

II

FREEDOM

What is freedom? Freedom is more than votes for all. Universal suffrage is good but it is not enough. As Benjamin Constant said, "The will of a whole people cannot make just that which is unjust." Of all the liberal philosophers. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the least consistent, the least penetrating and the most plausible, is unfortunately the one whose influence has been most widespread. Rousseau, with a dash of Marx, provides the greatest inspiration for the emerging African States, and they could hardly have more dangerous or less truly liberal guidance.

Africa lacks a political philosophy. It has indeed a racial mystique—the conception of *négritude*—which is a very different thing. Is it surprising to find this lack, when much of the recent thinking in British Universities has been logical positivism, and when Political Science in its most concrete and pragmatism form has largely banished political philosophy from American Universities? America has true emotions which have not communicated themselves to Africa, and good political institutions on which Africa has not built. It is a shattering thought that so much of the world which is moving towards the twenty-first century has no coherent philosophy of the State and yet is willing to entrust so much power to it.

Even in the field of constitutional liberty, universal suffrage is not enough. Universal suffrage in Germany sent to the Reichstag the men who put Hitler in power. Unless you can change your government without shooting it, the mere fact that it was put into power in the first instance by an electorate based on universal suffrage is no guarantee of liberty.

Freedom is more, however, than the most satisfactory form of constitutional liberty. It is based on respect for the individual personality, on belief in the infinite value of the individual who, though he must sometimes be coerced for the benefit of society, must not be coerced too lightly nor too often. With all the machinery of State before us, its pomp and circumstance, its mechanical efficiency, its robust and thick-skinned confidence in itself, we must recognize that often one man, even one child, matters more than the whole caboodle. We are social creatures, it is true, society moulds us and we have our duties to it, but we are children of the sun and stars, and in each one of us there is an inner citadel, which none can unlock except ourselves: even God waits for us to turn the key.

Across the centuries political philosophers and practical statesmen have thought out checks on the power of the State, with which many of us will be familiar, but will these checks operate in the world of the twenty-first century? Some of these checks may not be essential in their accepted form. Perhaps the two-party system, for example, may not be as acceptable in the rest of the world as it has been in Britain and America. In such cases we may have to find another effective check which will attain the same end. Other institutions which we feel to be essential may be rejected by the twenty-first century altogether. What then? The issue is an important one, for, while personal freedom must reside in the person, institutions can do much to make it harder or easier for the individual to be true to himself.

Let us begin with the two-party system. It arose in the most natural way in England in the seventeenth century. Whatever truth there may be in Sir Lewis Namier's analysis of parties in the late eighteenth century, no one who has studied the reign of Queen Anne can doubt that the Whig and Tory parties were real and pretty clearly defined entities and that in spite of Queen Anne herself and of

Marlborough and Oxford, parties made and unmade ministers and were real entities. After a time it seemed as if the division into Whigs and Tories was part of the nature of things, the natural bisection of the human race into those who moved on to the new and those who defended the old. As one of England's wittiest political thinkers, W. S. Gilbert, said,

Every little boy or gal
That's born into this world alive
Is either a little Liberal
Or else a little Conservative.

This is, however, no longer true, and in the Revised Standard Version, W. S. Gilbert ought to read:—

Every boy or girl who's kissed
When born into this world alive
Is either a little Socialist
Or else a little Conservative,
Except a dwindling handful who
Still feel the Liberals will do.

For, though the nature of the division has changed and does not seem quite so obviously bound up with innate attitudes, the practice of bisection is such as to make the disappearing Liberals seem a sort of doomed excrescence on the Body Politic, as in their day other third and fourth parties—Peelites, the Irish Party, Liberal Unionists, National Liberals and Liberal Nationals—have turned out to be. Britain casts out the foreign body and relapses into a peaceful dualism which in any case makes its institutions of Constitutional Monarchy workable.

Surely American experience has been the same.

Every woman, every man,
Or short or tall, or thin or fat,
Is either a Republican
Or otherwise a Democrat.

And into the stage wings history sweeps the debris of the Know-Nothings, the Populists, the Free Soilers, the Bull Mooses and all the other fauna and flora of American political history. I am told that in Canada things are essentially the same, despite occasional efflorescences, and that in Canada W. S. Gilbert's original verses may be applied unchanged. Certainly in my own country, the Republic of South Africa, the lot of third and fourth parties has been hard.

But can we expect other countries, in which this strange phenomenon does not appear naturally, to endeavour to create it artificially? In many European countries, where logic plays a greater role than it does in the politics of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, there are many parties, each representing different principles or *nuances* of principle. President de Gaulle's advent to power has temporarily altered the pattern of French politics, but in the Netherlands, Belgium or Israel the multiplicity of parties is still to be found. In Switzerland it has been met by the institution of a multi-party Executive holding office for a fixed period. Where no solution of its difficulties is found, the multi-party system means perpetually changing coalitions, short-lived governments and much instability.

If the two-party system cannot be artificially created and if the multi-party system means weak and changing government, why not a one-party system? This is the solution favoured by a large number of African States. Anglo-American criticism has sometimes failed to take account of the unique position of the leader and the party which have secured liberation, and also of the fact that oppositions have sometimes enshrined tribal differences which any respectable leader may well in good faith wish to disappear. Still our general experience of one-party governments is that they degenerate rapidly into tyranny. A government should not be irremovable. No system is good

where the only hope of those who oppose it is a successful and well-timed assassination. Every system which claims to enshrine the principles of freedom should have a possible alternative government visible.

So we believe, and while we must keep open minds and survey with interest and willingness to learn, and not merely with disapproval, the development of one-party governments in Africa, we are bound to search for remedies which may make freedom more effective in such States.

The multi-party system can be made workable by the adoption of a Swiss type of Executive, and even where there is a two-party system the parties can, as in Uruguay, by a modification of the Swiss system, be made to combine continuously in the government of the country.

What can we do to protect liberty in the one-party State? It might be thought that virtual parties would develop within the one Party, and overthrow governments. This has in a measure happened in the Soviet Union, and in the latest case, that of Nikita Krushchev, a change has been possible without the "liquidation" of the deposed leader. From the Anglo-American point of view, however, this is not enough. It is a brief and somewhat revolutionary interlude within the one-party system, not the beginning of a two-party system. The deposed leader retires into private life and is thankful to be allowed to live: he does not become "Leader of the Opposition." Moreover the fundamental principles of the one Party remain unchallenged and legally unalterable. In most one-party totalitarian states even these modifications in the Soviet system do not exist effectively. With the development of one-party systems in Africa, the twenty-first century may have to face the fact that a large number, perhaps the majority, of States in the world will lack the cut and thrust of parliamentary debate, the existence of Oppositions whose duty it is to expose scandals and irregularities, and the publication of different points of view

in Party newspapers, all of which are bastions of liberty against an irremovable and omniscient government. If there should ever be a World Parliament, it would not be fully representative of world opinion, since the minorities in many States would be totally unrepresented. In such a World State, Communists might well win a couple of seats in Great Britain and many more in France or Italy, while no non-Communist could ever win a seat in Russia or China.

