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CSD Background Study: Outside the Party: The Tangwai, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Democratization of Taiwan

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Introduction

Taiwan's Kuomintang (KMT) Party is often credited for the island's remarkably successful transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. Indeed, former KMT President Lee Teng-Hui is referred to as 'Mr. Democracy', in reference to the electoral reforms he ushered in between 1987 and 2000. One can argue that this assessment is accurate; KMT administrations in the 1980s and 1990s introduced the reforms that eventually led to free and fair elections for the presidency and legislature in 1996. However, these reforms were not introduced in isolation. The willingness of Presidents Chiang Chiang-kuo and Lee Teng-hui to introduce democratic reforms was influenced by domestic and international pressures affecting the KMT's ability to continue to successfully rule authoritatively. One of the most important of these forces was the *Tangwai*, a loosely organized coalition of politicians, intellectuals and activists, and later the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which openly criticized the KMT's authoritarian regime and used a variety of tactics to increase popular support for democratic reforms.

This case study examines the contributions of the *Tangwai* and the DPP in the democratization of Taiwan. It describes the DPP's evolution from a social movement in the 1970s, mainstream electoral force in the late 1980s and 1990s, to governing party in 2000. Critical features of the *Tangwai* and DPP, such as their adoption of a variety of advocacy tactics and the institutionalization of its various factions, are also discussed. The paper illustrates how the role of

opposition forces has evolved over the past thirty-five years. From a marginal voice of protest in the early 1970s, to the KMT's primary critic and opponent in the late 1970s and 1980s, the DPP is now only one voice in a diverse polity that includes multiple parties, a vibrant civil society and independent media outlets.

Evolving Roles of the *Tangwai* Movement and DPP

Democratic theorists often distinguish between procedural democracy and the consolidation or deepening of democracy.¹ Procedural democratization refers to the creation of institutions and laws that are necessary for the exercise of democratic politics. This includes the existence of a legitimate state apparatus, free and contested elections for executive and legislative positions and governance according to the rule of law. The consolidation or deepening of democracy is a far more fluid concept that refers to institutional, behavioural and attitudinal changes that cause democracy to become the only acceptable form of government for a country's political actors.² Whereas procedural democracy allows citizens to engage in democratic politics at a given point in history consolidation ensures that democracy is sustained over an extended period of time, even in the event of a national crisis or extended political conflict.

This distinction is important in understanding the role played by the *Tangwai* and DPP in the democratization process. In the 1970s and early 1980s, in the absence of even procedural democracy, the *Tangwai* served as a vehicle through which politicians, intellectuals and activists challenged the authoritarian KMT and articulated their demands for democratic reforms. The movement sought representation both within and outside political institutions. Members took advantage of rare political opportunities, such as local elections and the opening of select legislative seats, to form a political bloc capable of publicly criticizing the KMT regime. Grass roots mobilization and mass protests were also used to bring visibility to the movement and show the KMT regime the extent to which citizens were dissatisfied with authoritarian rule. *Tangwai* members successfully capitalized on incidences of repression, such as the Kaoshiung Incident, to increase their political base and discourage the KMT from using similarly heavy-handed tactics.

In 1986, as the KMT embraced democratization in an effort to quell domestic and international criticisms, *Tangwai* leaders created the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In the years that followed, the DPP continued to articulate demands for democratic reforms both within and outside of political institutions. Where possible, it attempted to influence the speed and shape of democratic reforms, prompting serious discussions on such issues as national security, constitutional reform, presidential elections and national sovereignty, as well as insisting that reforms be introduced without lengthy delays. At the same time, the DPP struggled to resolve internal conflicts between its various factions and to transform itself from a protest movement to a political party capable of governing the island.³

The introduction of presidential elections in 1996 is widely used as a marker for Taiwan's full transition to democracy.⁴ The DPP's role in the consolidation of Taiwan's democracy in the post-1996 period is complex and remains a

matter for discussion. DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian's victory in the 2000 election marked an important milestone for Taiwan, with a relatively peaceful transition of power from one party to another. However, the ensuing partisan bickering and controversy over the 2004 election results have had a negative effect on the public's impression of democracy.⁵

From Independent to Opponent: The *Tangwai*

The emergence of the *Tangwai* is without precedent in Taiwan's history. Colonized by five different nations, the island has a long history of authoritarian rule and little experience with organized resistance. Following the defeat of the Japanese in World War II, the island was transferred to the nationalist government of China. Any promise of democratic governance by the nationalists disappeared when the communists seized control of the mainland. Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist supporters fled to the island, where regaining control of the mainland became the government's principal priority. This aim in turn justified the imposition of martial law, under which political dissent, opposition parties and elections for the presidency or legislative positions were forbidden.

