been only sleeping through a long childhood, had thereby preserved its energies, and was now awakening into its first real youth. Progress, made possible by the new liberties, became the leading idea of all thought and action, and rapid changes everywhere in the external conditions of life were made and enjoyed with a sense of fulfilment. That little slice of history, that spacious moment of release—from about 1850 to about 1918—seen not in its political aspect only

but also in its opening up of all the earth, its running of dangerous areas into places of safe movement, its economic enterprise, its social advances, its scientific discoveries, its balanced scholarship, and its fine literature of hope—all that made up as wonderful a chapter as any century in man's whole past has to show.

The quickened spirit survived the First World War. When the horrors were over, a larger freedom set in for some nations, and for the unprivileged classes in most of the nations of the West. Even Bolshevism and Fascism had at first their liberating aspect. It was not until about 1930, when the economic blizzard struck us all, that the steeply mounting curve in the graph of history suddenly turned downwards and dropped more steeply than it had risen. The decade of 1930-1940 saw not the mere exhaustion but the deliberate reversal of the dominant trend of the centuries, the tremendous recoil from humanism of a resurrected primitive forcefulness with its bestial opressions and sub-human solidarities of drilled and shouting masses. The delicate structures of civilized freedom were wantonly torn down. So far as history has anything divine in it, this was the greatest blasphemy of all time; and so far as history is what it is because of the human in it, in the sense of what is above the animal, that recoil was the crassest assault on humanity there has ever been, for it was calculated, and took the tools of civilization for its weapons, whereas the barbarians who extinguished the classical world knew not what they were doing, and had only their simple barbaric weapons to fight with.

The second Armageddon is over. In military terms it has been a complete success for the armies of freedom. In moral terms, however, it has been a failure. This is because the moral battle had begun, certainly in Europe,

and had been already lost, before the clash of material arms loosed its opening roar. The most sickening aspect of the years before the Second World War is not that nations that had never been enthusiastic about freedom willingly put themselves into a deeper bondage, but that having looked on freedom elsewhere they judged it to be despicable; and one of their reasons for this judgment was that the nations that had drunk deeply of freedom, and had bought their draughts of it at great cost, had begun to find it tasteless or brackish. The moral collapse has only gone further since the end of the war. Where freedom remains, the fun has gone out of it, because faith in its values and possibilities has fallen into a swoon. We are now free less by burning conviction than by habit. That is the sum and summary of the state of at least large parts of Europe in these depressing days.

The considered repudiation of freedom and the ferocious attacks upon its institutions were formidable because they came from four of the Great Powers, one of which still maintains them. Russia, more eastern than western in mental affiliation, had not long been rid of serfdom, had always been an autocracy, and was a vast area of illiteracy, and shows its continuing political backwardness by its organized reliance on vulgar propaganda, secret police, foreign espionage, bluster and force. Japan was oriental with a recent veneer, microtomic in thinness, of western civilization. The other two Powers, Italy and Germany, had been in the vanguard of the culture of the West, but as political units they were both new and unready for democracy. There is another, and perhaps more interesting, distinction among these four Powers. Italy and Japan were moved far less by theory than by crass ambitions. Russia and Germany, on the

other hand, supported their denunciation of liberal society with the propagation of an elaborate apparatus of doctrine. Even between these two, however, there was a difference. The theory of Nazism was woolly in the extreme, shaped by shoddy thinkers to look like a philosophy. It was a bogus metaphysic. Nevertheless, it had behind it, however ill consorted and ill digested, a serious philosophical tradition—for example, Fichte's doctrine of the right of a vigorous nation to expansion by conquest, Hegel's theory of the national State as rigorously organic and as the highest form of human grouping, Treitschke's view of the State as essentially power, and Nietzsche's ideal of the superman. On a lower intellectual plane there was also a vaguely influential race-theory, which the Nazis developed into the silliest and solemnest solecism of modern times. It was this background of honoured ideas, deeply set in the national system of education, that made it psychologically easy for the German people to escape from their difficulties by jumping from their new democracy (which had been imposed on them, not freely chosen) into its opposite. Nazism had an historical lineage, and it was the history in it, calling to the deeps of a mentality which that history had formed, that made Nazism not primarily a theory but a popular movement. There are scarcely any signs as yet that Germany's second defeat has changed that mental substratum.

Communism is very different. It began as a theory—worked out in the reading-room of the British Museum—and is still propagated as a theory. It had no national origin. Born in the mind of a German-Jew in exile, it was based most directly on a study of industrial conditions in England, then the only highly industrialized country in the world, and received its first application in a country

where few of the conditions which Marx had chiefly in mind were to be found. It took hold in Russia because there it had no tradition of freedom to contend with, and because there was not among the people any of the political knowledge and experience that make free government thinkable. Communism there is not the dictatorship of the proletariat; it is dictatorship over the proletariat by the Communist Party, which comprises only about four per cent of the population, and dictatorship over the Party by a handful of leaders. Anything else would scarcely be possible with so simple a people when suddenly deprived of its traditional rulers. The régime, consistently with the theory behind it, has benevolence in it, but, equally consistently, the benevolence is hard; it is paternalistic, but in the old sense, expressing the *patria potestas* of the sternest days of Rome. The theory behind it is not political theory only, or economic theory only, but a comprehensive philosophy, with materialism as its metaphysical basis, with inevitable movement to the classless society as its law of history, with no ethic in our sense of the term since anything is held to be right that furthers the operation of this law, and with all interest and value placed in the group and none in the individual, personality as we understand it having to give way entirely to strict obedience to the leaders. As a practical programme it is totalitarian in scope, unscrupulous and ruthless in method, committed to violence and to the universal fomenting of the class-war. When we criticize it for any of these immoralities, we are applying an entirely alien standard of what is right for man. Communism ushered in the era of internal political violence in 1917; its methods were consciously copied by both the Fascists and the Nazis; when these were crushed it took over their spheres of influence and controlled them

without any need to change their methods; and, crowding its radio and its press with official abuse, it has substituted for the restrained language of diplomacy the bluster of the gutter, discarding only the decencies of the former and retaining all its deceits. It is important to recognize that the Soviet Government is following its creed as well as its own precedents in acting on the principle, recommended long ago by Machiavelli, that the chief obstacle to governmental efficiency is conscience, fellow-feeling, or respect for freedom.

So much for the nations that have recently repudiated freedom. With the exception of Italy, they have rejected what they have never fully had. It is in the European countries where freedom has been valued and enjoyed that the puzzle lies; they have not lost their freedom, but they are having less of it, and seem to be valuing it less. It is a grave mistake to say that this is entirely, or even chiefly, a part of the aftermath of war. The exhaustion of human and economic resources in two major conflicts has been an exacerbating and accelerating, not an originating cause. For a generation or two there have been certain tendencies distinctive of the age which war has hurried to a climax, partly by its own stimulus and partly by inhibiting to some extent older countervailing factors. A brief analysis of those modern tendencies that have been biting corrosively into freedom and individuality is necessary to our theme. For simplicity's sake I shall assemble the tendencies under two heads, the one economic and political, the other cultural.

The economic and political tendencies seem to be the natural consequences of the Industrial Revolution. The enormous growth of industrialism is certainly directly responsible for the following broad social changes.

with which the fall as well as the rise of liberty has been bound up.

(1) Large scale industrialization has brought a very big proportion of the population into towns, and in their masses here they can be easily got together by propagandists, and are far more open to demagogic appeal and exploitation than in their old dispersion over the countryside. They become more herd-minded, more suggestible; the up-to-date becomes their chief standard of value, so that they run easily after fashions—and the new mass fashions are economic and political. Countrymen are not naturally more intelligent, but by working often alone, and at a pace set not by machines but by the seasons and the weather, they acquire the habit of thinking and acting for themselves.

(2) Industrialization has made the workers conscious of their collective power. They can see that now they hold the whip-hand. In their trade unions they have become large and wealthy pressure-groups, setting up a new form of vested interest and wielding the powerful weapon of the strike, and in their political capacity they hold the majority of votes. They have naturally, and to some extent rightly, used this power to secure directly in their wages a bigger share of the wealth they have helped to create, and to secure a further share of it indirectly in the form of fuller social services. Unfortunately, their leaders have gone further in encouraging them to think *only* of a rising "standard of living" (materialistically conceived), and to demand that this be safeguarded by the State, that is, be maintained out of taxation even when it cannot be provided out of profits—in other words, to retain the claimed

quantum of wealth even when less wealth is being produced.

(3) In this way there arises the notion of the "welfare State." Social welfare, especially the welfare of the underprivileged, is obviously desirable, and desirable as a matter not of philanthropy but of right. The victims of an economic system—that is, the unfortunate, not the lazy—are by moral obligation the care of the community as a whole. The cost of relieving them with allowances and services is therefore to be borne out of common funds, on the insurance principle of spreading risks. This is the contemporary meaning of "the social conscience." Hence the expansion of public services, and with it the extension of the functions of the State, which are covering more and more of the citizen's life with a general moral justification. When, however, the reception of benefits acquires legal sanction, citizens become less unwilling to surrender their privacy of concern and their independence, and are more ready to be cared for. The moral result on paper is spoiled by the psychological result in fact.

To these three direct consequences of industrialization must be added two that are less direct.

(1) The pre-war and post-war difficulties of currency-exchange, the wartime organization of all national resources, and the post-war shortages of food, raw materials and labour, have accustomed us to the idea of central planning. In some way or another virtually every part of our economic life is thereby made subject to coercive regulation by the State—again with some justification. We have thus made the Government the dispenser of our bread and butter, and have multiplied the offices in which it can dispense its patronage to whom

it will. Internally we have made the material basis of our existence the plaything of politics, and externally, by allowing the State regulation of foreign buying and selling, which gives to trade policy a directly political colour, we have added to the possibilities of friction among the nations.

(2) From industry there has come into politics, now made inseparable from economics, the ideal of efficiency. As now understood—as what is sometimes called "rationalization"—and as a major ideal, this is something new. It has become a necessity in large-scale production and distribution, and the immense expansion and complication of State activity has made it appear to be a necessity in legislation and political administration as well. Now efficiency works by simplification, by the elimination of the frictional, the wasteful, the unnecessary. This is, of course, entirely right with machines. With humans it is subject to limitations both of expediency and of morality, for human friction has no analogy with mechanical friction. When it is pressed without those limitations, as it now often is under the pressure of urgent tasks, it reduces us in effect to units for statisticians, to man-hours and calories and suchlike. Men, however, were not made to behave like numbers. So much the worse for men, say the devotees of efficiency, who then either complain bitterly of our awkwardness, or set themselves to quell it. In this way, the delicate human problems of government are drastically simplified in order to bring them within the administrative capacity of the governors, a way of doing things that is all the more serious when it accompanies the tendency, held to be democratic, to appoint smaller men to cope with our bigger problems. A planned economy—the most con-

temporary political idea—by its very nature holds within it some threat to freedom, and even if it be allowed to be necessary, it is almost bound to go beyond that legitimate restriction of freedom which is required for the common good, unless it is met by the people with moral resistance. In a democracy, a planned economy is intended as a means to popular welfare, but when, by an almost inevitable tendency, it treats us not as men but as muscles and mouths, it is a method that cannot lead to its avowed end, for it is dehumanizing. Besides, it has a coarsening effect on the governors. In most democratic States, the governors already have more power than any humans should have over other humans, and a diminishing proportion of them has been selected for the moral bigness that would hold them from the temptation, always present, to use that power for the easy short cuts that solve the immediate problem by producing a crop of future ones, often worse than the first. True, the leaders in a democracy have a mass-mandate for their power, but so also had all the modern dictators. The substitution of the new notion of efficiency in politics for the older, less definable but more solid, notion of human competence, is one of the steps by which democracy is modifying its historical and moral basis.

