

III

FREEDOM IN FELLOWSHIP

1. CO-OPERATION AND COMMUNITY

WE HAVE DISTINGUISHED two main sets of conditions to which human freedom is relative. The first includes the *means* of action. We must have powers adequate to our intentions. The second concerns the *ends* of action. The intentions which we seek to realize must themselves be possible. Underlying both is the primary condition to which all freedom is relative—the inherent sociality of human life. The power by which we achieve our ends is a function of social interdependence, and its increase towards adequacy depends upon the efficiency of the system of organized co-operation. Equally, however, the possibility of the ends which we seek is socially determined. For what one of us intends may be incompatible with the purposes of others. The demands made upon the available resources may be in conflict, so that if one is achieved the other cannot be. Sometimes, no doubt, this may mean only that the available means, though adequate for either, are too small for both; and in such cases an increase in resources will remove the incompatibility. But this is not by any means always the case. The ends themselves may be in conflict. They may be *inherently* incompatible. In such cases freedom is lost. Even in the extreme case, where one party gives up his purpose without a struggle, he yields his freedom. But this is unusual, since it can only happen in the simplest cases where each party is directly and clearly conscious of the intention of the other. For the most part

these conflicts of ends are mediated through the system of interdependence in which we live. They appear to us as impersonal obstacles which frustrate our efforts and whose origins we cannot trace. The conflict of ends gives rise to a struggle for power, and in this struggle the intentions of each party are perverted to securing victory over the other; and the resources available are used, and possibly used up, merely to reach a point at which the real intentions may be at length pursued. So freedom is destroyed. For while the conflict continues the adversaries must lay aside the hope of achieving their real intentions. Each must act for ends dictated by the other's opposition; and the victor, if there be a victor, regains his freedom of action with his resources impaired, and often reduced to a point at which they are inadequate to his original purposes. If, then, there is to be freedom in society, it is not enough that our resources should be adequate to our intentions. There must be a compatibility of ends. Our intentions must not merely be possible. They must be compossible with those of all the others. It is this demand for a compossibility of intentions which sets the problem of freedom in fellowship.

Of these two major conditions of social freedom, the compossibility of intentions is the more fundamental. The economic system of co-operation for the production and increase of our resources has in itself no reference to freedom or to justice. Its regulative principle is simple efficiency; the best system is the one which produces the greatest quantity with the least expenditure of effort and resources. The unity it requires is not of persons, but of functions. The demand for justice in this co-operation, which is the proper aim of politics, is imposed upon it to safeguard the personal rights of all participants, and to prevent the sacrifice of freedom to mere efficiency. Justice, indeed, is a negative and external principle. It is negative, because its purpose is to set limits to the use of power. It

is external, because it works through the subjection of everyone to rules. Yet it is a *moral* principle, and rests upon an inner intention to secure that my own freedom shall not infringe the like freedom of other persons. It contains, therefore, a negative reference to the compossibility of intentions. Where intentions are not compossible, they shall be limited, by compulsion if necessary. The search for freedom through justice is itself a negative aspect of the effort to achieve a compossibility of intentions.

The achievement of justice in co-operation is relatively, but not absolutely, independent of the compossibility of intentions. In principle, whatever determines the ends of action must ultimately determine the means to these ends. The relative independence arises from the fact that the same means can be used to achieve diverse ends. It is possible, therefore, to amass resources without determining, in detail, the ends which they are to serve. But there are limits to this independence. The efficiency of organized co-operation depends upon an orderly subordination of functions, and this must concentrate power in the hands of those persons or groups who exercise superior functions. If there is an incompatibility of intentions, those with superior power will achieve freedom at the expense of their functional inferiors. Justice, as the natural end of political organization, seeks to neutralize this effect, and to secure a fair distribution of freedom. It does this by means of a conception of *right*, which sets limits to the use of power, and to the inequality of its distribution. The exercise of freedom is the use of power to realize an intention. To limit the use of power is therefore to limit freedom. The principle of *right*, therefore, only arises where intentions are incompatible. It is pointless to limit the freedom of one person unless it is incompatible with the freedom of another; for where all are able to realize their purposes, however diverse these may be, everyone is equally free. Thus

justice, originating in the necessity to regulate a *de facto* incompatibility of intentions, is itself concerned to secure a compossibility of intentions: but it does this negatively and externally, by determining, according to a rule, which intentions shall become effective in action.

Justice can be secured only through a system of institutions designed for the purpose of securing freedom. Yet these institutions, however perfectly designed, do not of themselves suffice to secure it. The effectiveness of democratic institutions depends upon how they are used. It is widely recognized that some peoples are more apt in their use than others. The British peoples have made excellent use of them. So have the Scandinavians. In Italy and in Germany democracy has had less successful results. In the South American Republics and in the Republic of China, the existence of democratic institutions has been even less successful in securing its avowed aim. These variations in effectiveness have generally been accounted for by reference to differences in national character. Though this is a vague and metaphorical notion, it has at least the merit of recognizing that the securing of political freedom depends on another factor besides democratic institutions and that this other factor is an inner and spiritual one.

The instruments of democratic freedom, then, can be used, more or less successfully, to secure their purpose. But they can also be used to defeat their purpose. In our own time we have witnessed, in Germany and elsewhere, the successful use of democratic institutions to overthrow freedom. We have seen the instruments of justice employed to establish tyranny and to maintain it. In face of this experience, though we may still insist that democratic organization is a necessary condition of freedom, at least in an industrialized society, we are debarred from counting it a sufficient condition. We are driven to inquire what

this other factor may be which determines whether the instruments of freedom shall be used, and successfully used, for the purpose to which they were designed.

One difficulty which meets us when we seek to answer this question is the indefiniteness and ambiguity of the language at our disposal. Human nature, we have said, is inherently social. But the term "society" is itself ambiguous. It covers any form of human association which is more or less permanent. Associations of human beings are of various types, however, and rest upon different principles of unity. Of these principles two are so radically distinct in type that their confusion has dangerous consequences, not in theory merely but also in practice. There is a type of association which is constituted by a common purpose. There is another which consists in the sharing of a common life. It is essential to our purpose to distinguish these by using different terms to refer to them; and I propose to use the terms "society" and "community" for this purpose. An association is, then, a "society" when its members are united in the service of a common purpose; it is a "community" when they are united in sharing a common life. The two principles of unity, clearly, do not exclude one another. A society may also be a community. But this is not necessarily so; and even where both principles are effective in the same group, they may be effective in very different degrees. But the principles themselves are radically distinct.

A society, in this sense, is a group of persons co-operating in the pursuit of a common purpose. The common purpose creates the association; for if the purpose should disappear, the society will go into dissolution. It also dictates the form of association; since the members must co-operate in the way which will secure the common end; and the ideal form for such an association is the form which realizes the common purpose most efficiently. Each member has his

place in the group by reason of what he contributes, in co-operation, to the pursuit of the common end. He is a member in virtue of the function he performs in the group; and the association itself is an organization of functions. Thus, though the members are persons, and the group is an association of persons, the members are not associated *as persons*, but only in virtue of the specific functions they perform in relation to the purpose which constitutes the group; and the society is an organic unity, not a personal one. This organic, functional, impersonal character remains even where the common purpose is necessary and permanent. The co-operative association to provide the necessities of life rests upon a common purpose which is not fortuitous, but universal and compulsory in human experience. The human societies which are constituted by such persistent and necessary purposes are still merely organic; they are functional and not personal associations. Their persistence and development, together with their compulsory character, gives rise to the State, as a central organ for the co-ordination and regulation of the co-operative life of an interdependent group. The State is, thus, the central institution of society; that is to say, of the functional association of a human group. It is organic; not personal.

A community, on the other hand, rests upon a different principle of unity. It is not constituted by a common purpose. No doubt its members will share common purposes and co-operate for their realization. But these common purposes merely *express*, they do not *constitute* the unity of the association; for they can be changed freely without any effect upon the unity of the group. Indeed it is characteristic of communities that they create common purposes for the sake of co-operation instead of creating co-operation for the sake of common purposes. It follows from this that a community cannot be brought into existence

by organization. It is not functional. It is not organic. Its principle of unity is personal. It is constituted by the sharing of a common life.

It might be objected that this in itself constitutes a common purpose to which community is relative. This is a common error in contemporary civilization, and it underlies the tendency to an apotheosis of the State. It is, indeed, the erroneous postulate of any thoroughgoing individualism. It assumes that the human individual is an independent, self-contained entity with a personal life of his own which he may or may not purpose to share with others. In fact, it is the sharing of a common life which constitutes individual personality. We become persons in community, in virtue of our relations to others. Human life is *inherently* a common life. Our ability to form individual purposes is itself a function of this common life. We do indeed enter into specific relations with our fellows in virtue of specific purposes of our own; and we must do so in order to realize, in concrete experience, the *common* humanity which makes us persons. But the sharing of a common life, in general, cannot itself be a purpose. It is our nature; and in sharing a common life we are simply being ourselves by realizing our nature. Community is prior to society.