For nearly thirty years, there were few avenues for political dissent. Elections were permitted in cities, townships and the provinces but the KMT used its power, vast networks and resources to ensure that its candidates routinely won key positions. Some independent members were elected at the local level but found it was necessary to collaborate with KMT members to accomplish any of their aims. It was also a difficult time to criticize the KMT government, who enjoyed a high level of support, both domestically and internationally, for presiding over strong economic growth and remaining fiercely opposed to communism.

Those who risked openly criticizing the KMT regime were brutally repressed and often imprisoned. Many dissidents ended up fleeing Taiwan to escape long-term imprisonment, and pockets of resistance appeared in a number of western countries, especially the United States.⁶ Like other expatriate movements, they sought to undermine the KMT regime by raising awareness of human rights abuses in Taiwan in the hope that western countries would begin pressuring Chiang Kai-shek to introduce reforms. In the west, expatriate activists were exposed to liberal and democratic societies, further reinforcing their convictions that authoritarian rule was unacceptable. In the late 1980s, many of these activists would later return to play critical roles in the newly formed Democratic Progressive Party.

The first cracks in the KMT's rigid governance structure began to appear in the late 1960s. National assembly members, who in 1953 were granted the right to retain their seats indefinitely, were rapidly ageing. A decision was made to hold open elections in 1969 for a small number of assembly positions to replace members that had passed away. Huang Hsin-Chieh was one of two opposition-oriented legislators who were elected to life terms in the Legislative Yuan during the 1969 elections. A former KMT member, Hsin-Chieh had left the party and sat as an independent on Taipei's city council before winning the National Assembly seat.

Three years later, another Taipei city council member, Kang Ning-hsiang, joined Hsin-Chieh in the National Assembly. Ning-hsiang shared Hsin-Chieh's opposition to the KMT's authoritarian rule, and during the election, he openly defined himself as a *Tangwai* ('outside of the party') candidate. Besides criticizing the authoritarianism of the KMT regime, he advocated the lifting of martial law and temporary provisions which prevented the full implementation of the constitution. With the election of Ning-hsiang and Hsin-Chieh, a small but vocal opposition force found political representation at the national level.

Ten years earlier, Kang Ning-hsiang and Huang Hsin-Chieh might have faced terrible repercussions for identifying themselves as opposed to the KMT regime. However, in the 1970s, the KMT regime faced new challenges from abroad. In 1971, the United Nations General Assembly voted to officially recognize the People's Republic of China. While many of Taiwan's supporters, including the US, maintained strong diplomatic relations with the island following this pronouncement, it became increasingly difficult for the KMT to justify acts of repression against those engaged in peaceful acts of dissent.

In this new political environment, Ning-hsiang, Hsin-chieh, and Chang Chun-hun, a Taipei city councilor, became leaders of a movement primarily dedicated to opposing the KMT (thus their adoption of the term *Tangwai*). In 1975, they published the *Taiwan Political Review*, to promote their political views. As the movement gained support, it also became increasingly diverse in its tactics. The *Tangwai* began to encompass intellectuals and activists promoting democratic reform outside of the political realm through popular education, grass roots mobilization and public protests.

This diversity of tactics was in evidence during the 1977 elections. Hsin-Chieh and Ning-hsiang recruited more than two dozen opposition candidates, including Hsu Hsin-liang, a former KMT member who became a *Tangwai* candidate after publishing a book that was openly critical of the ruling party. Hsin-liang's supporters started violent protests amid rumours that the KMT were tampering with election results. Reactions to this altercation, which resulted in one death, were mixed among *Tangwai* members. Leaders such as Ning-hsiang disapproved of protests that might have fueled fears that democratic reform would result in instability. Others felt that protests were an appropriate response to incidences of blatant corruption and repression.