Gathering up the points of the first heading, we may say that it is the contemporary domination of politics by economic concerns that is sapping the foundations of political freedom even in the democratic countries. After all, freedom is not an economic concept, but a moral one —this being the reason why communism or economic materialism has no room for it. Not as producers and consumers do we need it, but as men, for whom the function of the economic is subsidiary, to provide the

material basis of existence, of health, and of culture with as little fuss as possible, so as to liberate our minds for our characteristically human tasks and enjoyments. For these tasks and enjoyments we do indeed need more wealth than we now have, if all our people are to be helped to rise to them; but in making the production and distribution of it our main political concern, we are obscuring the justifying purpose of it all, and are at the same time generating in ourselves the low and narrow mentality that unfits us for constructing and maintaining a satisfactory human society, the foundations of which are indefeasibly moral because the human has the moral as an essential part of it.

This brings me by a natural transition to my second head, the broad cultural change that has come over all western nations, in varying degrees, during the past generation or two. It is closely, though not exclusively, connected with the industrialization, urbanization and democratization of national life. The aspect of it that directly touches our subject is the general decline of old convictions, scruples, standards, amounting to a landslide from the traditional religion and morals. Whether the traditional faith has been rightly scrapped or no is a fair question, but in fact nothing has yet been put in its place. We have discovered no equivalent internal discipline to keep our selfishness and short-sightedness in check, to hold society together above the merely instinctive plane, to give to both individual and society the challenge of non-material ends, and thereby an inherent dignity which each will respect spontaneously in the other. Without some such discipline freedom can be neither rightly demanded by the individual nor safely granted by the group; as a virtue and a right it can belong

only to moralized persons.[1] As mere absence of restraint, it is anarchic in all its expressions, disruptive of politics, economics, and of society in its general unorganized aspect. Therefore, as the internal restraints of prudence, conscience and religion weaken, external restraints have to be multiplied. As morality declines, freedom inevitably declines with it. Under a State obliged forever to enlarge its coercive authority there can only be correspondingly less and less freedom, and none under anarchy except that of the strongest and most unscrupulous.

What has led to the withering away of the old beliefs that liberated from without because they disciplined and guided from within, that brought our fathers their measure of freedom because they proved that they were morally entitled to it? Since the question sends us into many complexities, I shall have to be content with stating rather dogmatically what seem to me to be a few parts of the answer.

(1) As the poor have become less poor, they have naturally raised their demands. The capacity of our productive resources is enabling us, when political conditions are favourable, to move nearer to those demands. Industry has developed an increasing momentum, partly because of the love of enterprise as such (not merely of profits) among those fitted for leadership, and in part because of the constantly self-surpassing discoveries and inventions of technology. The resultant increase of attention and devotion, individual and public, to

[1]Cp. Milton, *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, 1649*, "None can love freedom heartily but good men; the rest love not freedom but license, which never hath more scope or more indulgence than under tyrants. Hence it is that tyrants are not offended nor stand much in doubt of bad men, as being all naturally servile; but in whom virtue and true worth most is eminent, them they fear in earnest, as by right their masters."

economic affairs has both left us less time for, and made us less sensitive to, the intangible conditions and possibilities of successful human living. The shape and texture and temper of our civilization are being vulgarized by its practical materialism. In such a civilization there is little taste for the profundities of religion, the simplicities of morality, and the refinement of the arts. We are moving fast towards a crisis in which we shall have to choose between a hard society without these, or a reconstruction of politics and economics with these.

(2) Culture itself, especially through the channels of the press, the theatre and the cinema, has been drawn into this vulgarizing descent. Social life always tends to pass into a homogeneity of spirit. The dominance of industry has turned those organs of culture also into industries, even into major ones. Of course, we do not expect a publisher, for example, to issue a book that will not sell, but until relatively recently scarcely any publishers would issue a book *simply* on the ground that it would sell. The pandering to low taste was most evident in the dismal 1930's. Able writers, who might have helped the public to survive those years of economic contraction and political blackmail with dignity and success, wrote for self-display and applause. Instead of trying to dispel the demoralizing mood of disillusionment and despair, they exploited and encouraged it. Instead of aiming, however indirectly, at enriching and strengthening the mentality of a generation faced with dreadful problems, they gave it little treats of cleverness, posturing with intellectual and verbal antics. Their claim to a new enlightenment, which saw all things as futile, was priggish. There was little sense of the responsibility that belongs to all public utterance, of the obligation a trained or

gifted mind is under when addressing a large audience, especially in disordered and disorderly days. Fortunately, the war has given those pundits a chastening shock, but their pre-war influence survives, and is renewed in that large body of the reading public whose reading takes the form of following fashionable names. The general triviality of the theatre and the sensationalism, garishness and maudlin sentimentality of the cinema, need only be mentioned. There have been occasional splendid exceptions, but it cannot be denied that the predominant cultural movements have for some time been destroying old convictions and standards without constructing anything in their place.

(3) We must, I suppose, add the effect on old beliefs of science. The effect has been indirect, because the bulk of the citizens of our democracies have not had enough education to be affected by science directly. Apart from its astonishing technological applications, the spirit and direction of science are unknown to most of us, even to many graduates of science, for our universities have been turning out men and women more familiar with a particular scientific technique than with the spirit of science as such. What has happened in the sphere of popular culture is the running round of a rumour, which few have tested or wanted to test, that science has shown all religion to be mere superstition, and morality to be only a matter of social convenience, with nothing absolutely binding anywhere in it.

Let these be taken as samples only of the factors at work yesterday and today; they are enough to show the lines along which an adequate analysis would move. The fact from which we started is that the face of our civilization is changing, and the heart of it too. Some of the change is

right, for it is not the business of any age to go on doing all that the preceding ages have done. Still, neither can it be the business of any age to disavow all that it has inherited, and least of all that which history seems to have been at long pains to build into our lives. What our current civilization is doing is to squeeze freedom out, and in the process, in some cases wittingly, in others not, it is doing despite to the dignity of the individual. The ordinary man never counted for much until not long ago. Under democracy he has been given the chance of counting. His way of taking it has been to organize himself into masses, in which he has become only a subscribing, voting, producing and consuming unit, and has used his collective power to force the State to become more meddlesome and mighty than it ever was before. In his effort to count he has reduced himself to a specimen of a class, has extinguished his private independence, and his importance otherwise than as a unit in the vast political machine. Beginning as ordinary he has become more ordinary, instead of using his democratic rights to augment his personality. He has exchanged the tyranny of employers for that of trade-union leaders, party-bosses, and State bureaucrats. He has insisted on a new political order which, while maintaining the externals of democracy, such as representative government under majority election, displays its inhuman efficiency, its real inefficiency with humans, by making government impossible without the progressive diminution of freedom. He has answered the Caesar-worship of Russia, Italy and Germany by erecting not men but masses into the seat of irresistible power, and in doing so has encouraged the rise of a class of politicians who are not leaders in human affairs, but handlers of masses by means of a propaganda of shameless cajolery that is an insult to our humanity. He is no

longer a real partner in the State, which is what he set out to be, but a beneficiary of it, even a ward of it. He is not really consulted, but only crooned to and nursed; not challenged, but simply manipulated. After so much has been sacrificed for freedom, he is surrendering it, under the inducement of immediate material benefits, for a willing bondage.[2] The indignity of the ordinary man has no longer to be blamed entirely, in democracies, upon oppressors, but largely upon himself. The effort that brought him respect—the struggle to affirm himself as more than a chattel, a hand, a means to the enrichment and ease of others—seems to be exhausting itself, and he is falling back into the mass where he began. The earliest form of man's life, we noted near the opening of this lecture, was collective. It is now returning to the same. The wheel of history is coming full-circle—from collectivism to collectivism. *That* is the tragedy of our day.

The process has not gone so far that it cannot be arrested. It is too recent to be unchangeable. Nearly all history has been moving, with various detours and pauses, towards liberty and individuality as the meaning and justification of its agelong reality. The bias of the past is marked: our institutions and traditions all exhibit it. We can undo the recent ominous betrayals if we want to; we can restore the old flaming ideals if we are convinced that they deserve to be restored. Can freedom, then, be justified? That is our next subject. In the present lecture I have simply assumed that it can.

[2]Cp. Milton, *Samson Agonistes*, ll. 268-71—

> What more oft, in nations grown corrupt,
> And by their vices brought to servitude,
> Than to love bondage more than liberty,
> Bondage with ease than strenuous liberty?

II

THE MEANING AND JUSTIFICATION OF FREEDOM

ANY INTELLIGENT talk about freedom involves a theory of human nature, for freedom is not an isolable quality, real and right whatever else we suppose to be in us. If we are free, or capable of becoming so, that remarkable status has rational implications, and these must be added to the obvious everyday facts if we are to arrive at a rounded understanding of our constitution. This lecture, then, will bring the subject of freedom into the theoretical context in separation from which it can be neither understood nor justified. Before beginning the construction of this context, however, I must make two general comments on any theory whatever of human nature.

The first comment is that any adequate theory of man must be more than scientific; that is, it cannot be simply the registration of the observable facts and the mental arrangement of these in the orders of space, time and causality. It must burrow more deeply, and it must be prepared to soar. We can go very far indeed in the study of matter without feeling the rational need to break through the circle of scientific concepts and methods. We cannot go quite so far in the purely scientific study of plants and animals, for the examination of life brings us up against such mysteries as its origin, and its phenomena of self-repair and propagation; but we can avoid plunging into these mysteries and yet go on adding to our real

understanding of living process and of the myriad genera and species in which it is embodied. When, however, we come to man, the limitations of the scientific approach become evident very soon. What we most want to know has to be discovered by studying him not in extension but in depth. We have only to give him a scratch or two to find ourselves in the depths where observation, experiment and the purely casual way of thinking have scarcely anything to hold on to. The reason cannot be simply that man is the subtlest and most complexly conditioned of all things, for such features only set a supreme challenge to the skill and patience of the scientist. Nor is it that man is the most individualized of all things, for although this makes generalization about him extremely difficult, it has not prevented the various sciences of man from giving us an embarrassingly large body of classificatory, analytical and causal knowledge of him. The reason is that in every science of man, especially in Psychology, Sociology and History (this last being the most concrete of them all), we are repeatedly and unavoidably falling on matters with which the technique of science is not fitted to deal. There are facts which, however fully described, analyzed, compared and causally "explained," remain unilluminated, insistently demanding something more; they call for judgment, assessment, evaluation. This reference of a fact already scientifically understood to an ideal standard for the real understanding of it is something that the scientist, so far as he is a full-blooded man, cannot help wishing to do, and yet in his scientific capacity cannot allow himself to do.