We must frankly say that we have not yet found the solution to the problem of preserving liberty in a one-party State. The most plausible solution is the enactment of a Bill of Rights, not easily amendable, controlling the despotic power of the Government in the interests of the individual and enforceable by the Courts of Law. However strong such provisions may be on paper, they depend ultimately, as we shall see later, on the existence among the people of a reverence for law. Only among a thoroughly law-abiding people could the institution of a Bill of Rights really control a powerful, centralized government with no effective Opposition. No friend of liberty should lightly accept the institution of one-party government, even if coupled with a Bill of Rights, where he has any power to stop it, for effective remedies against it other than insurrection are still to seek. As in other parts of this study, we are driven to the conclusion that freedom can ultimately be maintained only by free men, that the freedom of the spirit must work out into hostile institutions, that the guarantee of freedom is faith.

We have used the phrase "omniscient government"—and the one-party system becomes more dangerous when, as usually happens, such a State becomes supreme in every sphere of life. Truly autonomous local government is almost a necessity of freedom, and the protection of the family, the Church and the University, of the journalist, the author and the creative artist, from interference is one of the most urgent tasks of liberty in this and the coming century.

"Liberty," says Lord Acton, "enables us to do our duty unhindered by society, by ignorance and error." Without this unrestricted freedom to express one's deepest thoughts and feelings, liberty is in danger indeed.

Liberals the world over owe an immense debt of gratitude to Jacques Maritain for pleading as freshly and vigorously as he has the right of free association. His differentiation between the State and the Body Politic (or, as I prefer to call it, Society) is vital. Even if we owe Society absolute allegiance—and even this is dubious—we owe no absolute allegiance to the State, which is only one of many organs of Society. Rightly does Maritain say, and may our children carry his faith into the twenty-first century, "Man is not for the State: the State is for man."

The rights of the family are inherent in all social organization and spring from the very nature of things. The only author of any genius who has challenged them is not convincing. Few would see Plato at his best in his drab picture of the State nurseries of the ideal City. To break down the decencies and loyalties of family life is to destroy virtue at its very root. This disintegration in African societies under White rule is one of the worst crimes of Colonialism, though not specially recognized as such by anti-Colonialists. Light-hearted divorce and the "new morality" (which is really no more than the old immorality decked out with phrases) are among the worst dangers to western society.

Into the sacred garden of the family the State, with its jack-boots, must not be allowed to enter. It does so enter when it denies the right of a man or woman to choose a life's partner freely, by such extraneous criteria as race; when it denies the rights of parents to decide the form which they wish the education of their children to take.

It is true that all liberal thinkers would agree on the State's right to ensure that the children should receive *some* education, and to interfere when parents treat their children

with gross negligence or cruelty. But this is very clearly a case of *exceptio probat regulum*. All lovers of freedom will agree in the great difficulty of formulating with precision the limits of liberty, but this does not keep us from the deep and firm conviction that, whatever exceptions may be admitted, the freedom of the family is a sound rule.

From Mill onwards, lovers of freedom have been convinced of the value of a free local government. Exceptions occur at once, when, for example, we see the Federal Government of the United States interfering with the State Government of Alabama in the name and for the sake of liberty. But again the main principle is clear, however difficult precise definition may be. The somewhat risible pomp of municipal occasions must not hide from us the fact that a free town council is a pledge, almost a sacrament, of the wider freedom of the State. It is an education for the citizen: it protects legitimate diversity from the all-devouring conformity of a centralized State.

So with the Church. Ever since Christianity was first preached, it has introduced an essential dualism into life. "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's," but, as Jacques Maritain has taught us, there are many things which are not Caesar's, and in these "we ought to obey God rather than men." To solve this problem of dualism by theocracy or Erastianism is impossible: both have been tried and found wanting. The fact is that the dualism introduced by Christianity is part of the nature of life. It introduces tension, but it is a fruitful tension, without which the spiritual in man, his personality and autonomy as a human being, would wither and die. Truth and love in their highest forms cannot flourish under a State which has as its best ideal nothing more noble or adventurous than the *bonus paterfamilias*, and as its lowest form of degradation a raging tyranny. No wonder that the deep feeling of humanity can find no place for the Leviathan of Hobbes, crowned and

mitred. The excessive adulation given to Hobbes by some thinkers amounts to praising a thinker for his clarity in putting forward wrong doctrines, and most modern liberals will agree with Maritain in wishing that the conception of sovereignty and even the word "sovereignty" might be excised from the thoughts of political philosophers.

The University is in a very special sense the guardian of truth. To defend its freedom is to defend the human intellect from the force of the State. And what is the State? Another great French writer has pointed out that whereas many Frenchmen think of the State as some supernatural female descending from heaven in shining armour, the State is in fact some middle-aged civil servant, anxious to get away for a long weekend. The State as a kind of mystic Joan of Arc or Ste. Geneviève, may possibly have some rights over Universities; but this is not in fact the State as we know it. It is M. Dupin or M. Duclos, Mr. Smith or Mr. Jones, who is to know better than the Professor of Ethics what is right, better than the Professor of Theology what is true, better than the Professor of Fine Arts what is beautiful. For bound up with the freedom of the University is the freedom of the artist or writer. What community can be healthy where art and literature are to be regulated from the centre of an administrative machine? We must fight for this freedom, even the freedom of those for whose pictures we have a hearty dislike and whose books we deplore, for without it the brave new world will go sour. There must be room for error, that there may be room for truth. Without these freedoms we are in grave danger. We are called on to build up in our day and generation a good custom in these things—a tradition which, as it grows more and more in years, so it is more and more difficult to overthrow. We must also, as far as they can be defined, give these freedoms the protection of law.

To anyone familiar with the United States, the way out of all this is to define the essentials of freedom of association

in the Constitution, to make the Constitution rigid, so that it cannot easily be changed, and to enforce obedience to it by the existence of a strong Federal Supreme Court. But provisions like these need behind them the strong spirit of a law-abiding people, and indeed every step in the study of freedom leads us to the necessity of adding to freedom faith. The Americans are a law-abiding people. But virtually the same provisions exist in the Constitutions of Bolivia, the Argentine Republic and Mexico, and few will be found to argue that they have always worked in the same way. Behind the constitutional guarantees of law, if they are to be effective, must be the law-abiding spirit of the people; and also a clear understanding—absent much more often than we realize—of what law really is. Once again we are driven behind the bulwarks of freedom to the inner citadel of faith. Once again we are brought to realize how much it matters what men believe.

Let us take the two points raised above *seriatim*, and first the necessity for a law-abiding spirit among the people. Bryce, in his *Studies in History and Jurisprudence* (Essay V), written some seventy years ago, makes the point very clear, quoting an old Icelandic saga:

A chief named Thorodd, living . . . on the west side of Iceland, had just before Yule-tide been wrecked and drowned with his boat-companions in the fjord.

The boat was washed ashore but the bodies were not recovered. Thereupon his wife Thurid, and his eldest son, Kjortan, bade the neighbours to the funeral feast; but on the first night of the feast, as soon as the fire was lighted in the hall, Thorodd and his companions entered, dripping wet, and took their seats round it. The guests welcomed them: it was held that those would fare well with Rán (the goddess of the deep sea) who attended their own funeral banquet. The ghosts, however, refused to acknowledge any greetings, and remained seated in silence till the fire had burnt out, when they rose and left. Next night they returned at the same time and behaved in the same way, and did so, not only every night while the feast lasted, but even afterwards. The

servants at last refused to enter the fire-hall, and no cooking could be done, for when a fire was lit in another room, Thorodd and his companions went there instead. At last Kjortan had a second fire lit in the hall, leaving the big one to the ghosts, so the cooking could now be done. But men died in the house and Thurid herself fell ill, so Kjortan sought counsel of his uncle Snorri, an eminent lawyer and the leading Gosti of Western Iceland. By Snorri's advice Kjortan and seven others with him went to the hall door and formally summoned Thorodd and his companions for trespassing within the house and causing men's deaths. Then they named a Door-court and set forth the suits, following all the regular procedure as at a Thing-court. Verdicts were delivered, the cases summed up and judgment given; and when the judgment word was given on each ghost, each rose and quitted the hall, and was never seen thereafter.