Despite disagreements within the movement, it succeeded in winning fourteen seats in the provincial assembly. The KMT, on the other hand, saw its overall popular vote drop to an all-time low of 64.2%. These results sent a clear message to the KMT regime that the *Tangwai* platform resonated with many voters, most notably Chiang Chiang-kuo (CCK), who would soon become president. The success of ex-KMT members, such as Hsin-chieh and Hsin-liang, increased the threat of more defections if CCK failed to reach out to the moderate wing of his party, which favoured democratic reforms.

Following the death of his father in 1975, however, it became apparent that CCK was a different sort of politician than his father. He began sending strong messages that the KMT too was committed to democratization. In 1976, he announced in the Legislative Yuan that “our people are unanimous in wanting to have a democratic, constitutional political system. This goal is also our unswerving national mission.”⁷ CCK asked the electorate to remain patient, however, as national security remained a higher priority.

Meanwhile, in the late 1970s, the diversity of opposition positions found expression in the publication of a number of political magazines. Kang Ning-nsiang founded *The Eighties*, a magazine representing his moderate views, while Huang Hsin-chieh’s *Formosa Magazine* expressed support for mass demonstrations. In fact, *Formosa Magazine* became the rallying cry for an island-wide pro-democracy movement. Staff members opened offices throughout the island, creating a network of local branches capable of mobilizing protestors.

One such protest in Kaohsiung County in 1979, meant to commemorate International Human Rights Day, led to altercations between police and demonstrators and the arrest of a number of prominent *Formosa* organizers. Eight protestors, including Huang Hsin-chieh, were indicted on subversion charges and tried in military courts.⁸ Another

33 defendants were tried in civil courts. This event, now referred to as the *Kaohsiung Incident*, represents the most significant historical counterattack by the KMT against the *Tangwai*. It was both an effort to disable the movement and convince the public that *Tangwai* activists were a threat to national security.

The plan backfired. Kang Ning-nsiang assembled a strong team of defense attorneys to defend the accused.⁹ Although the activists were found guilty, and sentenced to long prison terms, the defence team was able to rouse public sympathy for the accused. In legislative elections the following year, the *Tangwai* ran a strong slate of candidates, including family members of imprisoned activists and many of the defense attorneys.¹⁰ Many were elected with unusually high levels of support, sending another clear message to the KMT that voters were responding favourably to the pro-democracy movement.

By the early 1980s, the *Tangwai* had achieved critical mass in the national assembly. While there were not enough members to pass legislation or block the actions of KMT legislators, they did have enough members to openly question the government’s failure to introduce democratic reforms. In posing questions, *Tangwai* members were able to present evidence of ongoing election fraud and police repression in the national legislature.

The early 1980s, however, also saw increased divisions within the *Tangwai*. Clearly delineated factions emerged which disagreed about tactics and policy positions. Moderates, led by Kang Ning-nsiang, continued to advocate working for democracy within existing political institutions. Supporters of Huang Hsin-chieh’s imprisoned *Formosa* faction continued to advocate for a combination of street level protests and political gains. Meanwhile, a new generation of activists with more radical views formed the Alliance of *Tangwai* Writers and Editors in 1983, and the influential *New Tide Magazine* in 1984.¹¹ These activists

were openly critical of *Tangwai* members, such as Ning-hsiang, who worked within the system. The Alliance Faction was highly ideological, openly sympathetic to Taiwan independence and other radical social objectives regardless of the political cost.

During the 1983 legislative elections, *Tangwai* members learned the danger of factionalism. Alliance members refused to endorse a joint election strategy as a result of a disagreement over how candidates for office should be chosen. *Tangwai* candidates had traditionally been chosen by leaders of the movement, such as Ning-hsiang, but Alliance members felt strongly that candidates should be selected openly by members. The factions also disagreed over the question of whether to advocate for 'self-determination', which the KMT argued was a veiled reference to independence. As a result of this failure to coordinate strategies, the movement failed to make the political gains seen in the elections of 1977 and 1980.

By fighting amongst themselves, *Tangwai* members were also missing a clear opportunity for meaningful reform. CCK was increasingly signaling that he felt that a democratic Taiwan might lead to demands for democratization in mainland China, thus bringing an end to communism. A new strategy vis-à-vis the mainland was necessary following the stunning announcement in 1978 by US President Jimmy Carter that his government would formally recognize the People's Republic of China. Democratization might allow CCK to achieve his father's dream of reunifying the country.