We shall return to this essential issue later. For the moment we shall consider the practical effects of confusing the two types of human unity, as they have revealed themselves in contemporary history. For it was by his use of this confusion that Hitler was able to bedevil world-politics for a decade. Not that he invented the confusion. He found it ready-made to his hand in the modern conception of nationalism. But the situation of the German people enabled him to use it with effect; and, I imagine, consciously.

Nationalism is a conception which identifies the idea of the State with the idea of nationality. The State is

essentially territorial. It is a legal entity in the sense that the boundaries of its territory are the limits of its legal authority. It is a material entity—a piece of the land surface of the earth within which a single system of law is authoritative. Nationality, on the other hand, has no inherent reference to territory. Originally it is based upon natural kinship, and the idea of kinship clings to it even when the biological basis is no longer a matter of literal fact. A nation is a group of human beings who are bound together by a sense of kinship. The bond is a spiritual bond. The mere fact of kinship is not enough. If men are ignorant that they are racially kin, the mere fact will not bind them together. The belief that they are kin, even if it is scientifically without basis, will do so. Nationality, therefore, as a unifying force in human association, is a psychological, not a geographical, fact. The “kinship” which constitutes it is symbolic, even when it has a real biological basis. Essentially it is constituted by the consciousness, in its members, that they share a common life, a common experience, a common tradition. Among the many factors which may combine to produce such a “national consciousness,” one of the most effective is the sharing of a common language. A common religion would seem to be more powerful still; in the case of the Jews, for example, it has been able to preserve the sense of kinship for centuries in the absence of almost all other factors.

To be effective, nationalism requires the coincident of these two factors—the territorial and the psychological. Where all those who are united by a sense of common nationality happen also to reside within the boundaries of the same State, the task of government is, of course, much easier. But there is no logical relation between the two principles of unity, and their coincidence in fact is fortuitous, depending upon the accidents of history. With the development of world transport, and the increase of

migration, it becomes less and less likely that the coincidence required by nationalism will in fact be found. The attempts to produce it artificially by a compulsory exchange of populations, which we have witnessed after both world wars, are barbarous and unnatural. Nationalism, with its dogma of the so-called right of national self-determination, rests already and will rest increasingly, if it persists, upon an unconscious atavism in the human mind. So long as it persists, it is a menace to the peace of the world. It can be dissolved only by dissociating its two components—the idea of citizenship, depending upon territorial residence, and the idea of nationality.

In Germany the coincidence of the two components of Nationalism was only approximate, and the element of national consciousness was the stronger of the two. There has always been a primitive and sentimental mysticism clinging to the German idea of "das Volk"—the people; a sort of legendary tribalism which found symbolic expression in the idea of "blood and soil." The political unification of Germany, on the other hand, came only very late; imposed forcibly by the military power of Prussia, and necessitated by industrialization. The German State had to be constructed out of a loose confederation of principalities. The basis for this construction was the sentiment of an organic, an almost biological unity of the German Folk. The task was to find a legal and therefore a territorial organization which would embody and express this sentiment of unity. But in the case of Germany, the attempt to combine the two components of Nationalism—territory and national sentiment—sets an insoluble problem. It is not possible to draw a line on the map which will enclose all the people who are bound together by the sentiment of German nationality. In other parts of Western Europe—in France, in Italy, in Spain, in Britain, for example—there are natural boundaries, or where the

boundaries are artificial, they have been so long defined that there has been time for the sentiment of nationality to grow up within them. With Germany this is not so. Even her Western boundary, for a Germany seeking to construct a national State, is ambiguous. It has been defined for her, by other nations, without too much regard to national sentiment. Alsace-Lorraine, in particular, is problematic, and also of great industrial importance. But the Eastern boundary has always been fluid, and along it the intermixture of peoples makes any determination artificial. It is complicated, too, by religious distinctions. Protestant Germans are mixed with Orthodox Slavs, Roman Catholic Germans with Roman Catholic Slavs in Poland, Catholic Germans with Protestant Slavs in Bohemia, where the natural territorial boundary of the mountains fails conspicuously to coincide with the limits of German sentiment. Austria herself is indubitably German, but until 1918 was bound up in the Austro-Hungarian Empire with a heterogeneous mixture of peoples, with outlying German settlements in Transylvania and the Trentino. On the South again there are the Germans of Switzerland. Thus any attempt on the part of Germany to construct her political and territorial unity on the principle of national self-determination could only lead, as it did, to confusion, catastrophe and war.

It was this situation which Hitler exploited so skilfully. Internally he completed the process of unifying Germany proper as a single, organic political unity, which had begun in earnest after the Napoleonic wars. Then, taking his stand upon the principle of nationality, as the leader of the German "Volk" he claimed the allegiance of all Germans everywhere to himself, for the task of creating the single, all-inclusive German *State*. This is the meaning of the Nazi slogan, *Ein Führer, ein Volk, ein Reich*—one leader, one people, one kingdom. It is important to realize that in

taking this line, Hitler was only pushing the dogma of the right of national self-determination to its logical conclusion, and in the process revealing the inherent irrationality of nationalism. The attempt to realize the German ideal involved, of necessity, a threat both to the unity of sentiment and to the territorial integrity of other States. Germans outside the borders of Germany could not give loyal allegiance both to the German Reich and to the countries of their residence; nor could they be included within extended German frontiers without including at the same time large numbers of non-Germans. Any possible solution, short of abandoning the attempt, could only be imposed by force. But the day is long past when localized territorial adjustments can be achieved by an appeal to arms. Industrialism has linked the peoples of Europe and of the world in a network of interdependence; and political organization is ineffective when it is not integrated with its economic basis. In fact, under modern conditions, the German appeal to war to achieve the demands of nationalism could only be successful if Germany could unify Europe, and ultimately the world, under her own suzerainty, by military conquest.

Under Hitler's leadership, Germany carried nationalism, with its principle of self-determination, to its logical conclusion. By doing so, Germany has proved the bankruptcy of nationalism as a principle of political organization, and has set us the task of overcoming and transcending it. From now onwards nationalism and freedom are incompatible. Their association since the French revolution, with one another and with the idea of progress, is accidental. In principle, modern nationalism is atavistic; it is a relapse into primitive tribalism; an attempt to reinstate the original organic unity of primitive society as an ideal for civilization. In rejecting nationalism, we are rejecting that worship of the primitive, that glorification of "nature," with which

the Romantics, from Rousseau onwards, infected modern European culture. We are refusing to be misled, by biological analogies, into substituting an "organic" society for a human community: and in doing so we are returning to the straight path of civilized development.

It is characteristic of primitive society that the two principles of unity, fellowship and co-operation, define the same group of people. The original kinship-group, from which all subsequent forms of human association are derived, is based upon blood-relationship, upon descent from a common ancestor. Kinship is the basis both of co-operation in work and of fellowship in community. This primitive group is the truly "organic" society. It is as close to the animal world as human life can come. The artificial element of rational construction is present only in embryo. There is a common life in which all the kin have their part; and reflection is limited to the consciousness of the common life and the expression of this consciousness in the rituals of primitive religion.

The development of the primitive group towards civilization inevitably dissociates the two bases of unity, so that they no longer define the same group. For this effect, the institution of slavery is decisive. In any slave-owning society the spiritual unity of fellowship is limited to a part of the co-operating group. The slaves are included in the society as co-operating members; they are excluded from the community of fellowship. From this point onwards it is rare to find a society in which both principles of unity define the same group of persons. The institution of an agricultural economy, and the settled life that goes with it, introduces territorial boundaries, and gives an impetus to the growth of property, and particularly of property in land. In consequence, residence within the territory of the group appears as a qualification for membership, and ownership of land within its boundaries is a

qualification for *full* membership of the community. The development of trade between independent territorial groups complicates and diversifies both types of unity. Co-operation passes beyond the limits of territorial and so of legal control; and some members of the group are linked in friendship with strangers. This process is well exemplified in the history of ancient Greece, and it produced the situation which created the imperialism first of Macedon and then of Rome: and in the city states of Greece, as in Hitler's Germany, it gave rise to the reactionary ideal of "self-sufficiency"—the vain effort to re-establish the primitive coincidence of co-operation and fellowship within the territorial limits of political independence.