Even in law-abiding primitive Iceland, swords sometimes flashed out to decide a legal point, but the spirit which actuated Thorodd and his fellow-ghosts is much needed by us at the present day. No formal Constitution will effectively bind a militant majority unless this lesson of obeying the law has sunk in and has become part of the very life of the people. The greater the reverence for law, the more sure are the legal guarantees of freedom.

But what is law? There we come to our second point; and at this stage we must indict Law Faculties of many Universities in many countries for not giving students a true picture of law as *ars aequi et boni*. No legal doctrine has done more harm to mankind than the doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament, as laid down in Austin's *Jurisprudence*, which in turn is derived from Bentham, and ultimately comes from the philosophic arch-enemy of all freedom, Thomas Hobbes.

In its origin the doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament was a weapon used by the upper-middle class Parliaments of the early Stuart period against the absolutist tendencies of James I and Charles I. As time went on, the powers thus attributed to Parliament became part of that "tyranny of the majority" against which John Stuart Mill fought so

stoutly. In this as in other things he was a Utilitarian deviationist. Bentham had supported the sovereignty of Parliament, but assuredly not on philosophical grounds. Rather was he in the position of an ardent and impatient reformer faced with the argument that "it can't be done." It reminds one of the story of the sea-sick passenger and the steward. "You can't be sick here on the carpet, sir," said the steward. "O, can't I?" replied the passenger—and was. Bentham's attitude was similar.

In fact liberty has been largely saved in England by the very tendency that Bentham challenged—the tendency to accept that certain things are not done. A greater writer in jurisprudence than Bentham, A. V. Dicey, has made clear to three generations of readers that the law of the Constitution in England cannot be understood without reference to the conventions of the Constitution. In some measure this has prevented a succession of majorities in English Parliaments from using their giant's power like giants. But even in England itself the legally unfettered power of Parliament is a danger: no one could doubt that if—to take a very improbable contingency—the Communist Party should one day obtain a majority in the House of Commons, it would not be hindered in its legislative programme by the feeling that certain things are not done.

How much more dangerous the sovereignty of Parliament can be in a country where its legal basis is not seriously challenged by convention or by public opinion. The Parliament of Canada must work under the British North America Act, as amended, and authoritative judgments flowing from it. No such restrictions bind the Parliaments of South Africa or of Ghana. The most far-reaching powers are given to Parliament, and the extra-legal restraints of custom, convention and public opinion operate very little at ordinary times and not at all in emergencies. There is in fact nothing that is "not done."

Now this, backed up by teaching in our schools of Jurisprudence, is in effect equating might with law. A South African or Ghanaian law is Law, not because it is right or just, but because it has had the approval of the majority in Parliament. No Law Court in either country will ever treat as invalid any Act of Parliament, with the possible exception of one Clause in the South African Constitution. For such an Act there may be no moral basis. Its only strength lies in having secured a majority in Parliament, which may be gerrymandered or may be intimidated or may demonstrably not represent the majority of the people. What moral justification is there for majority rule even where Parliament does in fact represent the majority of the people? "Nowadays we count heads instead of breaking them," but the principle is the same. We cannot escape from the conclusion that this is to say that might is right. But this is not how the great thinkers of the past have conceived law. This is not to make law the defender of freedom. This is to remove from law all moral basis and then to demand respect for the law from all citizens on moral grounds, and this will simply not do.

I would make an earnest plea to our Faculties of Law to reconsider the theories of jurisprudence and to reintroduce, perhaps in some new and modern form, the doctrine of the Law of Nature. As compared with the relatively recent heresies of Bentham and Austin, the doctrine of the Law of Nature has a great and justified pride of ancestry. It dates back at least to the Stoics. It was an accepted doctrine of Roman Law from Cicero to Justinian. Pre-Christian in its origins, it was baptized by the mediaeval Church, and forms part of the majestic system of St. Thomas Aquinas. The latest of the Thomists, and the greatest of modern political philosophers, Jacques Maritain, upholds it, at any rate up to the point, as we have already seen, of wishing that political thinkers would get rid of the name and even of the conception of sovereignty.

Nor is this conception entirely forgotten in our own day. The provision of the German Federal Constitution (Art. 25) that International Law prevails over the ordinary Laws is significant. Perhaps the judicial practice of Norway in this regard is worth looking into. The early records of Penang give us an instance of a young nineteenth-century British official who, in the absence of all other legal authority, avowedly decided his cases by the Law of Nature. But surely Africa is the *locus classicus* for this practice. In most British colonies or possessions in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, "Native" law, as it was rather unhappily called, was recognized by the British authorities "in so far as it was not incompatible with the principles of justice observed throughout the civilized world." The phrases used varied, but all were obviously attempts to define the Law of Nature in nineteenth-century terms. It was under this provision and no other that British Courts, while recognizing the bride-price and other unfamiliar concepts of "Native Law," refused to punish persons for bewitching other persons, although such punishment was just and urgently necessary according to indigenous ideas.

It may be objected that no Legislature would pass an Act recognizing the Law of Nature and that, if it did, such recognition would be based on Statute and not on the inherent reasonableness of reason. Here is where the Schools of Jurisprudence come in. For it was in these that, during the sixteenth century, Germany and the Netherlands began that great process of "receiving" Roman Law and that the Judges, without any Statute to back them up, "received" Roman Law in the formulation of their judgments. The common law of my own country, the Republic of South Africa, is Roman-Dutch Law, that is, the customary law of the Netherlands, modified by the widespread "reception" of Roman Law. Let no one therefore say that University teachers of Law are helpless in this matter. They can, if they

will, transform legal thinking. And nothing is more urgent than this task if freedom is to be preserved, nothing more urgent than that the power of the Legislature to invade the holy places of right and justice should be limited. Otherwise might is right, justice is the decision of the majority, or, in the words of Thrasymachus, "the interest of the stronger." In a country like South Africa, which does not possess universal suffrage, it is the will of an artificial political majority which prevails. This in its turn is the will of a disciplined party caucus. It could be the will of a powerful interest group behind that caucus. And to this is given the awful and reverend name of Law.

By such means the Courts may be forced to assent to their own exclusion from certain processes. A man may be banned for a number of years without either a charge or a hearing, on the decision of the Executive alone. The principle *audi et alteram partem* which is a vital part of Natural Law is excluded. Whatever else this is, it is not freedom. For freedom depends on law.

But freedom is also an inner thing in the life of man. Nothing hinders it so much as fear. Fear is to be resisted. Simple courage is the first step to liberty. And our Society, as we move towards the twenty-first century, is riddled with fears. Let us examine some of them.

First, there is the fear, common among good men and good citizens, that truth cannot look after itself. Censorship, persecution and interference with University teaching spring from this fear. But he who will not leave room for error leaves inadequate room for truth. No one has yet discovered a garden which will grow flowers and no weeds. We weed as we can with care, but too careless weeding pulls up the flowers too, and we have the highest authority for saying: "Let both grow together until the harvest." No one has yet discovered a printing press that can print the Bible but not

Das Kapital. The same tempered steel may furnish the surgeon's lancet or the assassin's dagger. We cannot ask for the questing spirit to be taken out of our minds or the skill to be withdrawn from our hands lest we should use our power wrongly. The good which we seek to defend with such pathetic devotion is not the highest good, which must emerge richer and better from its free and fruitful contact with heresy.