Let me give a few illustrations. In man we find freedom—or certainly the appearance of it—and the scientist is disconcerted because he has found it nowhere else, and has everywhere else confirmed his assumption

that it is impossible.[1] Science, then, cannot cover everything. Ask yourself whether the biologist or the psychologist has said the last thing, or only the first thing, when he has declared that mother-love is an instinct. Has he done anything more than apply a classificatory label? When an orator drops magic from his mouth, or a painter puts splendour into pigment, is the really important question to ask, where he did it, or when, or how long it took him, or what causes were at work and what observable effects will follow? A quite different order of question, requiring a quite different sensibility and method for its answering, is needed. We cannot understand Alexander or Aristotle, Michelangelo or Shakespeare, Newton or Napoleon, or even the little fellow next door, by studying him as we would a molecule or a beetle. Molecules can't with a thought turn sound into music, and beetles can't crack a joke. The maple knows nothing of the oak-tree. The beaver, like the bird, can build marvellously, but not by choice; it is not an architect freely constructing a thing that will satisfy, in himself and others, a spiritual as well as a utilitarian need. None of these things below man can be prompted to tell the truth or be tempted to tell a lie, or make an oath of loyalty, or organize a business, or create a government, or, like me, give a lecture, or, like you, listen to one. Man is so different from everything else in Nature that natural analogies do not help us to understand the human in him. In him the skin of natural fact is so thin that we cut right through it with even our everyday questions about him. He is not wholly, and is not chiefly, a natural being, to be explained by the elsewhere marvellous technique of science. The

[1] The unpredictability of the movement of an electron from one orbit to another is not necessarily freedom.

part of him that is characteristic, though closely connected with Nature, lies in some sense beyond Nature, and is therefore to be studied with the technique of philosophy. He is mostly a metaphysical being. Like an iceberg, only the smaller part of him appears above the surface; or, to choose a fuller figure, he is like the great earth itself, with a covering of sea that is drawn by celestial attractions, and a slender crust that is strained and buckled and sometimes rent by profound forces from within.

The second comment is that a theory of human nature, unlike a theory of anything else, is not under a completely objective control. The thinking is not here, and the thing thought about there over against it and firmly checking it at all points. Subject and object are in this case aspects of the same reality; our knowledge of human nature is self-knowledge. The two aspects are related to one another reciprocally. This means that the distinction between what we think we are and what we are is not so sharp as it is elsewhere. A man's theory of himself can, and in fact does, affect himself, and therefore, even if from an absolute point of view it be false, it can make him like itself; that is, within limits hard to define, it can produce its own verification. We might excuse the difficulty by pleading that the function of self-knowledge is not to bring us into the barely intellectual presence of truth, not to tell us either what we appear to be or what we actually are, but to show us what we may be and to guide us towards that end. Or we might, can and should break through the subjectivity by observing not ourselves only but the people round about us, and by surveying the rich fund of human fact supplied by history. Nevertheless, the intimate connection between knowing and known remains, since our view of other people is to some extent a projection of ourselves.

The aspect of this connection which I want to bring out is that we tend in fact to become what we think ourselves to be. That is both a form and a law of our moral responsibility. If you believe yourself to be a Canadian, you have a good chance of becoming one. If you have a small view of human nature, you are bound to be infected by that view; in the absence of outstanding, insistent, imperious gifts, you will yourself become really small. If you think that man is selfish, you will become selfish; and if you are convinced that man is generous, the believed generosity will spring up in yourself. A theory of human nature, irrespective of whether it be true or false, is never merely a concept or an image, but is also an active force, shaping, re-shaping or mis-shaping the mind that holds it. A man's life contracts or widens as his belief about himself and others becomes narrow or large. Milton puts the point in his own grand way when he writes of "this pious and just honouring of ourselves . . . whence every laudable and worthy enterprise issues forth."[2] We can talk of reason as much as we please and boast of its independence, but if our reason be primarily a critical one, leading us to believe as little as possible, our own nature will shrink to the stature of our belief, while if our reason be primarily appreciative and constructive, our whole nature will sympathetically expand with our expanding intellectual grasp. We have here what is itself a law of our nature, and a basic one, one of the marks of it that we can *not* alter; and the significance of it is that it draws belief, commonly supposed to be

[2] *The Reason of Church Government.* The passage goes on: "He that holds himself in reverence and due esteem, both for the dignity of God's image upon him, and for the price of his redemption, which he thinks is visibly marked upon his forehead, accounts himself a fit person to do the noblest and godliest deeds."

subject only to the commands of logic, into the dominion also of morality.

Of that law of human nature there are wide practical implications, which I can only hint at. It is one of the ultimate grounds of the great argument for a liberal education. According to the reach and quality of our belief about man, we become ourselves big men or small ones. I take it to be morally self-evident that we should become big ones. It follows, then, that whatever be the function of academic research, the use and end of teaching and learning—considered, as they must be, as practical processes—is to enlarge life by enlarging belief, imagination and sensibility. When that is done, and done well, in our schools and universities, we shall stride confidently out of our present poor pupillage in the business of living and swing into the mastery of our social tasks. We shall then scorn the idea of making our country into a nursery in which we are all nicely looked after; we shall be both eager and able to turn it into what our democratic fathers tried to make it—a free association of adults believing in one another's worth, too self-respecting to be either coerced or petted, and none of us being ruled only or ruling only, but all of us squarely shouldering, with difference of gift but equality of effort, the immense responsibilities of our common civic life, which, because of their immensity, cannot be successfully sustained by anything less than the brains and character of the entire community.

Well, after this portentous introduction, what *is* human nature? What *is* man? Is he made for freedom? And if he is, in what does his freedom consist? Further —though this is to be the question of the next lecture— is individual freedom compatible with social solidarity?

Man is obviously an animal. We know that without

study, and the scientists have extended and subtilized our knowledge of it considerably. We are animals in the mode of our generation, and in the manner of our decease. It is because the economy of our bodies is animal that the healing art has advanced by physical and chemical experiments on rats and mice. We are all subject to what are called instinctive impulsions, which betray the animal affinities of our race. There are schools of thought that put the whole emphasis there, and all of us have moods in which we are inclined to believe them; and, by the law I have just been discussing, the more we believe them, the more we shall live at the animal level—with a preposterous surprise at finding ourselves unable to build the kind of society we crave for in our ideal moods.

But man is just as obviously not an animal. This is why the art of medicine, for all its advances, baffled by successes here and failures there in cases that are pathologically alike, and why it has always in practice, and recently in theory as well, added to its biological methods the very different methods prescribed by our knowledge of mind. When we acknowledge that a cheerful patient is a help to his doctor, that a fearful one can aggravate his disease, and that a fearless man can walk through an epidemic with relatively little chance of infection, we are allowing that besides the biological factor there is a human factor.

The animal and the human in us are not simply juxtaposed, not separate, the earlier lying like a layer under the later. The human does not stay on top, but seeps down into the animal and, though never destroying this, transforms it. Consequently, when the animal in us erupts into the human, it does not do so with anything like its original force and grossness, except under abnormal conditions, as when we are tried beyond endurance, or

are in a pathological state. Eating, for example, is a persisting animal function, but a comparison of when, what and how animals and men eat makes plain how deeply even that elementary function in us has been humanized. This simple example will help us to see why psychologists, after working the notion of instinct to death, have begun to doubt whether it is really right to speak of instincts in man, at any rate of anything more than residua of them. The notion of instinct, borrowed from biology, is turning out to be of only minor value for the scientific understanding of human life, at least when this is passed in a civilized environment of long establishment. Perhaps instinct is still lively in savages, but even of this I am not certain, for many of these have the remarkable power of suspending the most elemental drives, such as hunger, and the recoil from pain, and the fear of death. In any case, we must gather our idea of human nature not from those who are least men, but from those who are most men—just as we can only learn what an oak is from the full-grown tree, not from the sapling, and *a fortiori* not from the acorn. In the sphere of the living, it is the end and not the beginning that most helps us to understand. From Shakespeare's origin and infancy we can learn virtually nothing that throws light on what made him Shakespeare; it is from his mature achievement that we learn all that is worth knowing about him—and a great deal also about man in general.

How, then, are we to define the difference between man and the beast? I have already stated the difference in concrete terms. We may so state it again by saying that even the highest of the beasts cannot consciously organize the gaining of its meat and shelter, cannot play football or hockey or chess, cannot make a piano or coax music out of one, cannot grace a courtship with a sonnet or

celebrate an adventure with an epic, cannot enjoy its memories or make plans even for the day after tomorrow, and is as incapable of morality and worship or any deliberate fidelities as it is of humour. We must now replace this concrete answer with one that embodies the results of psychological and philosophical analysis.

To clear the ground, let us begin with a negative. It is not practical intelligence, memory or anticipation that divides us *absolutely* from mere animals. In these respects, if we subtract the enhancement of them by what is peculiarly human in us, we differ only in degree, though in an extremely high degree, from the rest of the animal world. Animal psychologists have long made us familiar with the play of *unconscious* memory in animals, and with responses that are intelligent in the very limited sense of being appropriate and yet not instinctive. Recent research has taken us further. The chief value, the virtually revolutionary significance, of Wolfgang Köhler's work on the chimpanzees[8] lies in his finding in these, admittedly as very exceptional, a limited power of conscious memory, of constructive imagination, of intelligence in the sense of the ability to *perceive* the requirements of a situation. Here, then, is a thread of continuity, very slender though it be, between us and the highest of the brutes. There is a certain range of emotional continuity too—e.g. fear, anger, love, enmity (but apparently only man can hate), and the kind of loyalty or devotion which a dog has for its master. I am bound to emphasize that so far the difference is one of degree, but it must be remembered that on the human side I am making an abstraction, am omitting what *is* peculiar to us. The presence of this extends and refines

[8]*The Mentality of Apes* (2nd ed., 1927). See also R. M. Yerkes, *Chimpanzees* (1943).

in us the animal faculties of sensation, imagery, practical intelligence, emotion and its related impulses so considerably as to transfigure them. To illustrate from emotion: some kinds of animals have ample curiosity, but they are incapable of science, this being not the indulgence of curiosity but the austere subjection of it to a purposeful discipline. Köhler rated the best of his chimpanzees—her name, Susan, ought to become as familiar to students of psychology as Barbara to students of logic—as having a mentality roughly equivalent to a child of three; but the comparison is misleading, for that chimpanzee, solitary in its brilliance, was at the peak of its development, whereas the child of three has almost all its potentialities still to unfold.

The prodigious step from difference of degree to difference of kind, from even the highest animality to the peculiarly human, has more aspects than I have time to deal with. Anyhow, it will be more effective for the subject of these lectures to concentrate attention on the really fundamental, fertile, creative peculiarities of man. We could list these as self-consciousness, self-control, and the consciousness of values. I shall consider directly only the last of these. Before doing so, I shall venture to spend a few moments, by way of transition, on an aspect of human life which, though we may possibly share it to an infinitesimal degree with Köhler's one bright ape, is developed in us to such a height and constancy as to be really peculiarly human. This peculiar aspect is that the world you and I live in, the one that affects us and to which we respond, is not so much our physical environment as a world of ideas. Between ourselves and the realm of matter we hang a screen of notions, and it is these more than that that provide the stimuli to which we react. In other words, what acts on the mind is less often

the physical thing, even when this is actually acting on the body, than what we think that thing to be. This is a commonplace, but its significance is commonly missed. To bring this out, let me select two examples. If I were to drink a glass of perfectly wholesome water, and you were to assure me, after I had drunk it, that it was full of cholera germs, I should very probably be sick. What is then affecting me is not the water, but my idea of it. If a competent person, such as a doctor, thereupon reassured me that the water really was wholesome, I should cease to be sick, illustrating again the potency of ideas. Of course, if the water really were tainted, it would have its natural effect on my body whatever I thought about it, but the example is enough to show that the intervention of an idea can loosen our tie with our physical environment, can to some extent break the supposedly inexorable bond of natural cause and effect. An animal is affected by the physical stimulus as such; we are affected often only by what we suppose it to be. This happens to us even at the involuntary level. The second example takes us to the voluntary level. Strike a dog, and it will howl. Strike a man, and he may not even flinch. The natural force of the blow does, indeed, come through to him as pain, but the natural reaction to this is stifled. The reason is again the intervention of an idea. This potency of ideas, even their frequent prepotency over intense physical stimuli, takes us right away from animal life. When I avoid touching a live wire, it is not the wire but my knowledge of it—a system of ideas—that is governing my behaviour. We can escape from where and when we physically are and live in the world of memory, anticipation or phantasy. Our human gifts of imagination and reason enable us to organize our ideas into a world that becomes the reality in which we chiefly live. If reality

is what works, proving its reality by controlling our reactions as well as our actions, ideas are our principal realities. Here is a new type of determination. Unlike animals, we can link ourselves with something outside circumstance. That is a wonder which should not be taken for granted.