In the Roman Empire the attempt to combine the two principles of unity has been given up. Its unity is a unity of organized co-operation within which religious and cultural toleration allows older unities of fellowship to maintain themselves and new forms of fellowship to develop autonomously. The Romans created in this way the modern idea of the State, as a unity of society based wholly upon law and administration, and so providing a framework within which co-operation can be organized and developed. The State, so conceived and constructed, has a pragmatic justification only. It is not concerned with culture, with unities of fellowship, except in so far as they threaten to disrupt the system of co-operation which it maintains. Its business in this field is the negative one of "keeping the peace."

Within such a system of administration, provided it is efficient, there tends to grow up a sentiment of loyalty to the institutions it maintains, and a sense of unity with all ones fellow-citizens. This inner shadow of the external system of co-operation is real enough, and can under suitable circumstances and by suitable methods provide a strong motive for common action. But since it is impersonal in

its nature, and dependent upon self-interest in the efficiency of the system of government, it has not the binding force of a sense of fellowship which is direct and personal. In the history of the Roman Empire, therefore, we find attempts to strengthen its inner unity by appeals to religion; first, in the deification of Rome, and of the Emperor as the personal symbol of Rome; and finally by the adoption of Christianity as the official religion of Rome. So there was created, in the society of the Roman Empire, what has remained the ideal pattern of social unity for West-European civilization. The two principles of human unity are recognized as functionally separate. Church and State are charged with the care of the inner and the outer unity of society respectively.

In this final phase of the history of the Roman Empire the external, territorial, legal unity is already realized. The task of the Church is, as it were, to transform the unity of co-operation into a unity of fellowship. After the collapse of the Roman Empire the situation was reversed. The Church survived the State, and it fell to the Church to create the unity of Western civilization anew, with the ideal inherited from the Roman Empire as its guiding principle. In this case it was the spiritual unification of Western Europe which came first. What was created was Christendom—an inner unity of fellowship through a common religion. The task which remained was to create a corresponding political and administrative framework for Christendom so that it might be also an effective co-operative unity. This political unification of Europe was never effectively realized. The Holy Roman Empire remained a form and a hope which failed to achieve substance. When the mediaeval world gave way to the modern, the new, protestant forms of religion shrank within the framework of the new independent states and modern nationalism was born.

When, therefore, we turn to the problem of our own day, which is, as we have seen, the achievement of an effective world-unity, we should bear in mind both principles of human unification. We should remember the relative dissociation of fellowship and co-operation in the process of social development, and the variety of possibilities which their interrelation affords. In particular, we should recognize and oppose, in our own modes of thought and speech, the atavism which infects our modern tradition, and which has been so powerfully reinforced by the influence of biological and evolutionary metaphors. The organic society, with its fusion of co-operation and fellowship on a basis of blood-relationship, lies not at the end, but at the beginning of history. It is what we are moving away from. The patterns of unity in fellowship no longer coincide with or correspond to the political patterns of economic co-operation. Nor is it either possible or necessary that they should.

The facts of the contemporary situation are against nationalism. Great Britain is, and has long been, a political unity of different nations. The sentiment of national unity among its citizens attaches to Scotland or Ireland or Wales or England, in the first place; and this fact has proved not a source of weakness, but of strength. This British differentiation of the cultural from the political unity had its main source in the historical accident by which a Scottish king inherited the English throne. It was confirmed by the failure of the English attempt—totalitarian in conception—to force episcopacy upon Scotland. Scotland remained free in fellowship, with her own type of established religion and her own distinct type of law. The solid and characteristic British resistance to totalitarianism is closely related to this fact and to the historic experience which has flowed from it. An epidemic of militant nationalism would not consolidate, but disrupt the political

unity of Great Britain. From this experience, too, flows the peculiar unity of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The bond of unity in the Commonwealth is purely spiritual. It is a unity of fellowship, unfettered by compulsory legal or economic bonds, which is yet extremely strong in spite, or should one not say, because of its freedom. The structure of this inner unity is extremely complex and fluid, as any unity of fellowship must be. It is composed of an interlacing network of particular and diversified loyalties and friendships. Its strength lies in this; and any attempt to impose a comprehensive legal and political unity upon it would destroy it.

When we look at the inner structure of the United States of America, the same diversity appears, though on a different pattern. Here a single legal and political unity, federal in structure, encloses a great diversity of nationality, race and tradition. American nationality, like British nationality, is a formal and legal conception, which depends ultimately upon residence within the territory covered and defined by Federal law. The diversity of origin in the United States is so recent and so palpable that even a mythological sense of blood-relationship is out of the question. Ties of nationality, tradition and culture link large sections of the American people to the various countries of Europe; and the unities of fellowship that have been developed between them in the new world link the nations of Europe in a new unity of European culture beyond their borders. The effectiveness of this inner and spiritual unity has been clearly demonstrated in our own lifetime. In two great wars it has triumphed over the economic self-interest of the United States, and brought its armies to Europe to save the threatened freedom of the European continent. Today it provides the mainspring of the generous and self-sacrificing aid which makes possible the reconstruction of European life, and tends powerfully in

the direction of a political federation of European nationalities.

We recognize these facts when they are pointed out to us, though perhaps we do not apprehend their general significance. When we think about the future, and plan for our salvation, we tend to ignore them. When we refuse a world-unity which would subordinate to one nation all the other peoples of the earth, we cannot but recognize that the diversity and intermingling of nationalities, races and cultures makes any principle of nationality out of date as a basis for complete political freedom. It is rather an irrationality to be contended with; an obstacle to be overcome. So we ignore it and all it implies and concentrate upon purely political and economic organization. We find ourselves, in consequence, contemplating a world-state. My contention is not that such a structure is impossible or inconceivable, but simply that it could only be achieved, as things are, by the sacrifice of freedom. A World State, in the present condition of world society, would necessarily be totalitarian. The strength of Communism depends in great part upon the fact that its conception of society has no relation to the principle of nationality. It provides a theoretical basis for an international, world-wide unity. A communist unification of the world is therefore a real possibility. A third world war, in my opinion, whatever its outcome, would make it a certainty. But freedom would disappear for a long time in this process, not because communism intends to destroy it, but because it thinks and plans exclusively in terms of co-operative unity, in economic and political terms, and ignores, when it does not actively oppose, the human unities of fellowship which alone, in the last analysis, make freedom possible. It seeks freedom through justice alone; and subordinates the freedom of fellowship to the patterns and the exigencies of economic

co-operation. It is this that is expressed in its doctrine that culture is a superstructure to an economic foundation. It is this that is symbolized in its antagonism to religion.

2. THE NATURE OF FELLOWSHIP

Up to this point we have been considering the distinction between co-operation and fellowship as types of human unity, and the tendency in history to their differentiation. We must now turn our attention to the nature and the significance of fellowship itself. Here lies the centre of the problem of freedom and the only hope of its resolution. This conclusion follows directly from our starting-point. Freedom is the defining character of human existence. Our capacity for freedom makes us persons. But this capacity has to be realized in the empirical experience of living and in the actual conditions, which vary from generation to generation, in which our life is set. The core of the problem must lie, then, not in the more impersonal aspects of human relationship, but where they are most total and most personal. Political freedom is abstract and impersonal. It abides in the character of co-operative relationships, and these are compatible with personal indifference, and with motives of the most varied kinds. Enlightened self-interest will serve, at least within limits, to sustain the co-operative effort, especially if it is supported by a common enmity. But personal freedom is incompatible with such motives. It can be achieved only in fellowship. Indeed the extent and the quality of such political freedom as we can achieve depends in the last resort upon the extent and the quality of the fellowship which is available to sustain it. Conversely, the unity of co-operation, which is the care of politics, has significance only through the human fellowship which it makes possible; and by this its validity and its success must be judged.

Any type of human unity must be realized under conditions; and in consequence it can be fully realized only where the conditions provide for its complete expression. The instances in which the structure of such a unity can best be seen, are those in which the conditions allow for its complete and at the same time its simplest realization. Now unities of co-operation and unities of fellowship differ markedly in this respect. The possibilities of organization, upon which the first type depends, require a considerable complexity and permanence to manifest their full nature. Other conditions being equal, indeed, the larger and more persistent the group, and the more fundamental the purpose which its association serves, the more scope there is for the structural characters which constitute its unity to reveal themselves clearly. The structure of an organized society is best realized where it secures an effective unity of co-operation in a complex differentiation of functions. There are, of course, manifold instances of co-operation between two people, and the bare bones of the structure of co-operative unity are present in them. But they are present only in germ, and not evidently. It requires a more developed form of association to display the mature structure of a society.