Another devastating fear is the fear of losing power. To this fear some of the best men are subject, the men who have just carried through a salutary and much-needed revolution and cannot bear to think of anyone spoiling the great work. Hence it is a fear widespread in the States newly freed from "Colonialism." It is an intelligible fear, but surely it threatens freedom.

The Lord hath yet more light and truth
To break through from His word,

and the succession States have great riches awaiting their life which they are prevented from attaining by a too zealous protection of the triumph just won. In this case the good is decidedly the enemy of the best.

In large parts of the world today intimidation is rife, and this is especially true of States which have just won their independence, whether they are populated by white South Africans or black Tanganyikans. Colonialism had its adherents. Sometimes they were mean-spirited. Sometimes they were conservative. Sometimes they, too, believed in independence, but thought, not always wrongly, that the time was not yet ripe for it. To the imperial power they gave loyalty and service and in general they have been ill-requited. From the Tories of South Carolina in the 1780's to the supporters of General Smuts in the 1950's, those who loved Britain too well have found her unable to protect them in their particular day of judgment. To be a pro-

British Afrikaner, or a pro-Government African in the Republic of South Africa, is to expose one's self to severe and continued intimidation in daily life.

Wherever intimidation prevails freedom is to that extent limited. It affects not only those who took the course which turned out to be unpopular, but also those young people who, watching the process, realize for themselves how dangerous it is not to follow the herd. It may be that this process of intimidation is inevitable in great struggles for national freedom, but the sooner we can get out of this atmosphere the better, for in it all but the noblest and most courageous are tempted not to speak out, perhaps not to think too much.

A great fear of our day is the fear of acculturation. Like many bad things it arises from what is partly a good thing, for it springs from a desire to realize one's self, an impulse to rebel against contempt or patronage. Yet its effect is to keep one from realizing one's true self: its effect, in short, is not to increase but to limit freedom.

Take the strong tendency to seek for, to define and to realize *négritude*. How natural after somewhat snobbish attempts to imitate the ruling race! How emotionally satisfying after being patronized by a kindly administrator or an unimaginative missionary! There is a ring of the true and good in seeking to "look unto the rock whence ye are hewn, and to the hole of the pit whence ye are digged . . . to Abraham, your father, and to Sarah which bare you." But soon the search for *négritude* becomes a little precious, and as its servants attempt to describe in impeccable French or literary-English the dark secrets of the jungle in their innermost hearts, we realize that they resemble only too well Edmund Burke who, as it has been said, exercised the finest powers of reasoning in the English language to denounce the danger of reasoning too much.

Englishmen have caused a great deal of this by their own unconscious snobbery. The white Afrikaner in my own country has suffered much from this. He who had much to be proud of was so treated as to make him either ashamed of being his very fine self or aggressively rebellious against the new culture brought to him. Afrikaner nationalism has fostered a somewhat exclusive Afrikanerdom, as African nationalism has fostered *négritude*, as rebellious frustration in the American negro has fostered the Negro Muslim movement. These reactions are intelligible, yet after a time their limitations, even their dangers, become apparent.

For what, after all, is the history of world civilization but one gigantic process of acculturation? We ourselves are what we are very largely because of the process of hellenization as a result of the conquests of Alexander the Great and pre-eminently as a result of the Roman Empire. Is France less than she might have been because she accepted Roman culture, instead of starting a movement of what we might be permitted to call "*Gallitude*"? Is not the bright sunlight of Voltaire, Pascal or Bossuet, of Racine or Molière, at least as likely to benefit the human race as the Celtic twilight of some mournful modern Vercingetorix? And if the British have been responsible for much acculturation they have been passing on what they received. Take out of Shakespeare, in the name of Anglo-Saxon nationalism, such lines as

the multitudinous seas incarnadine

and have you improved him? We must be ourselves, it is true, but we ourselves live in a great world and we are "members one of another." By all means let the roots strike deeper, but at the same time let the trunk rise higher and the branches have a broader spread, exposed to the acculturation of wind, rain and sunshine. We are citizens of the world as well as of our country or our race, and if we are

members of Holy Church let us not forget that it is Catholic as well as Apostolic.

The fear of acculturation, whether in *Sénégal* or in the *Transvaal*, whether in *Quebec* or even perhaps in parts of *Ontario*, is a real limitation on freedom, although it has not been adequately recognized as such. It is accompanied, wherever it is found, by intimidation of the individual by society, and sometimes, in the dim recesses of the human heart, the intimidation of the individual by himself. A real belief in any one of the great world faiths can and must militate against this fear, just as the fear tends to make nationalists of whatever kind somewhat suspicious of the great world faiths.

Freedom is intimately bound up with faith. They stand or fall together, and it is important for men who would be free to refuse to be bound by racism, nationalism or even continentalism, to break away from vestiges of the old colonialism, for to be thus bound is to be unfree.

There are certain traditional guarantees of freedom which we ought to consider. It is true that each and all of them can be destroyed by the brutal use of force; but they can serve men well until that happens, and by their service of men can sometimes prevent it from happening.

First among these is the independence of the Judges. The vital point here is to ensure that Judges should not be dismissible at the will of the Executive Government, but it is also important that some safeguards should be introduced about the appointment of Judges, and that the Executive should be restrained from arbitrarily increasing the number of Judges so as to command a majority in the Courts. That a Judge should necessarily be selected from the highest-ranking group of lawyers in the country is a self-evident platitude. It is advisable to add that he should not be selected from barristers in Government employ. Beyond this we can hardly go. To let the bar itself fill judicial vacancies

is to incur the danger of entrenching professional conservatism. To choose the Judges by popular election is to incur the danger of having them brought into office on party lines, without any guarantee that the best lawyers will be chosen. There seems to be no way out of the present system of letting the Executive choose the Judges, although this should be done after consultation with the Bench and the Bar. Still in this way, though poorly qualified Judges will not as a rule be chosen, a Conservative Government may choose not the best lawyer but the best Conservative lawyer, a Socialist Government may choose not the best lawyer but the best Socialist lawyer. Here, however, one weakness of human nature provides a corrective to another, for it will not be long before the new Judge persuades himself that he was chosen not because of his party sympathies but because of his professional excellence, and the latter will loom larger in his mind than the former. Moreover the eyes of the profession, his fellow-Judges and his former colleagues of the Bar, will be on him and he will be lost to all sense of professional pride and shame if he gives an obviously unjust judgment. Considerations such as these are more powerful than some political theorists seem to realize. But even they will not always prevail unless the Judge is free from the danger of arbitrary dismissal, nor will they protect the citizen unless the Bench is not under the apprehension of being swamped.

Judging from the Constitutions of some of the new African colonies, Britain seems to have somewhat lost faith in the value of that bicameral system which she more than any other nation brought into being. We can all see that a suitably constituted Senate could be a great bulwark against unfair or too rapid change, a real protector of minority rights. Our trouble is not to accept the principle of bicameralism, nor even how to constitute a suitable Senate: the real difficulty is to give it adequate power. I myself was

for fifteen years a member of the South African Senate, and am aware that in Canada, as in South Africa, a reference to the Senate as an effective defence of freedom is to expose one's self to jeers, or at best to tolerant smiles. But this is not so on the other side of the Great Lakes, and it behoves us to consider how to make the Senate of a new State in Africa or Asia more like the Senate of the United States and less like the Senate of Canada or South Africa.