If I were to elaborate these transitional remarks I should have to speak of "free" ideas and of our astonishing capacity for forming abstract ideas, but I have said enough to pave the way for what is to follow. One more transitional point is needed to bring us to the heart of this lecture. Although I have had to distinguish sharply between an animal's reaction to physical stimuli and a human's reaction to ideas, I have to admit that in our thinking of ideas we are still to some extent in the realm of cause and effect. Pschologists have shown abundantly that mind, for all its differences from matter, is not altogether exempt from the sway of natural law. There are here also the reliable uniformities that enable us to say, "given this, then that." The laws of mental process are not the same as those of material process and cannot be deduced from these, but they have the same general character of being causal, of being no more mysterious, and no less, than any other of the great regularities of Nature that have made science possible. These regularities in mind are found even when the content of the process is distinctively human. For instance, only humans can think of Darwin or of evolution, but when we have learned anything about either of them we cannot think of one without thinking also of the other. It is surely impossible to think of Cabot or Cartier without thinking of Canada. Some of our ideas are firmly bound to one another. If several ideas have been thought together, the occurrence of any one tends to re-instate the rest. That

is the law of association, which holds of emotions as well as of ideas, and holds too of the relation between emotions and ideas.

At last we come to the heart of our subject. For the first fact on which my central argument rests is that not all our thinking is like that. If it were, there would have been no schools and universities, and no science. Thinking of that sort is simply natural process, of the same general order as the processes that go on in the body. It is the sort of event that happens when the mind is left to work in its most primitive unlearned way, as in dreaming and day-dreaming, in thinking by mere habit, or by mere prejudice, or merely under emotion. We would despise a mind that thought in no other way. We take it for granted that the thinking of adults should be controlled in a quite different manner, not by any natural law but by ourselves, and by ourselves not in caprice (for then we are still the playthings of the lower forces) but in accordance with an ideal of thinking, the ideal of truth, which has a law of its own, namely, the law of evidence; and this law is not a natural law for the quite simple reason that it can be broken and often is, being a principle not of compulsion but of persuasion, not of coercion but of conviction, not the formula of an inexorable uniformity but the statement of an obligation, of something that ought to be, not of something that is. This surely is what we mean by thinking rationally.

I am inquiring what makes man man. I can now say that so far as we are thinking beings we are human when, and only when, we are placing our thinking under the control of nothing but reason. That we can do this, however fitfully, is a wonderful fact, for it means that we have a freedom so incredible that it has often been denied. It means that whenever we are thinking humanly,

not having our ideas thrust upon us from below but ourselves selecting and arranging and holding them in voluntary accordance with the ideal of truth, we are proving our freedom from the bondage of Nature. Every time we are not the passive receptacle or stage of ideas but put them together by our own effort, reach a conclusion, and accept this not because we like it—for we may dislike it intensely—but because we have found it evidenced, we are following not Nature but human nature, are thinking not under causal enforcement but in free response to an ideal demand. Only humans can do that—which is the simplest of all reasons why they should. Instead of being helplessly driven by primitive urges, we can and do dominate our thinking with a conception of logical and methodological requirements. Here, then, is a quite new level of event, process, action. To it there is no analogue at all below man. Wherever we look, only in man is there freedom from causal law—it is shown in his *knowledge* of causal law—and this freedom is what makes him man. It is one of the paradoxes of speculation that the freedom of man has been most denied by scientists, whose brilliant successes in evidenced thinking exemplify, prove and justify it.

So much for ourselves as thinking beings. As practical beings we are deeply modified by the free rationality of our thinking. We can bring our knowledge and our power of inference to bear on our conduct and thereby make this, like our thinking, our own—not something done *in* us by natural process, but done *by* us for a chosen purpose and under a standard not given by animal instinct but set by reflection. We can ourselves control our outer as well as our inner behaviour rationally. In this respect we are again startling anomalies in our natural

context, incapable of being understood in purely natural terms.

But we must press further. As practical beings we control ourselves with something besides reason. What we call conscience comes into play. Under reason we learn how to cultivate the land, dig mines, build houses, and so on, and how to regulate our conduct with prudence. Under conscience we condemn and avoid oppression, and approve and seek justice, honesty, and the kindly consideration of one another, suspending instinct and habit and prejudice in the face of those requirements we call moral. For the ordering of our behaviour both inner and outer we can and do follow the ideal of goodness as well as the ideal of truth, and only so far as we do so are we living the life suited to humans, the life that is ours because we, and only we, are so plainly equipped for it as to be intended for it.

The ideal of goodness, like that of truth, is not coercive. Both only oblige, and can therefore be disobeyed. They have little, if any, strength or natural force. What they do have is authority or validity, a quality that has no meaning in the natural realm to which animal life wholly belongs. In an animal, all that an impulse needs in order to have its way is force, a force greater than that of any competing impulse. In us even a strong passion can be curbed by the still small voice of conscience. Authority or validity is the defining quality of ideals. Authority can, of course, be questioned, but not everywhere; to challenge it anywhere is to presuppose it somewhere, if the challenge is to have any meaning. To ask why we should obey reason is simply silly, because the question is itself a rational one, is a demand for a reason; no animal can ask the why of anything at all. To ask why in both thought and practice

we should honour the distinction of good and evil alongside that of truth and falsity is also simply silly, for goodness is a general ideal of the same order as truth. Truth, indeed, is a special form of the good, the obligation to seek it being a moral one, reason being the organ which we seek and recognize it. We can now enlarge our definition of human nature; man is fundamentally a moral being, with rationality as one part of his capacity to live under an ideal obligation. We may add (cursorily, for the main point should now be clear) that another part is the capacity to order thought and matter under the ideal of beauty.

If our interest in this lecture were in ethics in particular, instead of in the consciousness of values in general, I should now have to raise a crop of thorny problems. All that my immediate purpose requires me to do is to clear away a general objection that springs up whenever conscience is mentioned. What, you may ask, does conscience command? Well, ask in the same blank and abstract way what reason commands, and the hollowness of the question will become evident. In both cases we have to find out by effort; the answer comes at the end, not at the beginning. The thought behind the question is that there have been, and still are, notorious differences in the verdicts of conscience. We must not forget that there have been equally notorious differences in the verdicts of reason: the history of science is a tale not of smooth discoveries but of internal controversies, and very large controversies are being waged in all the major sciences today. We are not at all sure what reason has to say on many of the basic problems on which the scientists are engaged. Our confidence in reason is not thereby shaken, for the problems are problems only for the rational consciousness. The position in this respect is analogous to the problems of

morality, these being set by conscience as well as to it. We must also not forget that conscience, like reason, has presented agreements that cut right across the distinctions that might be expected to make agreement impossible—such distinctions as time, place, class and culture. The Hebrew prophets, Confucius and the Buddha, Socrates and St. Ambrose, are by no means entirely at variance among themselves, and most moralists of today would agree with much of what they taught. On this whole subject we think with confusion. When we compare conscience and reason to the detriment of the former, we are usually comparing a reason that has been strenuously and co-operatively developed with a conscience that has been left uncultivated and that is usually consulted with a hurried glance. When we have done with conscience what we have done with reason, we shall be in a better position to compare them fairly. Reason has never been thought to be a faculty that will bring forth its insights without constant effort and care; conscience unfortunately has. The lazy view of conscience has been encouraged, with unwitting blasphemy, by the supposition that the religious designation of it as the voice of God can be taken at its face-value. I dare not claim that my conscience is the voice of God; I would only venture to hold that it is so much of the voice of God, as, by moral cleansing and rational discipline, I have fitted myself to hear. Conscience is as errant as reason, reason as errant as conscience, both being errant because of our finitude and of our tendency to slip back into the dominion of our lower animal nature. Our carelessness and laziness make them more errant than they need be. Only in abstract definition, not in fact, only as ideals not as actual faculties, are they infallible. That the light

we have is imperfect matters little if we are always trying to improve it.

The awareness, pursuit and realization of values, then, constitute our evidence against all theories of determinism. They prove that we have a limited, yet large and very wonderful freedom. They are the foundation of common sense, of morality, and of science itself, so that none of these can be used in argument against them. We have one foot outside the causal order, as well as one foot in it. The physicist might show that a man puts out exactly the amount of energy that was put into him The biologist might accumulate instances of our being moulded by heredity and environment. The psychologist can point to many types of experience in which we behave as we do under natural compulsion. The sociologist has built up the view that we are puppets of our social environment, of the traditions and institutions into which we were born and with which we daily live. Even theologians, of more schools than one, have held that the divine providence and omnipotence place us under a divine determinism. All these determinisms may be granted, but with limits upon them, for we break through them every time we think logically, and every time we put an impulse under the yoke of conscience, and whenever we sort words into shapely phrases, and colours and forms into designs that have the authority of beauty.

Such, then, is human nature. The essence of it is freedom. In its wholeness it is an inherited set of animal tendencies together with the power to change and go beyond them, the power to lift ourselves, to an indefinite degree, out of the mesh of natural law and live by the freedom—the only freedom there is—of following the uncoercive laws of ideals. Some of us express that nature

only spasmodically; most of us rise to it and fall from it in not very high crests and deep troughs; saints, artists, scholars and great men of action exhibit it more steadily, it being the indispensable condition of their several callings and achievements. Human nature has to be defined in some such way as I have tried to outline if we are to be loyal to the facts of introspection, and if we are to explain man's reversal of biological law by adjusting his environment to himself, and his creation over and above this of an environment of ideas to which in fact most of his adjustments are made. Any definition must be framed to cover our frequent suspension of biological impulses in the interest of ideal ends, and our success in producing, under these ends and their inherent standards, a vast and varied culture that goes altogether beyond the race's need for biological survival. Man is free, and is the only created thing that is free. He is free so far as he can resist natural pressures and live by non-natural law.

This fact that we can liberate ourselves from purely causal determination—from circumstance, custom, fashion, habit, prejudice, superstition, merely associative thinking, instinct and appetite—is much too remarkable to be simply admitted and recorded. If we were to leave the matter like that, the rational part of our nature would rebuke us, for reason seeks implications. Besides noting the fact we must note its implications. Since of all things in space and time we alone have some freedom from the bonds of causal necessity, we have in fact a peculiar status. So far as we have and exercise that freedom we are not a part of Nature. We are out of space and time so far as we know them. We are exempt from causality every time we discover a causal law, since we can do this only when our thinking is not the mere resultant of mental and

cerebral antecedents but is a free weighing of evidence. And not only when we seek truth are we loosed from the tyranny of space, time and causality, but also when we check an impulse in favour of a principle, when we do something because we are convinced that it is right, and when, instead of taking matter and sensations and ideas as we find them, or making them serve a merely utilitarian end, we rehandle them radically to make them beautiful. Truth is excellence of thinking, goodness is excellence of disposition and conduct, and beauty is excellence of sensible form. Excellence is the element common to and constitutive of ideals, and because man can conceive it, can analyze out its requirements, can choose it and embody it in every department of his life, he is a unique kind of creature, not to be thought of in purely natural terms without doing appalling damage to the evidence.