In the case of a unity of fellowship, however, the typical instances are precisely those in which only two persons are involved. The reason for this is plain. Any unity of fellowship is personal. It is a unity of persons *as persons*; and each member of a fellowship enters it with the whole of himself, and not in respect of a particular interest which he happens to share with others. The conditions necessary to realize fully what is implicit in such personal relationships, and to express their meaning and character clearly, can hardly occur except between two persons. "Two is company, three is none," says the proverb. The presence of a third party limits at once the possibility of full

intimacy and self-revelation. In a group the full realization of the potentiality of fellowship is limited, and the larger the group the severer must be the limitation. This does not mean that in the larger communities fellowship is less real, or that it differs in its essential character. In the larger fellowship the full intention remains latent and potential, as it were, and is fully expressed only in the direct relations of its members, each to each.

A passing stranger may stop to help me lift a load which is too heavy for me; and in so doing he creates a unity of co-operation between us which is as simple as it is evanescent. Yet this is rather an expression of fellowship, a gesture of friendship, than a co-operative unity; and it is very difficult to imagine a persistent co-operation to two persons for a common purpose which excluded friendship as its basis. A pure unity of co-operation, or an approximation to such a unity, can hardly exist unless the great majority of those involved are only in indirect and impersonal relation with one another. For it is, in essence, a merely functional relation. In a unity of fellowship, however, the reverse is the case. The more it involves organization, the less fully are the constitutive relationships expressed. In the activities of a great church, for example, the communion of its members can only be *symbolized* in its services and ritual. It can be *realized* only in the direct fellowship of the persons who constitute its membership. To understand the nature of fellowship, therefore, we must consider it first in its fullest manifestation, in the mature friendship of two human beings. Our central question is, then, "What are the structural principles which constitute the unity of a friendship?"

We can begin to answer this question negatively, by contrasting the unity of friendship with any functional unity. In the first place, it is not constituted by a common purpose. It may arise, of course, in the beginning, out of

such a purpose; and it will certainly involve common purposes and co-operation to achieve them. But it is not *constituted by them*. A relationship which is constituted by a common purpose is simply not a friendship. Friends are necessarily interested primarily in one another, not in what each can achieve through the assistance of the other. In the second place, and because of this, friendship cannot be *organized*. It is not based upon, nor does it express itself in a functional differentiation, a division of labour. Since friendship will certainly generate common purposes, it may give rise to organization, but this is not of its essence. In particular, friendship does not involve, as any co-operative unity does, the subordination of one person to another. This is clearly incompatible with the nature of the relationship.

These two major contrasts enable us to state in positive terms the two major constitutive principles of fellowship. The first is *equality*. Friendship is essentially a relation between equals. This does not mean that "only equals can be friends." To think this is to fall into the error of defining human existence in functional terms. To assert human equality is not to say that two or more people are equivalent for this purpose or for that, in one respect or in another. It is not to say that they are equally clever, or equally strong, or equally good. Personal equality does not ignore the natural differences between individuals, nor their functional differences of capacity. It overrides them. It means that any two human beings, whatever their individual differences, can recognize and treat one another as equal, and so be friends. The alternative is a relation between an inferior and a superior; and such a relation excludes friendship. It is a relation of master and servant.

The second constitutive principle of friendship is *freedom*. This means, in the first place, that the unity between two friends cannot be imposed. It can neither be

established nor maintained by force. It is entirely, and throughout its whole duration, dependent upon the free activity of the persons concerned. It means, in the second place, that it provides for a complete self-expression and self-revelation which is mutual and unconstrained. As in the case of equality, it is here that we must look for the essential meaning of human freedom. In other aspects freedom is achieved only negatively, as an absence of constraints imposed from without. Friendship reveals the positive nature of freedom. It provides the only conditions which release the whole of the self into activity and so enable a man to be himself totally, without constraint. It is in this sense, in particular, that freedom is a constitutive principle of friendship. In its absence, any relation between persons must involve an inner constraint, and each must act a part and be other than his complete self.

Here again we meet, in its full concreteness, the paradox of human personality with which we began. Our reality as persons is always in us, and yet always beyond us. We are and are not ourselves. Any human fellowship is both matter of fact and matter of intention. Equality and freedom are *constitutive* principles of friendship, but they are also ideals to be achieved in friendship. It is the mutual intention to treat one another as equals and to be free in relationship that makes us friends; and the presence of the intention in the relationship means that it is already, to some extent, realized. Yet it is never completely realized, not merely because we fail to achieve it, but also because it "grows by what it feeds on." Each partial or temporary realization creates new possibilities of further and fuller realization.

We should note also that equality and freedom, as constitutive principles of fellowship, condition one another reciprocally. Equality is a condition of freedom in human relations. For if we do not treat one another as equals,

we exclude freedom from the relationship. Freedom, too, conditions equality. For if there is constraint between us there is fear; and to counter the fear we must seek control over its object, and attempt to subordinate the other person to our own power. Any attempt to achieve freedom without equality, or to achieve equality without freedom, must, therefore, be self-defeating.

The democratic slogan—liberty, equality, fraternity—embodies correctly the principles of human fellowship. To achieve freedom and equality is to create friendship, to constitute community between men. Historically, however, it is infected with the error we have just considered. It was enunciated as a *political* objective, to be achieved by legal and administrative reform. In consequence, it involved the confusion of community with organized society, and implicitly set territorial limits to human fellowship. Conversely, it endowed the political state with moral and spiritual qualities which imply its absoluteness, and contain the seeds of totalitarianism. Certainly, the organized co-operation of human beings is for the sake of the fellowship of the common life, and in this sense the freedom and equality of brotherhood is the end to which the State is a means. But it is an indirect end. The State, as such, being a centre of organization within territorial limits, can only provide at best the material conditions in which fellowship can flourish and through which it can manifest itself.

These, then, are the structural principles of the type of human unity which we have called fellowship, and which constitute the persons whom they unite a community. It remains to discuss the ultimate ground of fellowship, and to show why, in the nature of things, fellowship takes precedence of co-operation. We live in a society of co-operation because we need the assistance of others in the

pursuit of our human purposes. Why do we enter into fellowship with one another?

The answer to this question is that in no other way can we be ourselves. But this answer, simple and final though it is, is hardly self-explanatory. Yet if by "explaining" it we mean getting behind it to something more ultimate, then it cannot be explained. It is like asking for an explanation of the fact that material bodies gravitate. We can only say that it is the nature of bodies to gravitate; that if they did not they would not be *bodies*; that if the material universe were not united by gravitation, there would be no material universe. So the forces that unite men in fellowship express the ultimate nature of humanity. We can say that we enter into fellowship because this is our nature; that if we did not we would not be human; that if mankind was not united in this way there would be no mankind. There is, however, a difference in the two cases. The nature of bodies is a matter of fact. They always and necessarily are themselves. But, as we have seen, human nature is not merely matter of fact. It is also matter of intention. What makes us human is the intention to realize our humanity. We may mark this difference by saying that human nature is self-transcending.

But if we cannot "explain" this, we can exemplify it; and in doing so we may start from that aspect of it which is most familiar, because so much of the energy of philosophizing has concentrated upon it. I refer to the nature of knowledge. Thought is self-transcending, or to put it in a more familiar way, thought is *objective*. From a purely subjective, or psychological point of view, thinking is merely a process of ideas in our minds, a "stream of consciousness." But this misses the real point. It is of the essence of thought that it refers beyond itself to something other than itself. It is "about" something. When we really think we are seeking to realize the truth about an object. Because of this, philosophers have said that we are rational beings.

This "rationality" is our capacity to know the world "outside us," and we do this by forming *true* ideas "inside us." So it is our nature, as thinking beings, to know what is other than ourselves. We know the world in which we live; but again we do not know it except in so far as we succeed in making our ideas about it true. This aspect of our human nature has to be realized intentionally, in a never-ending effort to conform our thoughts to the nature of the objects we think about. If we are to realize our rational nature in this way we must be interested in the object, and not in ourselves, and be concerned with its nature rather than our own. For if we are not interested in the object, we shall not make the effort to know it; while if it is our own thoughts in which we are interested, we shall shape them to our own liking and think "as we please."

One other aspect of this self-transcendence in knowledge is important for our purpose. It is the fact that if we are to think truly we have all to think the same thing. Knowledge is common. There is only one common world, and the truth about it is valid for all alike. Though each of us must think his own thoughts for himself, so far as we think truly we are bound in a community of knowledge, and there is one world for all of us. Thought realizes itself in the community of truth.