Two points suggest themselves here for our consideration. The first is the role of the Senate as a Government-making organ, the second is the entrusting of the Senate with special powers not shared with the House. We shall not enlarge on the second, but the first is vital.

In a Constitution like that of the United States neither House can turn out the Executive Government, except by the clumsy and obsolete method of impeachment. The way to executive office is not more through the House than through the Senate. Therefore the Senate is not inferior to the House, and having a special composition and special functions may easily hold its own. But in a Constitution of the British type, it is the House and the House alone which is the Government-making—and Government-breaking—body. The House is a far more likely road to executive office than the Senate. A Senator may occasionally, if he is lucky, become a Minister, never in recent years Prime Minister. If, therefore, we wish to use a senate as an effective guardian of the Constitution and a real protection to minorities in a new State, we must either model the whole Constitution on that of the United States, or introduce a new system whereby the Senate becomes, like the House, a government-making and government-breaking body, and as normally as the House a way to reaching the highest executive power. This has never been tried yet and if it is acceptable in principle should have some of the best brains in the field of political science concentrated on it. As a lonely pioneer, I

can offer only a few tentative suggestions. One is that a vote of no confidence in the Senate should involve the resignation of the Government no less than a vote of no confidence in the House; alternatively that a vote of no confidence, to produce a resignation or dissolution, should be taken at a Joint Sitting of the two Houses. Another suggestion is that a fixed proportion of the Cabinet should be drawn from the Senate, higher when the Prime Minister is not a Senator than when he is. The system of allowing Ministers to speak in either House removes one of the greatest objections to the choice of a Senator as Prime Minister.

In most countries, though not of course in Canada, the Senate is a wholly or partly elected body, differing from the House only in the nature of the Constituencies or in the method of voting. There is therefore no fundamental objection in such countries, on the grounds of democracy, to having a Senator as Prime Minister. But we need perhaps to go more deeply into matters than this, for our age is an age where it is fashionable to express a blind belief in democracy, without defining it very clearly. If by the support of democracy is meant implicit faith in a casual majority of members of a caucus-ridden House elected by universal suffrage as the result of a campaign led by demagogues and intimidators, then I must express my determination to be unfashionable. Any attempt to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms against such a casual majority demands safeguards and it is difficult to see that the Senate is in such circumstances less democratic than the Judicial Bench.

Britain has given the world the priceless gift of an independent and professional Civil Service. This, too, is a great protection against the tyranny of a legislative majority. It is not so British that it cannot be taken over by other countries: India, for example, seems to have succeeded in doing so. To protect civil servants against arbitrary dismissal, to give

salaries such as to make bribery unattractive, and to visit condign punishment on any civil servant taking bribes—all these are essential to the system. But there remains one vulnerable point—that of promotion, which may be the most subtle bribe of all. In the interests of efficiency it is not desirable that promotion should be by seniority only. Promotion examinations cannot test those impalpable qualities of personality which count for a great deal in senior public servants. Promotion could be controlled by an impartial Commission, but *quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* No Government can in any case be expected to accept such an arrangement. The executive administration of the country is in its hands: it cannot consent to have no voice in the selection of its own subordinates. Here, as everywhere, we cannot erect a cast-iron system to protect freedom. The impalpables of the human spirit always come in. We cannot guarantee goodness: we can only make virtue easy and vice difficult.

The same applies to the freedom of the press and—what matters very greatly, especially in illiterate countries—of the radio. There is no royal road to securing these freedoms. They can be seriously undermined, as we know only too well in South Africa, without formally destroying them. But every effort should be used to protect them, for on them depends to a very large extent the freedom of the State. They in their turn depend on the schools and the universities. We have already glanced at the importance of University freedom: if this gives place to indoctrination the chances of a free press and a free radio are much lessened. Everywhere, however, we are driven back on the freedom of the human spirit as the one thing that is needful to preserve the other freedoms.

These freedoms are inherently valuable. They are not to be thought of lightly. The institutions hallowed by generations of success are not to be despised. We must not so interpret the appeal to the freedom of the human spirit as

to imply that the other freedoms are valueless. But in it they find their life and their security. Fundamentally, therefore, we who desire earnestly that freedom should be preserved in the twenty-first century, must look at the essentials of the freedom of the individual human spirit, and that must bring us to the vital issue of faith.

III

FAITH

Liberty, as we have seen, must be written in the hearts of men if it is to survive. It cannot be so written without certain presuppositions which are vital to life. The acceptance of these presuppositions is faith. Faith is not some mystical experience remote from daily life: it *is* daily life, lived as it ought to be lived.

What are these presuppositions?

First, that life is worth living. No man can live and be rational without accepting this axiom. Toast and coffee are incompatible with despair. Bacon and eggs are an affirmation of faith. It is moonshine to say that life is not worth living and then to sit down and eat a hearty breakfast. The natural and healthy instinct which leads us to rejoice at the coming of a new life into the world is irreconcilable with philosophic despair. A wedding, the normal result of which will be new lives coming into the world, is treated, even by the cynical, as an occasion of feasting. I doubt if anyone can prove mathematically that life is worth living: it is in the highest degree of reality an act of faith—the simplest and most elemental act of faith. I imagine that anyone who said he did not believe it would be considerably taken aback if his listener, logically enough, produced a loaded revolver and offered to assist him to terminate it.

There are other necessary presuppositions of faith, perhaps not quite so robustly obvious as this, but obvious enough. One is the presupposition that everyone is worth while. All Christian ethics must depend on this. The motto of the French Revolution may have been, in the mouths of those who invented it, anti-clerical: it is certainly not irreligious. Equality is of the very essence of any practical ethics. Even in the very matter-of-fact atmosphere of the Law

Courts I cannot defend myself from a charge of theft on the ground that the man from whom I stole is a half-wit, nor will even the most secular-minded judge admit as relevant evidence the view of a trained psychologist that I have a higher I.Q. than the man I murdered. In practice the Law which aims at no nobler standard than that of the *bonus paterfamilias* does in general accept practical human equality. The *bonus paterfamilias*, we have it on the Highest Authority, will not if his son asks bread give him a stone, nor will he even give bread to the son of whom he is most proud but a stone to the fool of the family. Once admit equality and you have liberty crowding in through the open door, for there is always freedom between equals: to deny it is not only to treat a man as unequal, but in the end to make him unequal.

This crime of maiming a personality is too dreadful to be thought of, but if we accept this, life is going to be impossible until to liberty and equality we add fraternity. This is in its simplest form to say that justice alone is as cold and arid a proposition as a desert landscape under the full moon. The warmth of sunlight is needed to sustain life, and indeed the universal instinct of man in far northern latitudes is to greet the first appearance of the sun after the Arctic night with jubilation. So it is with us. When, perhaps to our surprise, we realize that someone really *loves* us, the whole inner world begins its own springtime, and the sap begins to rise in our tree of life.

So we come to feel, with great reason, that the soul of things is right, that the soul of things is love. These are most reasonable propositions. They spring from the deepest reality within us. To deny them and yet to go on living is in the strictest sense of the term irrational. For reason, as St. Thomas Aquinas taught us seven centuries ago, is the ally of faith, not the alternative to faith. Rightly does G. K. Chesterton in "The Blue Cross" make Father Brown tell Flambeau that he knew he could not be a genuine priest

because he attacked reason. Moreover enemies of the same enemy become friends willy-nilly, and in the mission field both science and faith find the fear of witchcraft Public Enemy No. 1.