Negations imply affirmations. We are not wholly a part of Nature. What else, then, are we a part of? The world we respond to is a world of ideas and ideals, of meanings and values, whose relations to one another and to us are not spatial, temporal, causal, coercive. Such a world is different in both stuff and law from the material world. Passing, then, from the negative expressions that are only incidents in the search for positive ones, we might as well simply and straightforwardly call that non-natural world the supernatural or spiritual world. Ignore, if you are so minded, the religious associations which history has given to these terms; coin other terms if you can; but remember that the rational task is not one of terminology, but to find a positive conception of a realm to whose substance and order the basic concepts of the sciences of matter do not apply. Science itself, even the science that studies matter, is a world of propositions, and propositions are not in Nature; they are nowhere and

nowhen, and they are not connected causally but logically or evidentially; and the world of logic or evidence is constituted by the ideal of truth, and therefore collapses if this be discredited. And since the ideal of truth, and with it the ideals of goodness and beauty, work only by authority or command, and since Nature cannot utter an imperative but can only put forth her causal force, it is entirely right to say that the peculiar commerce of the human mind is with a supernatural order. In the life of science and art, no less than in that of religion, we are moving in a transcendent realm.

The great question of metaphysics here springs up: Is this supernatural world created, or only discovered, by us? My theme as well as my time prevent me from following this question out, but I shall allow myself a comment on it. If it be said that that world is created by us, this cannot be taken to mean that it is a figment of our imagination, or a necessitated by-product of cerebral processes which are themselves causally determined; for if that is all it were, reason, and therefore all science, would not be what it claims to be, namely, an organ of truth. The world constituted by our ideals is a real world if, and only if, they are valid. If they are not valid, we are left theoretically with a painfully elaborate nonsense, and practically with a preposterous chaos; for men who asserted that the ideal of truth is not valid could not claim truth for their assertion—which is nonsense; and men who held that conscience is only a subjective inhibition can scarcely respect it—which would result in social chaos; and men who took the ideal of beauty to be nothing but the concept of a wish or a liking would recognize no standards, would build and paint, speak and sing, perform and print and dress and dance, just as they pleased—and again there would be social chaos.

Our peculiar freedom, then, implies a spiritual world. There is another metaphysical implication. If our relation to that world does not confer on man everything that we mean by dignity, I am at a loss to know what other inference could be drawn. That inference is made by most philosophers, and it is the common ground between the secular humanists and the theologians. We may be born like animals, and we may die like them, but in the interval we have so singular a freedom from the grip of natural cause and effect, and a consequently singular power of achievement, that we cannot rationally assume that the perishing fate and ultimate significance of the whole order of mere animals is our lot too.[4] It is hard to believe that the kind of man that can know matter and direct it is finally subject to it, just as it is hard to believe that man is the only spiritual being in the universe, seeing that, since he cannot be explained from below, he must be explained from above (unless we put reason to sleep and leave him unexplained). On the destiny of man we have no analogy to fall back upon, for analogy is reasoning from similars to similars, and animals and men are not relevantly similar. However, speculation about our destiny apart, it is not a guess but a patent fact that man's distinctive nature is unique; and it is an elementary inference that the startling respects that make him unique give him dignity, a cosmic dignity, a high status in the universe.

That is as much metaphysics as this lecture can bear. It was necessary to hint at the relevance of our spiritual freedom to the theory of the nature of the universe as a

[4] "That mass of flesh that circumscribes me, limits not my mind; that surface that tells the heavens it hath an end, cannot persuade me I have any . . . There is surely a piece of divinity in us, something that was before the elements, and owes no homage unto the sun" (Sir Thomas Browne, *Religio Medici*).

whole. We may now pass from the metaphysical to the practical implications of freedom, its meaning for the attitude and conduct we should adopt to one another.

The first practical implication is that the dignity attached to our freedom belongs to all men, except idiots and lunatics. It is enough to be a human to have it. There are other forms of dignity, which individuals can rightly acquire by the worth of their personal achievement, but that fundamental dignity belongs to man as such, even to the scoundrel—even to the scoundrel, this being the postulate of civilized law. Even a criminal caught in the act is given an open trial, with a procedure devised to procure every safeguard against a miscarriage of justice. When he is sentenced, the terms and execution of the sentence are framed to show that we are still dealing with a man. And when he has fulfilled his sentence he is deemed to have purged his offence, and is thereafter protected by the law of libel and slander from any useless exposure of his past. The law pays us the compliment of assuming that we are morally responsible adults until the contrary is proved, and it assumes also that the civic freedom that follows from our moral freedom—and follows from nothing else—is never to be interfered with except for just cause shown. Moral freedom, whether it be used or misused, is recognized in all our democratic institutions as the defining and therefore the basic quality of a human being, and the general form in which it is recognized is that a society as a whole, with all the necessary exercise of its enormous collective power, shall never offend, but always respect, every one of its individual members, even its wayward ones. It is pertinent to say quite bluntly that the institutions which we have inherited are to some extent in advance of

our individual attitudes, so that a change in these rather than in those is the immediate condition of the better society we are all longing for. Democratic society in the impersonal sense, that is, in its institutional forms, is in part more democratic than you and I are. Again and again it is society and not the parent that insists on the child's right of access to education, showing its greater respect for the child's actual and potential humanity; and it is less common of the democratic State to exploit its members than of its members to exploit one another, the State entering here as the protector of the oppressed.

The second practical implication is that in the common dignity of freedom lies our equality, of which equality before the law, equality of civic rights, is the clearest social expression. That dignity rules out Nietzsche's magniloquent doctrine of liberty without equality, that is, liberty only for the exceptionally strong and the exceptionally gifted. But an important qualification has to be made here. Taken apart from its source in moral freedom, equality is not a right but sheer nonsense. Inequality of capacity and performance is too striking a fact to be conjured away by egalitarian rhetoric. A social structure that does not recognize it is based on petty jealousy, which is the special canker of decadent democracy: once the original formative vitality has begun to decline, there sets in a dull levelling down into a low plane of general political mediocrity, with the result that the abler members of the community, not allowed to let themselves go in politics, canalize their abilities into other fields. This jealous egalitarianism, this envy and repression of men more competent than ourselves, is robbing democracy of its leaders at a time when democracy is facing its hardest tasks. Among the larger countries of Europe the process has been going on longest,

and has produced probably its most painful history, in France, where the revolutionaries made the fateful mistake of putting equality on the same level as freedom. It is a derivative of freedom, or rather a property of it, being equality *of* freedom. We are equal in having the moral freedom that distinguishes us as men.[8]

The third practical point is that man's peculiar status makes each individual man an end in himself. This doctrine is clear enough in Locke, and is emphatic in the Christian tradition that originated it. There is an anticipation of it in the Greek conception of the State as a partnership in which each citizen is both subject and ruler in his own person. But it was left to Kant to utter the idea in its clearest form, and to give us the felicitous description of social life as a "realm of ends."[9] The idea is not intended to exclude our use of one another, for such use is reciprocal, the normal exchange of services by which society is maintained. What it does exclude, and that peremptorily, is that any human being should be *merely* used, treated wholly as an instrument or tool, and at the general plane at which we are now considering the matter, it makes no difference whether the exploiter be a State, a political party, a trust, a trade-union or an individual. No man—so runs this part of the big doctrine of freedom—is by nature *nothing but* the servant of an-

[8]Cp. Locke: "Though I have said above that all men by nature are equal, I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of equality. Age or virtue may give men a just precedency. Excellency of parts and merits may place others above the common level . . . And yet all this consists with the equality which all men are in in respect of jurisdiction or dominion over one another, which was the equality I there spoke of as proper to the business in hand, being that equal right that every man hath to his natural freedom, without being subjected to the will or authority of any other men" (*Two Treatises of Government*, 1690, Bk. II, ch. vi, sec. 54). The parable of the talents (Matt. xxv. 14ff.) implies inequalities of gifts and service.

[9]Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, sec. 2.

other, or the servant of the State. He has the obligation to serve his fellows, but balancing it is the right to be served in his turn. He has a value of his own, over and above the value of what he directly and obviously contributes to his community. That each of us is an end in himself is the cool philosophical formulation of the warm idea, which in the formative stages of democracy often became incandescent but which is now going stone-cold, of the worth or dignity of the individual. It is a better formulation, for it is richer in concrete suggestion. It also gives us another angle from which to view the nature of our equality. We have seen that we are all equal in the sense that we all have the freedom to act for reasons instead of being slaves of causal necessity. We may now see that we are all equal in being, in virtue of that same freedom, all alike on the level of ends, not distributed in a hierarchy in which many men, or even any, are put in entire subjection either to any other men or to any of the institutions devised by men. It is our business to translate this general abstract worth into the concrete worth of personal excellence and achievement. When we do this we shall complete the doctrine of freedom by producing its pragmatic proof, for a society whose members, being allowed their individual development, do their best to realize it, will build up a finer treasury of riches and a bigger arsenal of power than a nation that flattens the bulk of its citizens into the ignoble equality of subjection or the colourless equality of mediocre uniformity.

I began these lectures with a mention of the great trends and ends of history. I shall now return to that high theme, on which scarcely anything can be said that is not provocative. I return to it for the express purpose of being provocative. What, we may now daringly ask, is *the* goal of history? We usually think of it, with unreflective

vagueness, as "one far-off divine event, to which the whole creation moves,"[1] and pictures the process as a mighty stream gathering up and carrying forward all the busy rivulets of time and pouring them in one ultimate flood into an ultimate sea. The image of a single massive climax kindles the poetic in us, and the religious in us too is haunted by the prospect of a grand apocalypse, glorious or horrible, or perhaps both at once, as in the traditional image of a single Last Judgment or Doom, which is to inaugurate in one dread act the everlasting kingdom of the blessed and the everlasting chaos of the damned. If however, we are to take seriously the conception we have been studying, the conception of our essential worth as humans, we shall be induced to form another picture. If every human, possessed of the dignity of freedom from natural necessity, is an end in himself, he is such an end not for his fellows only but for history too. The prodigious time-process fulfils its purpose, justifies its energies and agonies, whenever it produces a full-grown man, one who has completed the original dignity of his essential freedom with the moral dignity of freedom well used, and, instead of allowing himself to be turned by society into an indifferent specimen of his kind, a barely distinguishable unit in a mass, has made himself really unique, assuming and discharging a strictly individual function and stamping somewhere on the course of events his own image and superscription. If this interpretation is right, history is not to be likened to a river, but rather to a stretch of canyons, plains and peaks, the canyons being the abject failures among us, the plains being all the nondescripts among us, and the peaks, of varying heights, being the men who have realized their

[1] Tennyson, *In Memoriam*, ad finem.

individuality, who have become themselves. On this picture, the function of history is to heave up peaks, and I imagine that we collaborate best in that function when, achieving our individuality shoulder to shoulder, we build our peaks into mountain ranges, instead of peppering the common plains with isolated hillocks. Picture or no picture, the doctrine of intrinsic individual worth, of each man as an end in himself, confers upon each of us the honour of finality, and this means that history has not one climax but many, triumphing every time a potential man becomes an actualized and irreplaceable individual. If the time-process be infinite, no single grand climax is possible. If it be finite, its ultimate climax (if there is to be one), being inconceivably remote, cannot be its only climax without degrading myriads of generations of millions of individuals into mere means to an end which only the final generation will enjoy; and that is shocking, a plain contravention of the unique and ultimate worth of each individual. The Christian tradition, which has done the most to spread the idea of individual worth, has found room for both an ultimate climax and for innumerable climaxes on the way: the ultimate climax is placed beyond history, where time can no more touch it, and the temporal climaxes consist of every moral victory that studs and dignifies our struggles here, each such victory reverberating out of time as well, for "there shall be joy in heaven over every sinner that repents."