The movement's various faction worked together to develop a coordinated election strategy for provincial and municipal elections scheduled for January 1985.¹² As a result of their coordination, all 11 of their candidates for Taipei City Council were elected, as were half of their candidates for Kaohsiung City Council, 11 of its Provincial Assembly candidates, and one municipal executive. These

results gave activists the confidence to begin plotting for a more ambitious objective: creating an opposition party.

In 1986, a branch of the *Tangwai* Public Policy Research Association (DPPRA) was opened in Taipei. The fact that the DPPRA, an organization representing the views of Kang Ning-hsiang's moderate faction, was allowed to operate was already a sign of the KMT's increasing willingness to tolerate the efforts of its opponents. A 'Committee for Organizing a Party and Carrying Out Its Construction' was struck, and activists spent all summer planning and strategizing. On September 28 1986, committee members from all factions voted to create the DPP.

The Struggle for Democratic Outcomes

The creation of the DPP marked the beginning of a new type of struggle between the KMT and the DPP. With both parties now advocating the introduction of democratic reforms, the DPP began focusing on influencing the democratization process. CCK's calls for 'patience' and the introduction of incremental changes were rejected by the DPP, many of whose members had struggled for over a decade for such reforms. The DPP instead demanded far more immediate and broad-reaching reforms and continued using mass demonstrations and vocal protests to articulate its demands.

The founding of the DPP is an excellent example of this new type of struggle. Even though opposition parties were technically still illegal under martial law, the KMT would have faced enormous criticisms both within the legislature and in the streets had it arrested DPP organizers. The *Kaohsiung Incident* had taught party leaders that voters do not respond well to heavy-handedness on the part of the governing regime.¹³ CCK would also have lost an enormous amount of credibility in his efforts to democratize Taiwan. However, allowing one opposition party to operate effectively meant the *defacto* transition of Taiwan from

one-party to multi-party system. It would mean that opposition forces were effectively steering the island's democratization process. Regardless of the actions CCK decided to take, the DPP would see its position strengthened.

Chiang Ching-kuo chose not to take retaliatory action against the DPP, refusing to allow the DPP to ruin his reputation as the man who brought democracy to Taiwan. He countered a few days later by announcing that martial law would be lifted once a new security bill was drafted and approved by the legislature. This bill was deemed necessary in order to protect the island against the threat of Communist China.

Prior to any debate over the bill, an election for national representatives was held in 1986. It represented the first election in Taiwan where the electorate had a choice between two official political parties. The DPP succeeded in increasing the base of support it had built under the *Tangwai* banner, which again demonstrated to KMT leaders that the electorate supported the introduction of democratic reforms.

Following the election, political discussion turned to the national security bill and the appropriate balance between security and human rights. Despite their small number, DPP legislators vigorously opposed the national security bill intended to replace martial law. Furor over the bill led to several demonstrations and more violent altercations between protestors and police. These protests surprised many KMT members who assumed the lifting of martial law would appease the opposition. Conservative KMT members pointed to such protests as evidence that Taiwan would be less secure as a democracy. In the end, KMT legislators used their huge majority to push the security bill through with few amendments. On July 15, 1987, martial law was lifted and the *National Security Provisional Law* took effect.

Only a few months later, Chiang Ching-kuo died. While CCK introduced few significant democratic reforms, he succeeded in setting his father's authoritarian party on a historic path towards democratization. His chosen successor, Vice-President Lee Teng-Hui, immediately announced his intention to remain faithful to CCK's efforts to bring democracy to Taiwan.¹⁴

The DPP clearly communicated their position to Lee. The party advocated open elections for all legislative positions, as well as for the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung. The Temporary Provisions, permitting the president to remain in office indefinitely, were to be eliminated and a committee established to draft a new constitution for citizens to ratify in a referendum. The Examination and Control Yuan were to be abolished, as was the National Assembly, with the president directly elected.

As with the national security bill, DPP members demonstrated their unwillingness to compromise these objectives over the next few years. In 1990, party members condemned the KMT for allowing the National Assembly to elect the president and vice-president. DPP representatives resorted to violent protests within the assembly itself, a tactic that would become only too common in subsequent years. Following their ejection from the assembly, DPP representatives helped to organize a massive demonstration against the proceedings.