These things are in our daily living but they transcend it. Nothing in Marx is sillier or more dogmatic than the theory that all this is superstructure and that the only real things in life are three square meals and a bed. Nobly indeed have his followers disproved him in many times and in many places by offering their lives, their liberty and their material goods for an idea—his idea. This is truly noble, but of course it is irrational, for no one can say that to face economic ruin, in order to prove that economics is the only thing in life that matters, is really consistent. I prefer to follow in this respect the Marxists' example rather than their theory, and so, to believe that ultimate spiritual values are higher than material ones.

But the one set of values is utterly relevant to the other. The life of the spirit must be lived out in the material world. This, too, must be accepted frankly and fully if one is to be rational. The most ascetic hermit must drink water and eat at least some food if he is to live. The most ethereal mystic must find a "comfort station" somewhere, even if it is only behind a bush. And the hater of physical life must somehow go through what must surely be to him the utterly repugnant process of making love if human life on earth is to continue. As Burke said, "All virtue which is impracticable is spurious," and religion which can meditate on the mystery of the Trinity and leave human beings in slums not as good as pig-stys is spurious as we know—again on the Highest Authority. But if true religion must take cognizance of economics and politics, surely the reverse must also be true. The twenty-first century is much less likely to be dominated by mystics who ignore the slums than by slum-eradicators who eschew all mysteries, not only of the Trinity but also of

the human heart. Their offerings of concrete and soap without real love are as offensive to the human personality as the offer of love without shelter or food. On both sides the issue of utter relevancy is to be stressed.

These, then, are the presuppositions vital to life—that life is worth living, that every human being is worth while, that liberty, equality and fraternity are essentials of the moral life, that the soul of things is righteous and loving, that faith and reason go hand in hand, that the spiritual matters as much as the material and that each is utterly relevant to the other. The acceptance of these presuppositions is faith, and without faith freedom cannot survive in the twenty-first or any other century.

The faith with which we are to meet the rapidly changing and increasingly unfamiliar world of our times must be strong, must be personal, must be real, and must be rational. We may take the last of these first, for we who believe in freedom rate reason higher than any of our enemies do. Not the playthings of predetermined economic history, not the emotional neurotics of obsessive nationalism, not the unthinking and inconsistent seekers of pleasure without joy and motion without direction, we stand as those who honour reason and strive to be guided by it. The most noble of pre-Christian thinkers and the most thoroughly Christian thinkers are on our side. We need not be ashamed to be in the same army as Plato and St. Thomas Aquinas.

This reasonable faith, which is sometimes supra-rational but never, never, never anti-rational, needs to be a robust one. Strength is of its essence. If we must face in the twenty-first century difficulties stronger than ever before, let courage rise with danger. No weaklings can cope with the situation.

And needless to say our faith must be personal too. What we may have to die for, and will certainly have to live for, must of necessity be our own. "A man's creed," it has rightly been said, "is not what he thinks he ought to believe but

what he cannot help believing." A faith as personal as this is bound to be real. It cannot ignore all the past.

Without this faith we cannot but be left either to irrationality if we do not reflect or to despair if we do. At its worst despair can be a dreadful thing—a thing for which suicide seems the only answer. At its best it can be a gentle despair, marked by sighs rather than screams, a Limbo rather than an Inferno, but with no hope of Paradise nor even of the purifying mountain of Purgatory. If we can escape into the fresh air of life, reason and battle from this sorrowful Lotus-land of Limbo, then and then only can we say with the poet

Thence issuing, we beheld again the stars

And if we truly behold the stars, we see how

March rank on rank
The armies of unalterable law.

This realization, as George Meredith's great sonnet reminds us, is what flung back into darkness that revolted Angel who made a cult of despair. We, having come out into fresh air and starlight, must essay to climb the mountain of testing, the hill of purification, which Dante called Purgatory, but which we may call the life of the later twentieth and the twenty-first centuries. Only by giving ourselves to the battle can we find ourselves

Pure and disposed to mount up to the stars.

The way of Purgatory, as Dante saw it, was a way of pain. So will life in the twenty-first century be to the man of faith. To live in twentieth-century South Africa with all its prosperity is to many of us to live in Purgatory. But the pain of Dante's Purgatory was purifying and so is ours. Resolutely we climb the mount. The road winds upwards all the way, and all the way to the very end compassionate reason, which

Dante typifies by Virgil, will accompany us and help us. Beyond that we look to Beatrice, the glory of what pain has achieved, the sapphire throne on which sits a King with scarred hands, the Beatific Vision.

Thus, reeling, failed the towering fantasy,
But yet the will moved onwards, like a wheel
In even motion, by that Love impelled
Which moves the sun in heaven and all the stars.

So the threefold music of the stars echoes in the song of one of the world's greatest thinkers and may find a further echo in our hearts.

But is not all this terribly Christian? And is not Christianity an unforgivable solecism in a political philosopher talking to a University audience? But if a man is to speak on faith, he cannot help his own faith peeping out. If he is an Englishman, his thoughts will clothe themselves in English, if he is a Christian in Christianity. But there is more to it than this. If we accept faith we must look at the heroes and thinkers of faith. Assuredly not all who call themselves Christians are heroes and thinkers, nor are all the world's heroes and thinkers Christians, as we well know. Yet we who are Christians when we read such a question as that put by a recent Swiss theologian, "Jesus a-t-il été dépassé?" are bound to answer, "Jamais, jamais."

Some will feel that in the twenty-first century we must not be bound by the historical accidents of Christianity, its rise in the first century, its early dissemination through the West; its association, however innocent or inevitable, with "colonization," "capitalism" and "imperialism." Should we not then, unless we abandon the religious expression of faith altogether, make a new synthetic world religion, including the best of all the old ones, but with up-to-date ideas, universal in its scope and of our own century? But as I raise this point, I recollect (I do not know if I am word-perfect) the reply of Talleyrand, a man of the world and no pillar

either of orthodoxy or of morality, to the man who came to him with a similar proposition in his century. I am bound to say that I think it a good one. "Allez-vous-en. Faites-vous crucifié et resuscité le troisième jour, et puis on verra."

And yet, although we cannot create a synthetic universal religion, there are deep levels of unity between men of diverse creeds who have been touched by the finger of love and who honour truth. It would be a denial of Christian orthodoxy to put bounds to the power and wisdom of the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the Giver of Life . . . who spake by the prophets. Rightly has a modern Christian writer told his fellow-Christians, "Your God is too small." You cannot divest Christianity of its first-century trappings. If ever there was to be an Incarnation it had to take place at a given time in a given place. It begins there, and its historicity is a strength not a weakness, but it cannot end there. It goes onward and outward to many centuries and to the uttermost parts of the earth. We therefore must go out in our thoughts to every man of faith, whatever he calls himself, although indeed, to paraphrase the saying of Dr. Johnson's old friend: "I have tried to be a universalist but Christianity was always breaking in."

There are two great phrases of our time against which I often react, but each of which contains a modicum of truth. The one is that we are "under judgment," the other that "religion is the enemy of faith." We ought to grapple with them: they are worth it.