Whatever be thought of these speculative suggestions, the fact remains that the most general course of history, like the most general course of evolution, has been a movement from the undifferentiated to the differentiated, from the generic to the specific, from the collective to the individual, from common and anonymous to personal and signed achievement. It is a further fact that all this

has been made possible by the waxing of man's singular emancipation from the natural compulsions that hold everything else but man in thrall. This freedom is clearly our birthright. It is the basic constituent of our humanity, so that to assert and expand it in every aspect of our living is our human task. To live by ideals or principles is to unfold the capacities that only man has; to live by instinct, habit, custom, fashion, imitation, social pressure, is to be regressive, atavistic, animal-like, reverting to servility to natural law. Freedom is what enables a man to be a man, and what entitles him to be treated as one, thus creating both a comprehensive obligation and a comprehensive right. It is freedom seen in this fundamental and general way that is the deepest principle of democracy, in that sense of democracy which until recently has been accepted in the western world. It was not the stupid idea of complete equality, and not the arithmetical idea of counting heads to see where the majority lies, that supplied the fire and drive to the splendid social movement that has given us our present heritage of political liberty. It was the recognition of man's peculiarity as a race, and every man's peculiar dignity.

As so understood, democracy has not one opposite but two, so that it has to guard itself on a double front. It is the opposite of demagoguery as well as of despotism. It is pitted as much against patronage and paternalism as against tyranny, as much again condescension as against contempt, as much against superior pity as against superior power, as much against being nicely looked after as against being trodden on. Contemporary democracy, guarding itself against its old foe only, is slipping into the coils of its other foe. Democracy, we are forgetting, excludes every social system in which men

are not treated as men, and therefore every system in which they are treated as children, as well as the system in which they are handled as beasts. It is the political expression of the ideal of manliness. It postulates that the aim of society is to release virility, and to supply the most varied stimuli to further virility. The basis of it is the conviction that there is a dignity which in some degree belongs to all men, and its programme is to make the sense and power of this dignity pass into the lives of all men. Measured by that fine standard, many of our contemporary programmes look sickly, framed as if all of us were childish, infirm or aged.

Such is the nature and vindication of our freedom. What, however, would happen if we all stepped into the social arena prepared to exercise this essential liberty? Would it not be dangerous? Is it not an explosive thing? Well, if it were, it would be more congenial to a vigorous people than doses of dope to keep them docile. Still, the question is a fair one. Is freedom—the kind of freedom that has been here defined—purely individualistic, antisocial, anarchic? That is our next subject.

III

FREEDOM IN SOCIETY

A SOCIETY MUST have order, and the task of government is usually defined as the securing of this. If the definition be accepted—and it is true as far as it goes, being only inadequate—we may describe the special difficulty of democratic government by saying that it is the reconciliation of public order with private freedom. Two factors have to be watched instead of one. Dictatorship, whether by one man dominating a clique, as lately in Italy and Germany, or by a clique, as still in Russia, or by the masses, as in some uneasy democracies, by reducing the political problem to the securing of order, is the most drastic of all simplifications of government, a simplification which we used to suppose to be a primitive thing natural in the past but outworn since the West began the move towards political maturity. Both in the modern dictatorships, and in the flabby collectivism that is copying their methods, the reconciliation of public order with private freedom has been stigmatized as impossible. If it is, democracy is impossible, since democracy stands for limited authority on the side of the government, and conditional obedience on the side of the governed; and on the face of it this looks like a necessarily disruptive principle.

Yet the assumption of the critics of democracy, that order and freedom must be defined as opposites, may be

confidently denied. In logic, they are not opposite but simply different; that is, they are not like black and white, but like red and green. In fact, they sometimes conflict and sometimes do not, and when they do it is not in virtue of any essential antipathy but because of the sort of contingencies that we study in psychology, those that arise from the complexity of our minds. In logic, they are not opposites because freedom is not identical with caprice or license, and because order cannot be sensibly defined as something that has to be externally imposed. We cannot, therefore, short-circuit the business of government by blandly asserting the incompatibility of order and freedom. If we do, we must lop off one or the other, and in the contemporary mood—so sickly are we, and so dependent on the external social framework—it is freedom that we are likely to let go. But, as we have seen, when that goes, our humanity goes with it, and when this goes, civilization will fall to pieces.

Freedom and order are like living things: they have their perverse as well as their normal forms. In recent years we have become so used to the spectacle of perversity that we are in danger of losing the sight and sense of normality. It is becoming a habit to know things only in their baser states, and in consequence our very vocabulary, the names that were given to things when they were good, has become corrupted. Hence freedom has come to stand for license, and order for the rigid system that comes of imposition by a heavy hand. Each of those good things passes into its perverse form when it is regarded as absolute, as good in itself. I doubt if any philosophically trained mind could think of them as ends. They are not ends but means, not strictly ideals but conditions of ideals, requisites rather than constituents of human progress. It is when they are taken absolutely that they

become horrible, the one as anarchy, making the co-operative unfolding of our human nature impossible, the other as tyranny, in which our human nature is stamped on with contempt. Taken relatively to ideals, they become intertwined as ordered freedom, in which freedom is protected as much from its own vice of license as from the vice of tyranny.

The distinction between freedom and license is radical. In my account of freedom in the second lecture, I put all the emphasis not on its obvious aspect of absence of external restraint, but on its deeper aspect of emancipation from natural causal pressure. License is doing what we like, but this is really the very opposite of what we think it to be. In doing what we like we are not human at all, for we are not free at all; we are then merely the passive puppets of our instinctive and other impulsions. We are simply letting certain natural processes run their course. *We* are not doing anything: certain things are being done *in* us. Our behaviour is being causally determined by the raw stuff of our minds, not being chosen or decided by the self. Just as the scientist is not thinking freely when he thinks as he likes, but only when he breaks the bondage of prejudice, of likes and dislikes, and thinks by the choice of evidence, so in conduct we behave freely when our behaviour is shaped by the self in the light of a chosen principle instead of by the natural force of our inherited and acquired impulses. Freedom is self-determination, thinking and acting not under casual gusts or obstinate obsessions (since with these we are mere sports of Nature) but under the non-compulsive appeal of ideals.

Freedom would certainly be anarchic if it were license. It would be quite as anarchic if it were *nothing but* the

absence of causal compulsions, having no controls of its own inherent in it, or indeed if, having such controls, they happened to be different in every one of us. Now just because freedom is not absolute, but relative to ideals, being in its very nature the power to respond to ideals, these are its own controls; and although they are not exactly the same in us all, they have at least a formal or general identity, and would come to have a concrete identity—such is the faith of most philosophers—if we only thought enough about them. The controls, then, are reason and conscience, and they are common controls; and they are controls upon freedom because we have to be free to respond to them. I make no apology for returning yet again to this mutuality of freedom and ideals, since it is the nerve of my argument, the principle which I am trying to clarify, illustrate and confirm in as many ways as I have time to do. Freedom and ideals have no meaning apart from each other, and in fact as well as in right stand or fall together.

These controls are social in their general tendency. That is because of their common validity. Because we are all alike bound by them, they bind us to one another. Scientists, for example, have their differences, but deeper than these are the wide agreements that unite them. The saints have not all the same conscience, but because they all honour conscience as such, they honour one another even when they disagree. The ideal controls, then, because they are common, bring us together in the very exercise of our freedom. It is by reason itself that we recognize the need for social order; it is by conscience that we acknowledge duties to others; and it is by reason and conscience concurring—for the two are so near that in action they often fuse—that we see that it is impossible for all of us, and ought not to be possible for any of us,

to live in society on our own terms; and by the same concurrence of ideal faculties we see that rights are paired with duties, that human freedom is responsible freedom, and that because each of us is an end in himself each of us has to respect his neighbour. Freedom is social.

Reason and conscience are not the only bonds of society. If they were, there would have been no society until they had reached a fairly high degree of development. Besides being social at the ideal level, we are social at the natural level. Sociality is a part of our lower nature; as animals, we are gregarious, both desiring to be with our kind and needing to be. When in moments of stress or weariness reason becomes dim and conscience dull, the primitive bond of gregariousness, and the social sentiment that long social experience has built upon it, are often strong enough to hold us together. We have a natural, inborn, coercive altruism. True, it is unsteady, liable at any moment to be interrupted and overwhelmed by an equally natural, inborn, coercive selfishness. The instability of all this natural impulsiveness, in which such opposites as kindness and cruelty, co-operation and enmity, activity and idleness, simply jostle with one another, each winning or losing according to the casual strength of the moment—this very instability is what makes these natural impulsions unfit to raise our social life to the properly human level. Nevertheless, it is well for us that in the chaotic animal groundwork of our being there is something gregarious to add natural force and warmth to the social prescriptions of reason and conscience. We are fortunately bound to our fellows from below as well as from above. It is therefore not good for a man to be alone. If, though physically with our fellows, we hold ourselves mentally aloof, we are starving both our natural and our spiritual needs.

Social order or cohesion, then, is in fact built up not only by external imposition but also by natural instinct or sympathy, by the common insights of reason, and by the common commands of conscience—by four factors, not by one. Its human quality depends on the relative weight of these. It becomes more human according as external imposition is lessened, and reason and conscience are given more play; and when this is done, the factor of simple spontaneous sociality can be safely left to spill over as it pleases, to give its natural warmth to the rest. The contemporary tendency is the opposite of this humanizing one; it proceeds by the multiplication of external controls which in some countries by intention, and in all countries in effect, is abridging the practice of freedom, and stifling the spirit of it. It is dehumanizing because the *imposition* of order makes its chief appeal to fear and ease, which are not the qualities that make us men.

Is this extension of imposed order necessary? It must be granted that a modern society requires a more complicated framework than a society living under a pre-industrial economy. We must grant also that a modern society cannot allow its weaker members simply to go to the wall, but must respond to the moral demand for a better distribution of welfare; it must organize for the prevention of poverty, since poverty can be dehumanizing, and for the mitigation of it when, despite the precautions, it comes about. The challengeable issue concerns the limits and mode of control of the organizational structures which the new economy and the prevalent demand for social welfare seem to call for. In this issue there are technicalities—of economics, of law and of administration—which I am not competent to discuss. I must keep to the general standpoint of social philosophy. Viewed from this standpoint, the crucial fact is that we are putting the

whole burden of shaping and maintaining the new organizations on to the State, and since the State is the only instrument of coercion that we recognize, we are multiplying and aggravating the *external* controls in our social life. Our statute-books are bursting with new regulations, our administrative machinery is clogged with new tasks, and our politicians are confused by the variety and magnitude of the matters they are expected to handle on our behalf. On the side of the citizens, the most uncriminal among us, unless he takes every step with a lawyer by his side, may at any time find himself in the dock. We are being swathed in State bands, which are deserved if we are wicked or stupid, which are appropriate if we are infantile enough to need swaddling-clothes, but which, if we are decent, intelligent and knowledgeable adults, are intolerable, intolerable because coercive, and coercive by the one body that has the right of imposition and the force for it. The State, which we so long boasted should be merely our servant, is fast becoming our master.