All this is commonly recognized. What is overlooked is that these characters of thought are not confined to the life of knowledge. They are partial and limited expressions of the self-transcendence which is the defining characteristic of human personality as a whole. Knowledge belongs to the reflective life of personality; and it is only one aspect of that. There is also an aesthetic reflection which is concerned with beauty, as knowledge is concerned with truth; and it too has its own peculiar objectivity and self-transcendence. But it is the life of action that is primary, and in an important sense it contains and completes the

reflective activities. Consequently it is in action that the full nature of personality is revealed, and in particular in the springs of action, the dynamic motives, which determine and direct our conduct.

There are two and, I believe, only two fundamental motives which determine the dynamic structure of the personal, as distinct from the merely organic life. They are *love* and *fear*. The one is positive, the other negative. As personal motives they are general, pervasive and permanent, determining the dynamic pattern of character, in contrast to the organic impulses, which are intermittent and successive. These two ground-motives are differentiated by the organic impulses on the one hand and by the variety of their objects on the other; and in their own interplay, in which fear inhibits love, and so frustrates the positive activities which love intends. This interaction gives rise to a third motive which is general but derivative, namely, hatred.

We are faced here with a difficulty of language, particularly in regard to the meaning of the term "love." It is clearly the proper term to use, since it is the name we give to the motive which creates and sustains friendship, and all the forms of human fellowship. The variety of its applications is an advantage, rather than a difficulty, so long as these all remain personal. The ambiguity which has to be guarded against is the confusion of love with sexual impulse. The identification of love with sex, which is now so widespread, and which has received scientific sanctification in the psychology of the Freudian school, is merely an instance of the error which identifies the personal with the organic, and which we have had to expose again and again in other connections. But it is the most disastrous, because the most intimate and effective instance. It is not too much to say, perhaps, that unless this form of our most radical error is overcome, it must destroy our

civilization. This is not the place to discuss this issue. We are concerned only to avoid ambiguity. It must suffice, therefore, to point out that, in principle, there is no essential relation between love and sexual attraction, even in cases where both are operative, and where the one is easily mistaken for the other. There can be love without sexual attraction; indeed this is normal in personal life. There can be sexual attraction without love, though this is an abnormality which is very common. Love is a personal motive; sex is an organic and functional impulse. When, therefore, we use the term "love" to denote the positive motive which sustains every form of human fellowship, and which manifests itself most fully in the direct relationship of two persons, we must be clear that no reference to sex is implied.

The same ambiguity is present in the term "fear." The word is used indiscriminately for the organic impulse and the personal motive. Animal fear is a specific reaction to a particular danger which is directly sensed. Personal fear is the permanent and pervasive motive producing a defensive attitude and dictating a defensive policy. It inhibits the actions which would realize our positive intentions, and substitutes negative intentions, either of self-concealment or of aggressiveness. In its proper subordination to love it sustains the activities of reflection, and introduces the element of caution into our practical activities, preventing us from "acting without thinking." It is in this sense that fear is the negative ground-motive of personal activity.

Love, as the positive ground-motive of personal activity, can best be defined as the capacity for self-transcendence, or the capacity to care for the other. Love is *for the other*: fear is *for the self*. In actual experience, of course, both motives are operative together; and either may dominate the other. Where fear is dominant, the self becomes the

centre of reference, and all commerce with the external world is for the sake of the self. Conversely, when love is dominant, the centre of reference lies outside the self, and the activities of the personal life are for the sake of the other. Now since fear is in its own nature inhibitory, its effect is to limit the spontaneity of the self and to curtail its freedom in action. The farther its dominion extends, the more the self is confined and limited in the expression of its nature. Indeed, beyond a certain point it must destroy the capacity for self-transcendence in the self and produce insanity. This is why the psychologist finds some form of fear, some phobia, at the root of all mental derangement. Clearly, therefore, our capacity to realize our nature and to be ourselves in full achievement depends upon the extent to which love is the dominant motive of our total activity.

It is one of the traditions of philosophy that the *differentia* of human nature is Reason. We have discovered now that it is Love, as the capacity for self-transcendence, which is the defining character of the personal. What, then, is the relation between the two? This is partly a question about language, and different people will decide it differently. We may take Reason as the proper name for whatever it is that distinguishes man from the animals, and then we shall have to identify Reason with Love. Or we may prefer to retain the common identification of Reason with the capacity for knowledge, in which case we must surrender the view that Reason is the *differentia* of human nature. But the essential point, which belongs to the substance of the issue, is to realize that our capacity for knowledge is a particular and limited expression of our capacity for self-transcendence. The rationality of thought is its objectivity, and the motive which sustains this objectivity in our thinking is our interest in the object for its own sake, which alone can shape our ideas to the nature of the object instead of to the nature of our own desires. To seek the truth is, in fact,

to care for the nature of the object, within the limits of our intention to know it.

This, however, is merely reflective. When we act as persons, we act with knowledge, and so in terms of the nature of the object. Rational action has its own objectivity, even when we treat the world simply as material for our own satisfaction. The ultimate aim may be egocentric; yet our ability to compass it depends upon the truth of our knowledge of the objects we use, and upon our willingness to conform to the laws of *their* structure and behaviour. In such a case, however, our human capacity for self-transcendence is only partially and imperfectly expressed, and unless the object is itself personal this must be so. Only another person can elicit a total response in action, of such a kind that the self-transcendence of every aspect and element of our nature is expressed and fulfilled. This is the implicit intention of all fellowship—the complete realization of the self through a complete self-transcendence. If this intention could be realized in an actual instance, the self would “care for” the other totally; in action and in both modes of reflection, intellectual and emotional. “I” would think, feel and act *for* “you,” in terms of “your” nature and being. In this way, and only in this way, could a personal being achieve and experience a complete objectivity, a complete rationality, a complete self-realization. The ground of friendship is, therefore, the inevitable need we have to be ourselves. It is our nature, as persons, to live *in the world* and not in ourselves; to have the centre of intention and realization outside ourselves, in that which is other than ourselves. The basic condition of this is that we should enter into fellowship, that we should love the other. So love may be defined as the complete affirmation of the other by the self: and since to be completely oneself is to be completely free, fellowship is the basic condition of freedom.

To complete this exposition of first principles we must add that the essential condition for *realizing* fellowship is a mutual reciprocity. The individual cannot achieve freedom in fellowship unless the other person does so too. I may love another person and find that my love is not returned. In such a case my love for the other remains only an intention which cannot be realized. Without reciprocity no common life can be established between us. Further, the intention to be friends, even if it is mutual, does not itself constitute fellowship; it constitutes merely the condition of its possibility. Fellowship has to be realized in the activities of a common life, under material as well as psychological conditions which vary continually. It has to be lived through difficulties, and the difficulties have to be overcome. But provided the intention is maintained on both sides, some realization of fellowship and of freedom is certain, and some common life is necessarily established. But its quality depends upon the extent to which the fear of the other—which is the fear for the self—is overcome in practice and not merely in intention. Fellowship has to be lived: it cannot be established once for all. For though the activities of a common life may persist through habit after the intention of fellowship has ceased, the unity which remains is no longer a fellowship but only a co-operation for common purposes.

We had to concentrate our attention upon friendship, as the simplest and most fully realized example of human fellowship, in order to grasp the structural principles of second type of unity which binds human beings together. We may now return to the more general aspects of human community, which are our immediate concern. It might be thought that a friendship between two people is such an unique and exclusive relation that it has little in common with those larger groups which we call communities. Friendship is a very personal and intimate thing, and no

man can have more than a few real and lasting friends. This is, of course, true in fact, but the conclusion does not follow. Friendship, in this sense, is only the full realization, the ripe fruit of human fellowship, and it is, perhaps, even rarer than we are apt to think. But the root from which it springs, and the soil in which it grows, are universal. In particular, the intention which it fulfils is the same in all forms of fellowship, and it is this, as we have seen, that is decisive.

Since we can only be ourselves in fellowship, in a mutual caring for one another, it follows that the intention to enter into fellowship is implicit in every human being and in every human activity. This indeed is what makes us human. It is the positive ground-motive of all personal life, and so both absolutely basic and absolutely universal. *The ground of fellowship is common humanity.* It is not one intention among others, but the integrating intention which gives meaning to all the others, and to which they are relative. This means, in the concrete, that the natural tendency of any two human beings who meet one another is to enter into fellowship, irrespective of all differences, whether of age, sex, race, nationality, social condition, natural ability or any other, simply as human beings. If, in fact, they do not, it must be because the natural tendency is inhibited by fear. Any meeting of persons holds the potentiality of self-realization for all of them. Since this rests upon the basic structure of human personality, its objective correlate is a universal fellowship of persons, a single human community. This shows us the proper meaning of what is called "love of humanity." It is misunderstood if it is construed as a thin, diffuse and rather sentimental attitude of general benevolence. Like all attitudes, it can be sentimentalized, and then it is unreal. But in its proper meaning the "love of humanity" is simply the recognition and explicit affirmation of the implicit

intention which constitutes our own personal nature. To love humanity is not to feel a vague affection for some imaginary human totality. It is to maintain the disposition and the purpose to care for *any* human being with whom we are brought into relation, in whatever fashion circumstances make possible, and simply on the ground of our common humanity.