When we say that Christianity or Missions or the Church are "under judgment," we express a great truth. The misfortunes that have befallen them in our day are in part the natural result of their own faults. The stodgy unimaginative, defensive Churchman drives young people out of his Church, but is he alone under judgment? Are the young people so utterly helpless and irresponsible that they cannot sort out what is sound and what is unsound in his theorizing? Are

they so foolish as to throw away the gold because there is so much quartz around it, and if they are why is this folly condoned or even commended? This is to be patronizing indeed. It is not treating young people as adult men and women. Intellectually it is on a par with the attitude which makes parents condone drink or immorality among their sons and daughters because otherwise they will be regarded as "squares." When we hear of Africans repudiating missionaries we say, in this phrase of our day, that inspiration of one which becomes the cliché of thousands, that they are "under judgment." It is true that many missionaries have been intellectually and spiritually arrogant, and it is often those very deficient in intellect and in love who have been the most arrogant. They went out to assert the superiority of Christ to the terrible evil spirits of fear that haunt the African jungle, and they often spent time in maintaining the superiority of Liverpool or Minneapolis to the villages of the Congo. Even some of the rarest and loveliest personalities among them, while they gave themselves without reserve to the Africans, never learned to receive from them. Here was a lack not only of humility but of discernment. Yet how much they have given. And are we to excuse and even praise the African who, revolting from them, forgets what they gave in schools, in hospitals, in caring for women and children, in compassion and practical help, even in the very ideals of liberty, and remembers only these faults, preferring a revival of the old horrors to the more recent narrowness? And why is it only Christianity that is "under judgment"? Why not Islam, Hinduism or philanthropic agnosticism? There are agnostic humanists who listen complacently to Christians accusing themselves, and they remind me of the case of Charles Lamb and the Methodist Class meeting. Charles Lamb agreed to go with a Methodist friend of his to a Class Meeting, on the distinct understanding that he would not be called upon to speak. In due course his friend

proceeded to share his own sins in great detail, and then the Class Leader said, "I see we have a guest with us: would Mr. Lamb not care to say something?" Stuttering with indignation at this outrage, Charles Lamb said: "I have n-n-nothing much to say about myself, but I can qui-qui-quite c-c-confirm what my friend has said about his being a m-m-miserable s-s-sinner."

The other phrase is that "religion is the enemy of faith," and this is only too tragically true. It was religious men who crucified Christ, and it is too often religious men who attack the heroes of faith of our own day. Narrow, conceited, unimaginative, riddled by fear, insufferably superior and self-satisfied, religious people often fight true faith and would kill it if they could. But when this truth is enunciated its exponents forget two things—that not all religious people are like this, and that while man remains a social creature no power on earth can prevent faith from crystallizing itself into religion. The tension between the two is inescapably part of life on this planet.

Not all religious people are narrow or arrogant or self-satisfied. On the contrary many are well aware of these dangers and are fighting them. Never has the western world been less religious: never has it had so many religious leaders who are heroes of faith.

But when faith comes, is the man of faith to go out alone under the stars? Man is a social creature: he needs his kind. Even hermits have been known to be narrow-minded and arrogant, and Christ, who of all people could have lived alone without this happening, chose to surround himself with friends and disciples. So the Vision Splendid institutionalizes itself into a Church: can it be otherwise? St. Paul carries the Vision on the road to Damascus to the men of Corinth. They accept the truths which he preaches, and in a short time have to be warned of the dangers of division, adultery, quarrelsomeness and uncharitableness.

A man in Africa accepts the new light. It is a deep experience. He joins the Church. Must he not take his children with him? And will they all have his experience, his costly experience? Then comes along some smug University man or superficial journalist and talks about the failure of Missions. The fact is that it is not only Christianity—which, however, as usual, is the only thing singled out for attack—but every phase of institutional life that is subject to this danger. You may as well say that there are university teachers who are the enemies of learning—and some are—or that there are political parties which are the enemies of the very ideals which call them into being. You may as well say that the family is the enemy of love, and alas! how often it is; but can love exist without the family?

The tension between the prophet and the institution which is the natural result of his prophesying is ever with us and is quite inevitable. To resent its existence is to rebel against the conditions under which alone human life can be lived on this earth. It is not intellectually honest either to resent this generally, or to single out Christianity for attack because of it—unless indeed it is on the principle *corruptio optimi pessima*.

Take our ordinary municipal government. Our councillors are rather above than below the average of their constituents. They have an interest in public affairs which, except where corruption prevails, costs them a good deal more than it brings in. Yet put before them a proposal, urgently justified, designed to benefit the poor but likely to raise the rates, and watch their reaction! Is the conclusion to be drawn from this that city councillors are the enemies of good government? The tension must always go on. Generally it is only a minority which insists on reform, and the intolerable thing for that minority is that the majority is so often made up of good folk—decent, respectable people, *boni patresfamilias* as the Romans would have

said. They sit there with consciences not very deeply stirred. They rarely take a stand for evil, but how they blunt the weapons of good! They are the people who find that the time is never ripe, that the world cannot be ruled by starry-eyed idealists, that we must be realistic and reasonable. They protect themselves against higher taxation, but even more firmly against uncomfortable ideas. But they believe in all respectable things, they are shocked by sexual immorality, even in themselves, they are pillars of the social order, umbrella-armed paladins of the *status quo*.

The lover of freedom, the liberal, is bound to resent these men, these useless and terrible friends who are more heart-breaking than open enemies. But when the fight is joined, he is appalled by his allies. For men do not readily do great and noble things as a result of the light of reason. Their emotions are engaged, and emotions are very powerful. Even the man who will resist to the death putting two cents on the rates will send his only son to die for Queen and country. The men who hate the respectable defenders of the *status quo* also have their emotions. Expel religion out of the front door and it comes in by the back door as Nationalism or Communism. Freedom is not served by this: it is only a change of servitude. Reason is not exalted: it is only the triumph of a different kind of irrationalism.

Consider the case of a priest or a minister of religion who looks at the rows and rows of respectable eyes looking up to the pulpit or half-closed with the joyous anticipation of sleep. Must he not long to throw things at them? Must they not break his heart? But they are human beings: they will sooner or later be in trouble, in pain or facing death. Must they not claim the love of his heart? If he attacks them and empties his church of all but the few true believers, he may indeed face the anxious queries of his bishop, but nothing that he will have to face will be worse than the letters of support which will appear in the local press, insulting in

their patronizing good-will, from all the atheists, Communists and cranks who do not even comprehend what he really stands for.

What he is to do will be known to him only in detail. But one thing is sure—he must accept the tension as part of life. It *is* life—the tension between the sexes, the tension between the generations, the tension between the best and the good. He must have faith—faith that out of the very tension will come growth in truth and love, for himself as for his flock.

Take the case of Abraham Lincoln, with Robert E. Lee as an enemy and Thaddeus Stevens as an ally. What could the poor man do? What indeed did that great man not do, rich in humanity and in faith as he was! He honoured Robert E. Lee, but this did not deflect him from the cause of the Union. He did not let Thaddeus Stevens and his other allies deflect him from the path of magnanimity and wisdom. We rightly honour him as a great man, but there is greatness in many and many a lesser-known hero of faith who, in the pulpit or at the council table, fights evil without hating the evil doer, stands for righteousness despite the deplorable attitudes of the righteous.

This faith we must all have if we love freedom; and we must face the future with level eyes, accepting the drudgery of liberalism not less than its inspiration, remembering

That tasks in hours of insight willed
Must be through hours of gloom fulfilled.