There may be a dilemma here. It is conceivable that we are reaching a stage of economic and social complexity in which we shall be forced to choose between an inhuman efficiency on the one hand, and on the other a humane freedom that is prepared, for the finer values which it alone makes possible, to accept a simpler economic order and return to the personal facing of risks. If we are in a hurry, with no time or temper for long views, or if all we want is to be well cared-for animals, there is no doubt that we should choose the former alternative. But I am by no means convinced that we are faced with such a dilemma. What I am sure of is that underlying the present tendency to aggrandize the scope and power of government there is, in the democratic countries, an elementary confusion of ideas. Of this we are unconscious, and need

to be made conscious of it if we are to escape from what seems to me to be a false dilemma. In every democracy we are now simply taking for granted that since what concerns all the members of a nation—as wealth and poverty and their accessories clearly do—should be dealt with in the name of all, it should be dealt with by the State. We are thereby confusing the State with the nation, with the community as a whole.

On an organic, collectivist or totalitarian view of the State, that is no confusion but a deliberate identification, for according to such views the State *is* the all-embracing unity of the people, within which and for which every member must live out his life. Russia has recently given a consistent specification of this view by forbidding its citizens even to marry outside the State. But on the democratic view of the State, which rests on a more generous view of man and makes freedom one of its major values, it certainly *is* a confusion to make no distinction between community and State. The State is, of course, the whole community in the sense of including all the citizens. It is not, however, the community in its wholeness, but in one only of its aspects. Its sphere is not everything that is of common concern, but so much of this as in the first place ought to be, and in the second place can in practice suitably be, regulated by impersonal law, by imperatives with sanctions, and by an agency that can enforce the law with irresistible power. In the application of a principle stated in such very general terms there is much room for difference of interpretation, for the open controversy which democracy requires and which only democracy has the health to allow; but on any interpretation that principle sets very big limits to politics. The State is a people so far as it is politically organized, and the Government is its political organ. That definition

holds universally. Of democracies it holds with two qualifications. The first is that the Government is the concentration of the people's collective power for the formulation of the majority's will and the enforcement of this upon all its members severally, after making whatever concessions are possible to the will of the minorities. The second qualification is that the whole life of a people ought not to be dealt with in this way; and where the democratic spirit is well established, the whole life of a people cannot in fact be dealt with in that way. The matter may be put briefly by saying that democracy stands both for as much freedom as possible *within* politics, and as much freedom as possible *from* politics. It regards the Government as one only of the organs by means of which a people organizes and expresses its common concerns. It goes further, holding that the Government, despite its monopoly of coercion, is not necessarily the people's *supreme* organ. The Government cannot be allowed to claim overriding allegiance in all things. For the religious man, for example, God alone has the final claim; with or without that higher reference, we exempt conscience from political overruling; no true scientist will admit any control over his inferences except that which comes from the evidence; and no true poet will sing to a theme and a tune set by political authority. Herbert Spencer's saying that he had "a constitutional disregard of authority" was neither a piece of impudence nor a merely clever phrase, but an accurately worded expression of the democratic conviction that the State has a limited function, and must be firmly kept to it.

Underneath, all around, and penetrating the State is a varied community-life in which the energies of a people find their free expression. In this area of spontaneous freedom we do not live as political entities, whether as

subjects of or as partners in the State. There we are not abstractions, interchangeable units, counters for statisticians, voters for politicians, or pawns for administrators to hold still or move about, but possess our being in its concrete plenitude. There we walk as individuals, with ties of blood and friendship, with a large space of interest and activity entirely our own, and with a sphere of social interest in which we can organize ourselves as we please into non-political groups. There we live as unique persons, in relations that are personal, and by methods that spring from willing co-operation, and which for the most part could not be codified, and could not be enforced, without losing everything that makes them acceptable and effective, there being many ways with humans that cannot be effective unless they are acceptable. These non-political relations and associations we may enter and leave at will, and in them we can behave not as general instructions from above prescribe but as the particular situation requires. A local human problem arises, and without fuss or pretentiousness a few people come together and deal with it, and then dissolve, sorting themselves into other associations that come into being and disappear in the same sensible way. Some social interests or needs are steady, and therefore give rise to more or less lasting associations, but within them too we act without constraint and suitably to the occasion, and we join or quit them when we please. All this community-life, human, personal, intimate, free, is the source from which the huge, impersonal mechanism of the State derives whatever life it has, and all State encroachment upon it impoverishes it, and thereby impoverishes the State as well. Hence the short-lived strength of dictatorships, which are unable to preserve a permanent pool of ability and character for the

regular filling of all the offices of State. The vigour of a nation lies in the extent and healthiness of the non-political side of its life. Political organization was a marvellous invention, an historical accomplishment of the first order, reflecting a social genius as well as meeting a social need; but the genius goes out of it when it is allowed to grow by its own momentum, to go on extending almost automatically, instead of being vigilantly kept to its function, namely, the care of so much of our common concerns as can be brought under general regulation, be administered impartially, and be enforced without exception. The generality and impartiality and coerciveness that make a State a State unfit it for the handling of an indefinitely wide range of social problems.

The Anglo-Saxon tradition has emphasized all this in what has come to be called the voluntary principle. We learned until recently to cope with most of our social problems by voluntary association, and in that way not only kept for ourselves a larger area of freedom than was known in almost any other country, but also acquired a training in initiative, organization and joint action which enabled us to move into politics, when we had to do so, with prior insight and competence. We received our education for self-government not from books but from the habit of voluntary social service. That, I am sure, is the chief explanation of the political maturity that used to distinguish Anglo-Saxon life, and which has not yet altogether gone out of it. We grew by directly tackling as many communal problems as possible by our own direct efforts. We saw the need for schools, hospitals, almshouses and suchlike, and quite simply supplied the need by getting together in friendly co-operation. As these tasks grew with a growing population, and with

rising standards of how they should be discharged, they became too big and too costly for exclusively voluntary effort, and had then to be handed over to the State, probably to everybody's advantage; but these State institutions still bear upon them heavily the impress of their voluntary origin, the tradition of humaneness and flexibility having proofed them against overmuch bureaucratic control.

Today, however, another practice is setting in. The process of handing over social tasks to the State is going on indiscriminately. We follow the first precedents without troubling to make sure that we have the same justifying reasons. Any big problem is now thrown at once on the State for its solution, which is thus from the outset given an impersonal character. Even where such commission to the State is seen to be probably eventually necessary, it might in some cases be possible to set up first a voluntary organization, and to work it long enough to ensure that a human, personal tradition is established before the impersonal hand of the State takes control. But we are now deserting the voluntary principle and are following the State principle, which leads either to dictatorship or to collectivism, and therefore away from the democratic evaluation of life in terms of freedom and individual worth. The supposedly democratic justification, that since the State consists of all and exists for all it is obviously the body to assume all common concerns, will not do, for the identification of State and community on which it rests is contrary to what the democratic mind has stood for.

Along with this confusion of State and community there is, I believe, an element of cant. When a people turns over its problems easily to the State, it is not really

shouldering them in a collective way. It is getting rid of troublesome matters by laying them on a small group of men, the Government of the day. It deals with the matters by proxy; in other words, *it*—the people—does not deal with them at all. At most, it will dip its hands into its pockets to pay in taxation the cost of the solutions, sometimes with surprise and resentment at there being any cost. Where a people makes no more contribution than that to the surmounting of its communal difficulties, it can only barely claim to be a democracy. The trouble with contemporary democracies is that the Government has far too much to do and the citizens far too little. Of course the citizens must do some things by proxy. Democracy does involve representation and this does mean the handling of some common concerns by proxy. But when we take our stand on that, hold to that and will have nothing other than that, we are emphasizing the convenient externals of democracy and are ignoring the whole soul of it. Democracy is an attitude, not a constitution, and when the attitude disappears, the persisting constitution is but a false façade. I can see nothing worth emulation or celebration, nothing fitted to make posterity climb a step higher up the ladder of history, in our new habit of referring all our social problems, including those that we have ourselves created or aggravated by our selfishness or improvidence, to the Government—a nation of millions loading its burdens on the shoulders of a score of men, and execrating them in public as well as in private when they fumble, falter or fail. No; that is not democracy, but only the lingering ghost of it. When a spade is called a spade—as it rarely is in these sophisticated days—that way of conducting the affairs of a nation is mass infantility, petty, petulant and perverse. It is almost as

debilitating as dictatorship. Where is the virility in it? Where the reality of the boast that we are men? What is the freedom but a running away from co-operative responsibility and effort? There is nothing so easy as delegation, and nothing so contemptible as blasting the public name of delegates on whom we have laid impossible tasks. It is an insult on our forefathers' independence of spirit to give to this easy device the honourable title of democracy. It rests on love of ease, and the consequent fear of freedom. It is the abnegation of manhood.

The democratic ideal, as understood by those who did not shout the name but worked for the thing, was that a nation should be a society of free persons, a community remaining a community—that is, bound by personal links—despite its adoption of the political device of control by enforceable law; for when persons hold freedom as a conviction they can regulate a great part of their common affairs without delegation and law and force; and when they do resort to law they can take the sting of imposition out of it by helping their legislators to reduce it to a minimum, and by carrying it out in the spirit that enables it to produce its intended effect. Freedom, I have noted repeatedly, involves responsibility, and therefore individual freedom means individual, personal responsibility. If, then, democracy is to mean anything like what it meant when it was being shaped, as the social system in which men can act and be acted on as men, the liberty it involves, being a moral liberty, puts the responsibility squarely on our own shoulders. We cannot shift any but a small part of it on to a tiny group of politicians. If we pool it in such a way as to lose our individual share of it, thinning it out over the millions of us so that every-

body's business becomes nobody's business, that business either remains undone or has to be taken over wholly by the Government of the day. It is the assumption by all the citizens of personal responsibility, expressing itself both outside the law and in it, that distinguishes democracy from all other systems—from the dictatorship that is only government of the people, the paternalism that is only government for the people, and the collectivism or mass-shouting that pretends to be government by the people. It is by virtue of its central emphasis on the responsible freedom of each individual, and on the dignity belonging thereto, that democracy alone is fitted to preserve that inner vitality which is necessary for sustained and advancing cultural achievement, and without which any nation, under modern conditions, will pass first into insignificance and then into subjection—a law of progress and a law of degradation with which I have no quarrel, since it is a proof that the universe we are in is constituted morally.