Lee, however, proved to be far more effective in dealing with opposition forces than his predecessor. Soon after he was elected president, Lee convened a national affairs conference to discuss various options for democratic reform. Thirteen DPP delegates were invited to attend the conference, as were a number of former political dissidents or prisoners. Despite their initial suspicions, Lee succeeded in engaging DPP members in a serious debate about future reforms in order to build bipartisan consensus. In exchange for a promise of direct president elec-

tions, the DPP delegates agreed to drop their demand for ratification of a new constitution by popular vote. Although he would face criticism from within his own party, Lee showed a commitment to the practice of democratic politics.

After the conference, Lee turned his attention to abolishing the Temporary Provisions, retiring National Assembly members and approving new articles for the 1947 constitution for electing a new national assembly.¹⁵ While the DPP leadership supported these actions, representatives disrupted the proceedings on several occasions to protest the involvement of old representatives in the process. Fights even broke out between DPP and KMT members over routine procedural matters. This behavior may be understood as a response to the marginalization of DPP representatives from a process that they had advocated for over many years. It is also a reflection of the DPP's roots as a protest movement.

Indeed, the DPP retained many aspects of its past as an opposition movement, most notably its internal factionalism.¹⁶ While factionalism is common in political parties, the DPP is unique in having institutionalized its various factions. Within the party, factions have their own leadership and former organizational structures. Factions also play a key role during the nomination of DPP candidates in order to ensure they are well represented.

Factionalism was an issue during the national assembly elections in 1991, following the official retirement of the original representatives. Party leaders disagreed over policy issues such as Taiwanese independence, constitutional reform and the nomination of candidates. Violent protest by DPP representatives in spite of the KMT's success in introducing democratic reforms also hurt the credibility of the party. As a result, the DPP won only 66 out of a total of 325 seats, significantly less than it had projected. Even more surprising, it appeared that the KMT, the island's his-

toric authoritarian party, was emerging the most credible winner in the emergent democracy.

Emboldened by the victory of his party, Lee turned to the matter of constitutional reform. He honoured his agreement with DPP leaders from the national affairs conference, advising his party that direct presidential elections should be strongly considered. However, party leaders decided to delay any decision regarding this issue until 1995, one year before the election of the ninth-term president. This decision was greeted with loud protests from DPP members. Representatives again resorted to loud, and sometimes violent, protests to bring attention to their demands, as they lacked the seats necessary to support a reform motion. When this failed to have the desired effect, the party quit the reform process and organized demonstrations outside of the assembly. Once again, the DPP responded to its marginalization in the reform process by reverting to its protest tactics.

A series of elections were held following the constitutional reform process. Marginalized throughout the democratic reform period, the DPP candidates increasingly ran on platforms emphasizing social policy issues, such as health and education.¹⁷ Factional conflicts were successfully controlled by the party leadership and the question of independence was downplayed. As a result, the DPP steadily increased its number of seats in the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly. By 1996, electoral gains by the DPP and other parties meant the KMT no longer had enough of a majority to have effective control over these two bodies.¹⁸

Elections in 1996 also marked Taiwan's full transition from authoritarian to democracy, with the election of a Lee as president. Following in the footsteps of his predecessor, Chiang Ching-kuo, Lee introduced democratic reforms remarkably quickly. While this was no doubt due in part to the pressure imposed by the DPP, the KMT managed to

remain in control of the democratization process. Mass demonstrations organized by DPP members served in many cases to reinforce the position of moderates within the KMT who were pushing for democratic reforms.

For the DPP, this was a period of both elation and frustration. While many the party's objectives were realized, DPP members remained marginalized throughout much of the process. Tactics that helped the *Tangwai* gain support in the 1970s proved less effective in the 1990s with the KMT's increased willingness to engage in democratic politics. As the number of parties grew in the 1990s, the DPP was forced to transform itself from an opposition force to a party capable of governing with a clearly articulated platform.

From Protest to Power

The DPP's most significant achievement since 1996 was the election of Chen Shui-bian as president of Taiwan in 2000, and again in 2004. This election result is widely attributed to the emergence of former KMT Secretary General James Soong as an independent candidate for president. Soong is widely credited with 'splitting' the KMT vote, thus handing the presidency to Chen despite his low level of popular support.