The primitive human community is the family—the kinship group. It is also the original unit of co-operation. The common life of co-operative activity is grounded in fellowship, and stands in no need of organization so long as the fellowship is unbroken. Now since human nature is intentional, and not mere matter of fact, and since the primary need is to maintain and perpetuate the fellowship, there must be a set of group activities designed to express the consciousness and maintain the intention of fellowship in a common life. These activities constitute the religion of the group. Religion is thus the original expression of the specifically human element in group life, of the capacity for reflection, of that reason which distinguishes man from the brutes. The unity of a human group, however primitive, is not mere fact. It is not maintained by “instinct” or mere natural impulse, but by those informed and transformed by the consciousness of them; by reflection; by knowledge; by intentionality. The core of religion, from its very origin, is the “celebration of communion”—the expression and glorification of the consciousness of fellowship. Since all the aspects and all the activities of the common life meet in this consciousness of fellowship—for they are its content—religion is all-inclusive. Its objective correlation is the whole content of human experience and human activity. In its central function, it brings to conscious the implicit human intention of unity in fellowship—with its principles of equality and freedom. It maintains the intention in consciousness, deepens and

strengthens it, and directs it towards its day to day realization in the co-operative activities of the group. As an expression of conscious reflection, it enlarges the field of fellowship in time; linking the living with their dead and with the generations unborn. In this way it creates the sense of the group as continuing through time, overcoming death and the fear of death, and laying the foundations of history. This is the significance of ancestor-worship as a form of primitive religion. It guides the intention of fellowship to its realization in co-operative activity, so giving rise to conscious techniques, to fertility rites and all forms of magic. In this field also it exhibits the extending and generalizing activities of reflection. It provides and enforces general techniques of relationship in the practical life which are valid for all its members, so laying the foundations of morality and law. Since the fellowship has to be realized under the conditions imposed by Nature, it provides a consciousness of Nature and the powers of Nature as objective conditions of practical fellowship, and directs the intentionality of the group towards them. This is the significance of primitive Nature-worship. Since it is concerned with intentionality, it has to *symbolize* its objectives; consequently its primary expressions are ritual activities in which all members of the community share. These religious rituals are parts of the common life; but they have a special characteristic which separates them from the other, ordinary parts, and which gives them an extraordinary character. They have a *meaning*: they refer beyond themselves, beyond the present immediacy of common experience, to what is not present. They *represent* what is hoped for, what is feared, what is purposed in common. So, on the subjective side, primitive religion is an awareness and enjoyment of fellowship, as well as an affirmation of it; while on its objective side it is a technique

for the achievement of common intentions *through representation*. Religion is thus the matrix of all the representative activities of human consciousness, and of their rationality: of their rationality, because representation, as an activity of the imagination, is necessarily private and individual, and religion is concerned with community. So it involves the demand that the private activities of the imagination should conform to the conditions of community and be valid for all. Religion, then, is the original creator of *tradition*, which is the total common awareness of the group, as a persisting community. Tradition includes, on its practical side, awareness of the rules and techniques which are valid for maintaining the common life both as co-operation and as fellowship; and on its reflective side, a mythology which is valid for all its members, an orthodoxy of common belief. In this mythology two elements are fused which are the roots of knowledge and art respectively. The first is a community of belief about the natural world, that is to say, about the persistent conditions under which the common life is carried on. The other is a set of common beliefs about what is to be hoped, feared, desired and intended, a set of symbolic expressions of the common emotions of the group. In this way common values are determined which regulate the intentional activities of the community, providing common grounds of priority in its choices.

There is no need to go further into the philosophy of religion. The point that concerns us is already sufficiently clear. Because of its central function of expressing the conscious and intentional unity of a human group, religion is necessarily the matrix and the generating source of all culture; that is to say, of all rational awareness, whether in its practical or its reflective aspects. In primitive religion all the aspects are held in solution, as it were, and fused together. When, in the development of religion,

they are separated out, distinguished and contrasted with one another, they gain a relative autonomy, and form the basis of a division of labour in the communion which is not merely economic. But they are still elements in the activity of a unified fellowship, and the consciousness of the fellowship, which religion primarily expresses, permeating the individual members of the community irrespective of their special functions, maintains a unity of spirit in all the aspects of their activity, and so a unity of culture; a tradition of common life. But in this case the unity of the group as a fellowship depends wholly upon the adequate fulfilment of the religious function; upon the maintenance and reinforcement of the consciousness of fellowship. In proportion as this fails, the unity of the group sinks to a mere habit of co-operation, which, though it may persist for a time by its own inertia, is bound to break up. For the autonomy of the elements of the common life becomes absolute, and the development of each is unrelated to that of the others. In their unqualified autonomy, they come into conflict and antagonism, as special interests, and divide society into competing and conflicting groups. The society itself would go into dissolution very quickly, were it not maintained by fear. The political function becomes paramount, and maintains co-operation by law and the threat of penalties. The more the habit of co-operation, the practical element in tradition, breaks down, the more unity of co-operation must be imposed and the more dictatorial government must become. Political leadership may, and almost certainly will, try to perform the religious function as well as its own, but the effect can only be spurious. For the political intention is co-operation, and it seeks to create fellowship for the sake of co-operation. This, as we have seen, is in the nature of things impossible, and the attempt is irrational. Friendship cannot be organized. Whatever the eventual outcome, freedom is

lost; not merely freedom in fellowship but also, and as a gradual consequence, political freedom also.

Certain aspects of the development of religion demand our attention, however, because of their pertinence to our main theme. The first is the discovery of the inherent universality of religion, and the rise of "universal" religions. Primitive religion is exclusive. It is the religion of a "kinship group," and is limited to the "kin." We have already noticed the confusion of the organic relation of kinship with the personal unity of fellowship. This is natural in primitive society, for two reasons; firstly, because primitive society is as nearly organic as any human group can be, and secondly, because the natural family provides the environment within which personal relationships can most easily be established and maintained. But in the development of society the inclusion in the group of members who are not related by blood, through fusion, through intermarriage or in any other fashion, has the effect of distinguishing between the organic and the personal unities. Men who are not related by blood behave "like brothers." So "brotherhood" acquires a metaphorical meaning, by no means either sentimental or mystical, and comes to denote the state of being in fellowship, and religion becomes the expression of a consciousness of community irrespective of kinship, and borrows the terminology of kinship for a new and personal use.

When this distinction has been made, religion becomes potentially universal. When its implications are realized in reflection, the idea of a universal religion emerges. In the fulness of time, when the social pressures demand it, universal religions are founded. They are founded by individual persons, of high religious insight, who seek a personal community denied or frustrated by the character of the societies of which they are members, and who seek to realize the potential universality of personal fellowship.

Only three of these religions have been permanently effective—Buddhism, Christianity and Islam—and remain today competitors for the universal allegiance of mankind. They are differentiated by the types of motivation which underlie them, and which provide the motive force of their expansion. In both Buddhism and Islam the negative motive is dominant. We noticed earlier that the dominance of fear has two expressions, one a withdrawal into the self from the other; the second an aggressiveness directed against the other. Buddhism seeks a universal fellowship through withdrawal from the enmities and dissensions which frustrate personal fellowship in the actual world. Islam seeks it through aggression and compulsion. Christianity, on the other hand, is positively motived. It seeks a universal fellowship realized in the actual conditions of human life, a brotherhood of mankind, a kingdom of heaven *on earth*.

It is, of course, obvious enough that in its long history Christianity has failed to maintain the characteristic intention of its foundation. Fear gets the upper hand and it falls into negation. But what is characteristic is that whether the failure tends, Buddhist fashion, to the escapism of a withdrawal from the world into a "pure spirituality" or contrariwise, into the aggressive self-defence which, as in Islam, would use power to conquer the world, either of these aberrations is recognized, within the Christian fellowship itself, as a denial of its true nature, and produces a protest and a compensation. In the same way its tendency to become, in one or other of its branches, the religion of a limited group—a national religion, for example—is compensated for by a missionary movement which protests against exclusiveness. Its fundamental positiveness gives it a power of self-renewal which recalls it, after every aberration, to its original intention.