The view of democracy which I have been trying to clarify makes it not one political system among a number of expediencies, but the only one in which men who really are men can govern and be governed. It therefore depends for its possibility on personal qualities. If what I have said be granted, the belief now fashionable, that a juster, happier and more humane society can be *legislated* into existence, is simply silly. If we could assemble a cabinet of statesmen superhuman enough to be able to see so clearly through the enormous complexities of the affairs of a modern nation as to be able to frame laws perfectly fitted to regulate them, there would be some advance, but not much, for whether the laws would work or no would depend not on the statesmen but on the

citizens; and whether or no the affairs that are too variable or too inward to be regulated by law at all could be rightly handled would depend entirely on the citizens. Whenever we examine thoroughly any political programme we find that what matters most in a State is the tone and temper of the citizens, the ideals and standards they have, and the degree of their intelligent devotion to these. If the personal qualities are right, the external framework of law, administration, custom and voluntary association will go on improving up to the limits set by world conditions outside any one nation's control. If they are wrong, an enlightened Government would be either frustrated or be obliged to discard democratic limitations on its power and assume either paternal or dictatorial authority. The tone and temper which, more than the law and the personnel of government, make or prevent a truly human social order, reside in the mind of the great millions who *are* the nation, and for whose well-being the political organization exists. A people that demands a better social order, when that people has all the power that universal suffrage brings with it, and presses that demand without raising its own mentality, is expecting its politicians to work by magic. This is the superstition of contemporary politics. When we are in a democracy, the conditions of improvement reside preponderantly in ourselves. It is both a natural and a moral impossibility to be merely the beneficiaries of government. Just as a Government has no economic wealth of its own, but has to depend on what we produce and on how much of this we are willing to surrender in the form of taxation, to cover the cost of the public services which we demand; similarly, a Government cannot create the life it is to govern, and cannot alone maintain the standards of good

legislation and administration. The political level and vigour of the State are quite inevitably the reflection of the life of the people as a community of individuals in their daily unorganized contacts with one another. Again, in a democracy we cannot be beneficiaries only; and neither can we be victims only; for we are not subjects merely but also partners, not puppets or effects only of the State but its causes too, either providing the current of moral and intellectual power that keeps it in progression, or else standing as an immovable and stupid block which even a cabinet of archangels could not organize into a happy and advancing society.

Politics has its own laws of cause and effect, its own technique, its own requirements of special skills. There is one craft of the statesman, another of the legislator, and another of the administrator. There can be no substitute for these. When a nation puts its public affairs, even the minimum of these, into the hands of men not trained to deal with them, but only possessing good intentions, or perhaps loving place and power, it cannot blame the consequential muddle on anything but its own unintelligent choice. Nevertheless, the highest competence in the Government is not enough. Leaders intelligently chosen must be intelligently supported. To put the point in another way, while the leaders should merit our respect, we should merit theirs. The democratic constitution requires them to pay an external deference to our views and attitudes, but these are for the most part so cheaply formed as to deserve nothing more than such merely formal acknowledgment. We have to exact the genuine respect of our leaders, and this we are not doing. I have no hesitation in saying that our failure to do this is one of the chief causes of the political slump in the

democracies today. Not without some reason, our politicians are losing faith in their constituencies. Those who retain it are the toughest idealists in the world. Public administration is probably the most disillusioning task there is; it brings those who are engaged in it full up against the worst in human nature—the cringer for benefits or honours, the scrambler for power, the liar, the deceiver, the spy, and all those who think that public institutions are fair game for anything. Among these are many who are careful to observe the decencies of private life, but do not believe that they apply to public life. It is idle to keep silent about this aspect of our present troubles, for a crisis is upon us, and we must make the diagnosis candidly. When a democracy sickens, in nine cases out of ten it is the majority that is at fault, for it is the majority that is responsible for its leaders, and for withholding the kind of support without which even the best leaders cannot discharge their onerous functions with success. A democracy sickens when it emphasizes only the responsibility of the leaders to the people. In order to win the respect of good leaders, and thereby to draw more of these into the high places of politics, a people must give plain proof in the quality of their daily dealings with one another that they are fit to handle political freedom and power unselfishly and constructively.

Such are the qualities of mind which a democratic society can neglect only at its peril. They are not, be it noted, specifically political qualities, but general mental excellencies that have their occasional political expression. What we are in our citizenship depends on what we are in our whole life. It is absurd as well as immoral to go on as we are doing, requiring of our leaders excellencies which we have no intention of building up in ourselves.

We cannot take every advantage over our fellows and expect our politicians to give us a just social order. We cannot stick to our prejudices and expect them to be impartial. Their overwork cannot cancel out our civic laziness, our merely passive citizenship, and their competence is frustrated if we are ignorant or careless of the great common concerns. Once more, if the general community-life is not sound, the State cannot be, the State being not a distinct thing but simply the community in its politically organized aspect.

Thus the cleansing and strengthening of democratic society has really to be effected in the area of life that is not directly political, in the general sphere of our community-life—at home, at work[1] and in our leisure, and not least in our leisure, this being the acid test of whether or no we are fit to be free, for it is in our leisure that we are most free. Indeed, I would go so far as to say, my line of argument compelling me to do so, that the best mind for politics is not the politically minded one. This is not a mere paradox. A person, who, from his youth up, gives his *chief* attention to politics, throwing himself early into the party game, is forming his mind in an inflammatory and pugnacious sphere. That is not educative, but the opposite. It fixes the habit of selecting facts that fit one's own case, and of arguing not for truth but for victory, and it makes one less capable of being generous to one's opponents. It takes a young man away too early

[1] In this connection A. N. Whitehead has one of his rare references to the business mind: "The behaviour of a community is largely dominated by the business mind. A great society is one in which its men of business think greatly of their functions. Low thoughts mean low behaviour, and after a brief orgy of exploitation low behaviour means a descending standard of life. The general greatness of the community, qualitatively as well as quantitatively, is the first condition for steady prosperity, buoyant, self-sustained, and commanding credit." (*Adventures of Ideas*, 1933, ch. VI, sec vi).

from the concrete stuff of life, the variety of which he has not yet learned, into the abstract and impersonal aspects of it with which the State is concerned. It robs him of the unstudied contacts, the simple companionships without ulterior motives, the easy movement from group to group, which alone can give us knowledge of life and keep that knowledge sweet. There are few people so tiresome as the red-hot youthful politician. None of us, I am increasingly convinced, should begin to make politics his *chief* interest until his mind has already been healthily formed in the non-political life of the community. The qualities of mind that condition sound political judgment—e.g. human sympathy, social imagination, and a bias for foreseeing the particular practical implications of a suggested policy or programme—are more soundly built up first outside of politics than in it. With them we can learn the craft of politics; without them we shall only become doctrinaire, or perhaps efficient enough to run the political machinery in its routines, but not human enough to respond sensitively to the troubles and aspirations of our fellow-citizens and to handle, not the machinery, but them. A wide extension of early political-mindedness contracts and sours the social mentality of a people, makes it factious, and divides it into extremes; and when that pitch is reached, the only peace possible is that which is imposed by the party that has the most strength, the most cunning, and the least scruple about oppression.

The best education for politics, then, whether we wish to become politicians or simply good citizens, is indirect. It consists in whatever is requisite to give us a whole mind. The stuff of life comes first; we must enter unreservedly into all the common activities and experiences of the ordinary man, feeling ourselves into his sufferings and

enjoyments, his limitations and possibilities. That and that alone will make our practical judgments at once warm-hearted and sagacious. For the rest there comes in as much education as a man can absorb, provided it be broad and balanced. In the universities we cannot suspend our specializations, for these are the condition of that expertness in the known and that steady eating into the unknown for which universities, at the apex of the educational system, exist; but we can destroy the isolation of our several specializations. The student who is widening and refining his human sensibility in the Arts has need of the cool clearness and iron discipline of thinking which the sciences can provide; and the student of science should remember that his detachment is only half the qualification required for the understanding of human affairs. Let history be not political only, but the whole story of man's varied life. Economics and jurisprudence can be mischievous when they are not set in a philosophy of society. And so one might go on. Whatever may be the special aim or utility of our subject, we should use it as an opportunity for acquiring the educated mind, without which we are nothing but technicians, skilled in a narrow craft, and unskilled in the things for which every man was made.

It is because the contemporary mood is withdrawing its attention right away from personal qualities, and is placing all its emphasis on the social framework, that I am trying to pull attention back to what is really basic. Many will charge me with ignoring the importance of the social framework. No student of human affairs can be unaware of that. The shape of a society certainly affects mentality widely and deeply, and some sorts of organization are necessary for the emergence of personal freedom.

In a society where people can wither in poverty, ignorance and indecency through no fault of their own, something more tangible is required than the preaching of ideals. What a hungry man needs first is not civic liberty but bread, and a reasonable prospect—for no cast-iron guarantee is possible—that he will not hunger again. There are countries in which this aspect of the problem is the most urgent one. But it is a propagandist extravaganza to say that countries like Canada and Britain are at that desperate level. There is still much to be done to raise the material standard of living, but the great majority of our citizens have sufficient freedom from material distress to have the power, if they had also the will, to become far more fully human and adult than they now are. The problem is a moral one, and the solution of it is more moral than political. Our very weakness consists in our being much more controlled by impersonal social forces than we need be, and we therefore depend upon them more as our sense of weakness increases. We run after new doctrines because they are fashionable; or we look weakly for the winning side; or we number ourselves in hate among the misanthropic malcontents; or we wring our hands and hope that affairs will straighten themselves. We spend ourselves in adultation or criticism, or else we do not spend ourselves at all. That is not the life which adult humans ought to live, and with it we can never produce a really human society.

Of course we need an improved social framework, or an improvement in the working of it; but only through the assumption by most of us of our personal moral responsibility can that framework be modified so as to make its operation humanly satisfying. Without that moral temper, the enlargement of the functions of State is *neces-*

surely fatal to freedom, and therefore to all that freedom makes possible. Just because the framework is important, we should shape it with a foresight of the full range of its effects, and if we must extend it, we must call for still more personal moral strength in order to keep the swelling structure so completely our creature that it cannot turn itself into a Frankenstein, and so fully under the general control of the community that it could not be seized and held by a tyrannous minority. The aggrandizement of the power of government so that those who hold it can dominate the whole life of the nation is the evident, and consistent, aim of the extreme Left and the extreme Right alike, and many support this way because it would bring them an immediate ease or easement, not reckoning in all that the loss of freedom would pull down upon them. There is a kind of ease that releases virility, but the surrender of freedom cannot be of that kind.

The moral problem, then, is still prior to the problem of structure. Further, I believe the current assumption to be profoundly wrong that even the structural problem is to be solved preferably in the political way. Anyhow, it is only an assumption that the removal of all our large communal troubles is to be sought by the enlargement of the political machinery, and in exposing that assumption to the light of examination I have only been doing one of the typical tasks of a student of philosophy. I have pointed out that it rests on either the deliberate or the confused identification of community and State. What I have been trying to make clear is not the unimportance of the social framework, but the higher and more urgent importance of the methods and spirit with which that framework is devised and maintained. The more it is caught up in the coils of political power, the more impersonal and ungainly

it becomes, and the more oppressive, since political power is what individuals and minorities cannot resist without disaster to themselves. The more it is devised and maintained non-politically, the more it will express, and encourage the growth of, the qualities that make us men; and it is these qualities alone that can enable us to produce a lastingly better society. There is, in all conscience, room for more security and more ease, but we shall not get them until we love them less. Not these, but the freedom that makes them and very much else both possible and deserved, is what we shall have to restore to its due place in the hierarchy of personal and social values.

About the Author

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In 1914-1918 Dr. Jessop was with the infantry on the Western Front, was twice wounded (permanently disabled) and won the Military Cross.

In the Second World War, rejected on volunteering for the Army, he gave almost full time to helping as a civilian in the education and chaplaincy services of the Army and R.A.F., chiefly in Britain but with tours overseas to camps ranging from Austria to Cyrenaica, from Malta to India and Ceylon. O.B.E. in 1944.

Dr. Jessop is still engaged in educational work, his chief concerns being citizenship and international affairs. He is an Honorary Directory of the Student Christian Movement, a Methodist, but known in all the Churches. He specializes in conducting conferences and schools for ministers and lay leaders.

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