There will be hours of sunlight as well. In the life of action as well as that of nature, seedtime and harvest, night and day, summer and winter shall not fail.

Time so complained of
That no one man
Shows partiality
Brings round to all men
Some undimmed hours.

A man who believes all this may, as it were, save his own soul, but can he be effective? Are we fighters of freedom foredoomed to failure? "Why don't you *do* something?" asks the impatient ally. Are we, after all, frauds, finding unreal comfort in theories?

The true results are those which will remain as permanent gains in the pilgrimage of man. This does not mean that we must not try to achieve material results in the political field: it only means that if we are disappointed in all our hopes we have not failed. In the "Ballad of the White Horse," G. K. Chesterton makes the Blessed Virgin say to King Alfred:

I tell you naught for your comfort,
Yea, naught for your desire,
Save that the sky grows darker yet
And the sea rises higher.
Night shall be thrice night over you
And heaven an iron cope:
Do you have joy without a cause,
Yea, faith without a hope?

But this did not mean that Alfred was to spend the rest of his life meditating moodily and burning cakes. It was with this apparently unpropitious message that he raised all Saxon England and beat Guthrum the Dane.

For those who face the twenty-first century, for us who enter on the last decades of the twentieth century, these thoughts are poignantly appropriate. As fighters for freedom we find that the times indeed bring "naught for your comfort," yet we must fight. If we win, we win as Alfred did: if we lose we win as Christ did. Victory is assured in either case. The only real defeat is cowardice, apathy and compromise.

When one considers the dead of the First World War, the hundreds of thousands who lie under their crosses amid the

Flanders poppies, how tragic a loss it seems! The best of England and of so many other countries sacrificed to produce a better world—and look at the world! Yet it is under the Cross that each man lies, and the flowers of spring bloom from his burial place, and his spirit is in what heaven of fulfilment we can hardly imagine. Of all the sacrifices of men, none can be greater than the useless sacrifices. “Why was not this ointment sold for three hundred pence and given to the poor?” Men ask this question in every generation. They almost always ask it when a cathedral is being built, for in the end it is always Christianity which is hated and attacked. They do not say it about the Taj Mahal. They do not suggest that the hundreds of thousands of dollars paid for a Velasquez or a Goya should have been used for slum eradication. They do not even raise the question about the climbers of Everest, or the astronauts, although all these might have put their energies into social service. But try to build a really noble and beautiful cathedral, and all the hounds of criticism are let loose, and even church people join in the baying. Look at Sir Basil Spence’s beautiful new cathedral at Coventry. Look at those wonderful windows, that beautiful Baptistery. The Cathedral was built over the protesting bodies of the Coventry City Council. The poor might have been relieved without raising the rates by that amount of money. Yet it remains as beautiful as a poem. It *is* a living poem. No one reproaches T. S. Eliot for wasting in the “Four Quartets” the energy which might have been used in breeding Short-horns or running a pickle factory, for even though Eliot was a devout and committed Christian the “Four Quartets” were not a cathedral.

When we are tempted not to subject ourselves to danger by the argument that our sacrifice will be useless—and it is

easy to be so tempted—we should resist the temptation. These are the great self givings.

Upon such sacrifices, my Cordelia,
The gods themselves throw incense.

We cannot tell moreover, whether our sacrifice will be useless or not. It is our call to obey, not knowing. How could Socrates know? He or truth had to die. He chose as it befitted him to choose. He died, but truth lived on. There is a humility which we need about ourselves. We are not as big as our cause. Even about the war of 1914-18 Rudyard Kipling rightly wrote:

Who stands if freedom fall?
Who dies if England live?

Freedom is well served by men who have faith, for faith means putting freedom before self.

But all this, according to official Marxist theory, has to do with the superstructure. What really matters is the foundation of economic reality. Marxists do not, of course, despise art or literature—the ballet, and much more, flourishes in Soviet Russia—but they say that it must build on the economic reality. The material is the creator of the spiritual. On this basis they are prepared to accept much in literature, music, painting and sculpture, but never the Christian faith which is to them the real enemy. The material, I repeat, is to them the creator of the spiritual. We believe the exact opposite. It is the spiritual which builds the material. And this, I suggest, is simple common sense. The Professor of Mathematics precedes the bridges, the vision of the artist precedes the oil painting, the discoverer of the alphabet precedes the book.

Art must be free. Art must not be bounded by a theory, not even by a true theory. Art has nothing to do with

surplus value or the dictatorship of the proletariat. We impoverish humanity beyond words if we insist that the artist should believe in the Communist Manifesto, or for that matter in the Athanasian Creed. When we fight the battle of freedom we fight for artistic freedom as well as political freedom, for no one can say what great results may flow from the creative artist working in integrity to express truth and beauty, letting the creative spirit take him where it will.

Surely it is so with literature too. Only the centuries can sort out the wheat from the chaff. If a man writes from his heart, better let him write—the mistakes will look after themselves.

For who is to censor him? What Elizabethan politician could have been trusted to censor Shakespeare? What Spanish office-holder could have been trusted to censor Murillo? When Communist theory subjects artists and poets to the control of the State, what does it mean? The State in action is Comrade X or Commissar Z—no more. It is a man who is no artist, who does not even begin to understand what the artist is getting at, who must accept or reject a great painter on the basis of whether he has or has not built on the right economic foundation. It is again a prosaic man, a man at the best of equations and syllogisms, at the worst of indoctrinated ideas, who must decide whether or not Shakespeare (or his modern counterpart) is worthy literature.

And if we extend this to the field of religion it is men who not only have no religious faith but who have been specially trained not to have any religious faith who must decide whether the Christian Church is permissible in a country based on Marxist economics. Yet no one would think of putting a man who had had no training in applied mathematics or engineering to pass judgment on bridges,

no one would suggest choosing as a tester of a new chemical fertilizer someone who had never studied chemistry, no one would even advocate a commission of garage mechanics to report on a university, nor for that matter a commission of professors of political science to design a new automobile.

So we postulate faith if man is to preserve freedom into the twenty-first century. The artist, the writer, the philosopher, the man of faith—these are needed at least as much as the scientist and the technologist if our children are to cope with the new world which is so rapidly growing around them. In our weakness is our strength. Like Joan of Arc we ride to victory in the power and valour of our dreams, and kingdoms fall before us.

If I have spoken of Joan of Arc, it is not without an ulterior reference, for Joan is not only a champion of faith: she is a woman. The movement for women's rights, for equality of opportunity as between the sexes, is one which has had my whole-hearted support, and there is plenty of room for the career woman. But, try to wriggle out of it as we will, woman, unless the human race is to come to an end, must still be, must always be, a mother and a homemaker. As such she knows that technology is not the last word in life, that there are things to be done for children which only the human hand can do, an atmosphere for the happy growth of children which only love and faith can create, a distinctive quality of a good home and true comradeship which cannot be written into or derive itself from any economic theory. Since women will always be half, or rather more than half the human race, here is a great ground for hope. The battle for the vote has been won, the battle for opportunity and economic equality is moving towards complete victory, but there is a greater women's movement, and in this women, if they are true to themselves, can yet make the twenty-first century safe.

I have done. My thesis is that a good world is impossible without freedom, and that freedom is ultimately impossible without faith. Given these things, and given the indestructibility, unpredictability, and inner integrity of the human spirit, we can face the twenty-first century with hope. We may be plunged into an inferno of history, yet

Thence issuing, we behold again the stars.