This original intention can, of course, be most easily discovered in the teaching of Jesus. Unfortunately this teaching is usually misconstrued because it is interpreted in terms of a Graeco-Roman tradition which is alien to its own Hebrew background. Jesus presupposes the validity of the Hebrew conception of community in principle, as against the Roman type of society based upon law and administration backed by force. He stands, with the tradition of his own people, for a human fellowship issuing in and conditioning social co-operation in every field. His own contribution to the development of Hebrew experience is rooted in a very clear consciousness of the personal character of any human fellowship, and the recognition that it has no essential relation to natural kinship. The parable of the Good Samaritan is a definite assertion that the basis of human relationship is common humanity. It follows that human fellowship is potentially universal, overriding all natural differences and all artificial grounds of exclusiveness: and that the implicit goal of human intentionality is the realization, in concrete experience, of an inclusive and total human fellowship, a brotherhood of mankind. But this is merely the starting point. The problem it sets is a realistic and practical one. How is the universal fellowship to be created?

The question, I repeat, is realistic and practical. There is a tendency in many quarters to think that it is idealistic and impractical, because it would involve a universal perfection of character which is far beyond the reach of the mass of human beings. Such a view rests upon an elementary misunderstanding of the relation between theory and practice. Any theory is ideal, and provides a standard which can never be fully realized in its application. One does not say that because ideal justice cannot be realized on earth, we should not aim at justice in the political field. We do not scorn the theory of the steam-engine, because a

perfect steam-engine cannot be built. Nor do we imagine that because an ideal friendship is beyond our capacity, it is stupid to make friends. The question of a universal community is of the same sort. If we understand the general principles which govern any human fellowship, we can ask the practical question, "What conditions must be fulfilled by any actual community if it is to extend without limits and so become an inclusive fellowship?"

What is often referred to as the "ethical teaching of Jesus" is a realistic attempt to answer this question. The background is the Roman Empire and its drive towards a universal and inclusive State, based upon legal justice and efficient administration, and achieved by aggression. The Hebrew community, to which Jesus belongs, rests upon an antithetical principle of unity, and must reject the Roman Empire in principle. The Roman State has no inner unity. It is not a fellowship. If, as a Jew, Jesus must reject the Roman Empire, he must also accept the principle of universality—of a Kingdom of Heaven on earth—which is implicit in the Hebrew tradition. What, then, is the alternative? The Roman city-state has expanded into a universal State in its fashion, according to its own principles. How can the limited Hebrew community expand to a universal community in accordance with its own principles? In particular, what conditions must it fulfil in order that this may be possible?

The general conditions to be fulfilled are those which constitute a unity of fellowship in contrast to a mere unity of co-operation. These we have already considered. But we must add a new condition, the intention of universality. The expansion of the Roman State to universality sets the problem of the expansion of a limited community to universality. Clearly such an expansion cannot be based upon aggression, and cannot appeal to fear. The very nature of fellowship renders such methods self-stultifying.

The alternate rests upon the principle that fellowship between persons is natural, and will be realized wherever fear is overcome. Consequently, the technique for the expansion of a fellowship—if one may use such a phrase—must be a technique for eliminating fear. This enables us to understand the principle of “forgiveness” which Jesus substitutes for “punishment” in dealing with injury, or the injunction to “love one’s enemies.” These are, in fact, the conditions of reconciliation; and granted the intention of universal fellowship, they follow of necessity as practical rules for its achievement.

The exclusion of fear, as the principle of a fellowship which intends universality, has both an internal and an external reference. Internally, the fellowship must be constituted in such a fashion that it is *potentially* universal. It must, in principle, be open to everyone, and therefore no principle which differentiates between people, such as race, sex, nationality or creed, must enter into its constitution. Since its constitution is psychological, is the structure of its common mind, this means that it is not on the defensive. It does not seek to defend its exclusive individuality against other groups or individuals. It must be prepared to lose its life as this particular community in order to find it again in a more inclusive community.

Externally, it is not afraid of those who are outside its membership, whether they are individuals or groups. Since it intends universality, all men are potentially members of it. They are outside only because they exclude themselves; and they exclude themselves because they are afraid. The problem of achieving their inclusion is the problem of overcoming the fear which excludes them. How is this to be done? Evidently it can only be achieved if the community which seeks to include them in its fellowship is one of which no one can rightly be afraid. It must neither withdraw into itself nor become aggressive against

others: and it must maintain this attitude, under all circumstances, in its relations with outsiders. The critical issue arises over its attitude to aggression against itself. For its refusal to defend itself invites aggression, and provides the conditions for successful aggression. The group which intends universality is committed to pacifism. The reason for this should be carefully noticed. It is the only means to achieve its end; for if it resists it abandons its purpose. Moreover, there is no guarantee that its pacifism will be successful in any particular instance. The justification of its refusal to resist evil lies in the belief that the fear which motivates aggression is illusory and self-stultifying; and this is so only because its own refusal to resist is not a means of self-defence, not a withdrawal from co-operation, not a mere submissiveness grounded on fear. It is only the negative aspect of its offer of friendship and co-operation, of its care for the other party and for the interests of the other party. The pacifism which is a weapon of self-defence, since it rests on fear, justifies the fear which lies behind aggression, and cannot hope to eliminate it.

Such are the principles which dictate the behaviour of any limited fellowship which intends a universal fellowship. We must not forget, however, that as statements of principle they are necessarily ideal. They are the norms for conduct which aims at a community which shall be all-inclusive. When we apply them to the actual conditions of human life, we shall expect them to involve a simplification of the actual issues. In the light of this we may restate the conclusion as follows. Firstly, any fellowship which intends the creation of a universal human community will tend to be successful in so far as it behaves in accordance with these principles, and will tend to fail in so far as it abandons them. Secondly, in so far as any community actually behaves in accordance with these principles it will tend to create a universal community. We have to combine these two

assertions for the reason that a group may intend universality and yet fail to achieve it by using means that are incompatible with its intention; and also it may tend to produce universality by behaving in a way that has this effect, without consciously intending a universal fellowship.

It has been necessary to discuss the teaching of Jesus in this way, and to this extent, because it has a direct bearing upon the problem of human freedom as it faces us today. The Christian churches are the outcome of the life and teaching of Jesus. The Hebrew community to whom Jesus appealed to undertake the task was not prepared to sink its individual identity in a universal fellowship. It was left to the small group of his followers to become the nucleus of the self-expanding fellowship which he envisaged; and this original group, in its international expansion, became the Christian Church, and the historic instrument for the creation of a community expanding towards the community of mankind.

No one who is seriously concerned about the future of freedom can afford to overlook or to underestimate Christianity. To maintain and increase human fellowship is the function of religion; and the achievement of an inclusive human fellowship is a religious task. To this task the Christian fellowship is committed by its origin and its history. However much it may forget or falsify the intention of its foundation, or fail to realize the conditions of its achievement, it is tied both to the teaching of its founder and to the hope and purpose of a fellowship of common humanity. As a result it is subject always to criticism, both from within and from without, which reminds it of its principles and recalls it to its function. It is this criticism, no doubt, which explains its extraordinary capacity for renewal and reform. It created the inner unity both of Western and of Eastern Europe, and as a result it underlies the two traditions which today tend to divide the world

between them in a struggle for political dominion. In the recent past, through its missionary enterprises, it has established itself in all the great centres of the world's population, and everywhere exerts an influence far in excess of its numerical strength. When we add to this the indirect effects of its civilizing influence through the centuries, we are bound to conclude not merely that it is a significant factor in the problem that faces civilization, but that there is no other factor which can rival it in importance. In a very real and practical sense it is the only instrument for the achievement of a community of the world which we possess. If this is not obvious to us, it is because we think so completely in terms of organization and engineering; in terms appropriate only to the political task of enlarging and consolidating the unity of co-operation by means of law, backed always, as it must be if it is to be effective, by force. For this task religion has no aptitude. Its function is a different one, and its end dictates quite different methods.

We can sum up the general argument, however, without special reference to Christianity, in this way. A universal community would be one in which, in fact, all men are potentially friends. By this is meant that they do in fact care for one another in their actual relations, whatever these may be; that when brought into direct relations they act as friends and enter into fellowship. For this to be possible two conditions are necessary; an intention in them all to behave in this fashion, and a common way of life that is shared by all. All intention depends for its realization upon habit; and what we call a "way of life" is simply a system of social habit. The achievement of a fellowship of mankind waits upon the creation of a way of life that is common to all men everywhere, and which would replace the various divergent ways of life which differentiate the humanity of today, and prevent mutual understanding.

The old traditions everywhere are breaking down. The task before us is to lay the foundations of a single tradition for the world as a whole. Now a tradition is the embodiment, in the habits of common life, of a system of values. The incompatibility of different traditions is brought about by the inclusion of values which discriminate between people in terms of natural or artificial differences, between white and black, for instance, or between rich and poor, or between educated and uneducated. A universal tradition could only be grounded in the habit of treating all men as persons. Common humanity would be its basis of judgment, respect for personality its first law, and friendship, which is the fullest realization of the personal life, its supreme good, to which all other goods are subordinate.

It remains only to point the moral of a long discussion by returning to its central theme—the conditions of freedom in our own day. The necessity of our time is the achievement of an effective world-order. This is not simply a desirable step forward in human progress. It is a necessity from which we cannot escape and in face of which we have no choice. We shall move from war to war, from catastrophe to catastrophe until somehow it is achieved. There is no effective alternative. The condition of freedom from now onwards is bound up with this. The effort to maintain the limited freedoms of our traditional, isolated communities, if we do no more than this, is futile. They will continue to dwindle away, or to be violently suppressed, as they are doing, unless we can universalize them. We have to establish freedom for all men in a single world order, or lose our own.

Most of those who realize this—and they are many—tend to envisage the problem as a political one, to be solved through economic and legal organization on a global scale. They look for some kind of world state to emerge from the international conferences of exalted statesmen or through

the development of the United Nations Organization and its associated agencies, or through the triumph of communism, or in some other fashion, according to the political ideal which they favour. But these competing ideals are incompatible. Consequently the efforts to realize them are thwarted, and become efforts to prevent the other party from realizing theirs. The effort to realize a communist world order is transposed into an effort to prevent, by all means, the achievement of a democratic world order, and vice versa. Political action everywhere is driven into negation and stultified.

It has been one of the main purposes of this book to reveal the reason for this tragic stultification of international politics in our time. The efforts which have been made to achieve international agreement since the end of the first world war have been without parallel in history. They have not merely failed of their object; they have made the situation progressively worse. Why do our efforts to organize world-peace carry us from one world war to another? Why do our attempts to reach international agreement sharpen disagreement into hatred, and become milestones on the road to catastrophe?

The answer we have found is that we are asking of the politician what politics by its nature can never achieve. The State is concerned, in its positive functions, with the unity of co-operation. It organizes, with law as its instrument, the co-operative activities of men for the achievement of common purposes. It requires and enforces conformity to law. But the unity of fellowship, because it is unorganizable, because it is necessarily spontaneous and spiritual, lies outside its scope. We have seen that a unity of co-operation may be the expression of a unity of fellowship; but it need not be. So the State may be the instrument of fellowship; the means to the expression, in common activities, of a true community. Where this is so the

organizing task of government is easy: but in proportion to the absence of fellowship it becomes more difficult and more oppressive. In particular, it is only so far as the State is an expression of fellowship that it can be an instrument of justice, and of freedom through justice. We had forgotten that law is not necessarily justice. In the hands of a Hitler it can be an instrument of injustice and despotism. If those who are governed are not in fellowship, if they do not care for one another, but only for themselves, then a bare unity of co-operation is all that can be achieved. The State becomes absolute, and its aim, unqualified by the control of fellowship, reveals itself as a rational efficiency. Neither justice nor freedom belong to the essence of politics. They derive from the personal fellowship of the common life, and are added to the political life. Where there is no fellowship, there can be neither freedom nor justice, or only such justice as is expedient. It is precisely because the proper and natural purpose of politics is the efficient organization of co-operation that the price of freedom is eternal vigilance. The temptation to gain efficiency at the expense of freedom is always present.

The achievement of an efficient unity of world co-operation is indeed a political task. It is the political task of the present day. But if we commit it wholly to the politicians, if we forget the task of extending fellowship as co-operation extends; if we neglect the agencies whose function it is to enlarge the boundaries of fellowship—religion above all, and the partial agencies which derive from it and share its aim and spirit, then we ought not to be surprised if the achievement of a world polity is accompanied by the loss of freedom everywhere. We ought not to be amazed if it should come as the result of another and more terrible world-war. A military dictatorship of the world, with scientific instruments of terrorization sufficient

to make resistance futile, would be a solution of the political task, if that is all that we demand: and it is not difficult to imagine conditions arising, in the near future, which would make it preferable, for the mass of mankind, to an international anarchy which produced famine. Under Augustus, the Roman Empire did just this for the civilization of its time, and the peace it imposed, and the international co-operation it achieved were hailed as a boon in its own day and are still held up for admiration in ours.

This may well be the solution of the impasse we have reached which history has in store for us. But to any individual or nation for whom freedom is the pearl of great price, it is a bitter prospect. It would mean that the struggle for freedom would have to start again from the beginning. Within the world-empire, we should find ourselves in the same position as the Jews within the Roman Empire in the time of Christ; facing the same problem of transforming a world-co-operation into a world-fellowship. The conditions under which this could be accomplished would still be those which he discovered, expressed, and exemplified in his life and death. The Christian Church would still be the only existing institution capable of undertaking the task, which is, indeed, its historic mission and the justification of its existence.

But however probable such a solution may seem, it is not inevitable. The balance of motives in human society is incalculable, and its transformations are apt to be sudden and unexpected. The manifestations of fear are more spectacular than those of love and trust, so that we tend to overestimate their relative power. Evil is parasitic upon good; the negative forces in personal life ultimately draw their strength from the positive forces, so that there are natural limits which they cannot pass. It may be that there is already in the world a sufficient basis of fellowship to produce and sustain an agreed solution, even if, at first,

it is a precarious agreement, constantly threatened, and upheld through crisis after crisis only with difficulty. We do not and we cannot know. We can discover only in the attempt. Since this is so there is only one proper course for all, whether individuals or nations, who love freedom. It is to strive in every field and at every opportunity for world-unity by agreement; and against the temptation, however strong, to appeal to force or the threat of force. But we should not deceive ourselves. We must be realists. Success cannot be guaranteed, and the signs are against it. The appeal to force does offer a solution; but only at the expense of freedom.

Prophecy, however, even if it were possible, is undesirable. What is important is to understand, and then to fulfil, the conditions of human freedom in our time: and since our necessity is world-unity, these conditions are, at last, even as a matter of practical politics, the conditions of freedom for all men. The critical point of our discussion is the conclusion that the basic conditions of freedom lies outside the political field, and cannot be produced or maintained by any ingenuity of statecraft, though a perverted politics may disregard them even when they are present, and can do much to destroy them. Freedom is the product of human fellowship, and the laws of friendship are its conditions. These conditions are spiritual, moral, religious: that is to say, they depend upon the motives that animate men in their personal relations with one another. The struggle for freedom is the struggle for the transformation of human motives, for the triumph of friendship over mistrust, of love over fear. Politics is necessary to freedom; the more necessary the larger is the society which it embraces. But a democratic polity is possible only for a human community which has established a common way of life upon a basis of mutual trust; and the extent and quality of the freedom it provides depends upon the extent to which

those it governs and organizes are in communion with one another.

If we realize that there is not one form of human unity but two; that law enforced by a state is not the only unifying principle in human relationship, then we see that the possibilities of a world-unity are not limited to the construction of a world-state on the model of the nation-states of today. I confess that I find the dream of a superstate governing the whole world something of a nightmare, even when it presents itself in the garments of federalism. The States we know are as they are largely because they are exclusive and have to face outwards, armed to the teeth, to defend their exclusiveness and sovereign independence. In a world fellowship the barriers of nationalism could be down, and their political implications would vanish with them. We should be free to draw such boundaries on the map as were most convenient for the purposes of co-operative activity; and the co-ordination of these units of political organization, in so far as that was necessary, and for this special purpose or that, could be arranged without difficulty, without the need for a single sovereign centre of power which should be omniscient. If anyone thinks this the idle dream of visionaries, he should consider the extent to which this has actually been achieved, even under existing conditions, within the fellowship of the British Commonwealth.

So we return to our starting point. Freedom is our nature. But our nature lies always beyond us, and has to be intended and achieved. The obstacle lies in our fear, and the craving for security which expresses it. So at every crisis we are faced with a free choice between freedom and security. If we choose security, and make that our aim, we lose freedom, and find in the end that security eludes us. If we choose freedom, then we are debarred from aiming at security; for that would mean imposing our bondage

upon others. If we choose freedom we may find the security we do not seek, though of this there can be no guarantee: yet it is the only path that offers promise of security. The generosity which offers friendship to others commits itself to their good-will. They may respond in kind; perhaps we have grounds for believing that in the long run the response must come if we have the patience to wait and to persist. Of the immediate response we cannot be certain and the long run may be very long. Yet it is simple realism to recognize that there is no other way to freedom, if it is indeed freedom that we seek. Freedom is conditional, and these are its conditions. It is for those, whether individuals or peoples, who are ready to pay its price.