Despite the KMT's loss of the presidency after fifty years in power, the office was successfully transferred to Chen Shui-bian.¹⁹ This in itself is an indication of the strength of Taiwan's democracy. Chen's first and second terms have been marked with a number of controversies, most notably his alleged shooting during the 2004 elections. What is less to be determined is Chen's influence on the consolidation or deepening of Taiwan's democracy.

Conclusion

The DPP and earlier *Tangwai* played important roles in the democratization of Taiwan. As this case study demonstrates, these roles have evolved over the past thirty-five years. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the *Tangwai* successfully used political representation, printed materials and mass demonstrations to mount a strong opposition to the authoritarian KMT regime. With Chiang Ching-kuo's adoption of democratization as a KMT position, the newly formed DPP sought to influence the nature of the democratic reforms that were introduced. With Lee Teng-Hui's rapid introduction of reforms, and the relative marginalization of the DPP, the party was forced to concentrate on becoming a viable political force in the new emerging democracy. And finally, with the victory of Chen Shui-bian in the 2000 presidential elections, the DPP has had to struggle with the challenge of governing the country according to its founding principles.

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Notes

- 1 Relevant texts include Larry Diamond et al, *Consolidating the third wave democracies* and Samuel P. Huntington's *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Also see Joseph Wong's "Deepening Democracy in Taiwan".
- 2 Larry Diamond et. al, *Consolidating the third wave democracies* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1997), 15.
- 3 Centre staff had the opportunity to meet with many Taiwanese who were expelled from the ROC while it was under KMT rule, however have since returned. For instance, Dr. David Hong was blacklisted by the KMT after he appeared on television at an anti-KMT protest in the United States. He served as a high ranking civil servant in Minnesota before returning to the Taiwan. He is current the Acting President of the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research. Also, W.S. "Peter" Huang spent 25 years hiding from KMT authorities throughout the world after he made an attempt on Chiang Ching-kuo's life in April of 1970. Huang was smuggled back into Taiwan in 1996, later becoming president of the Taiwan Human Rights Association in 1998. He is currently a senior advisor to President Chen.
- 4 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 7. Huntington said, "... a twentieth-century political system [is] democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. So defined, democracy involves... two dimensions, contestation and participation... It also implies the existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, and organize that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns."
- 5 Yun-han Chu, "Taiwan's Year of Stress," *Journal of Democracy* 16,2 (2005): 46. A cross-national survey in 2001 showed that a smaller share of respondents (40.4%) in Taiwan than in any other emerging East Asian democracy were willing to affirm that 'democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government. 23.2% of respondents indicated that 'under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one.' 25.9% of respondents felt that 'it does not matter whether we have a democratic or nondemocratic regime. During an interview, Chu suggested that a recent survey reveals evidence of growing disengagement and polarization; respondents largely feel that the quality of democracy is decreasing and criticisms of democratic government were widespread.
- 6 Peng Ming-min shared his story with Centre staff. A former law professor at the National Taiwan University, he was sentenced to eight to ten years in prison after writing a manifesto calling for democratic elections. After serving 14 months under house arrest, he escaped to Sweden with the help of Amnesty International and American missionaries. He spent the next 23 years in the United States advocating for changes in Taiwan. Peng Ming-min returned to Taiwan only in 1992 and ran as the DPP candidate in the 1996 presidential election. He currently serves as a senior advisor to President Chen. For a full account of his experiences, see "A Taste of Freedom: Memoirs of a Formosan Independence Leader".
- 7 Linda Chao and Ramon H Myer, *The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2000), 112.
- 8 One of Taiwan's foremost human rights lawyer, Yao Chia-Wen, was arrested for his involvement and spent seven years in prison. Yao said that he was introduced to legal aid while he was a law student at Berkley University; he was concerned about poverty law, labor and housing issues, founding an island-wide network of legal aid centers for the poor upon his return to Taiwan. Yao became politically active after his initial attempts to see to legal reforms failed. He made speeches, wrote articles and campaigned across Taiwan during the 1970s prior to his arrest. While in prison, he wrote several award winning books, such as *Ho Ling Ping Yang*. He currently serves in the DPP administration as President of the Examination.

- 9 Shelley Rigger, *From opposition to power: Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2001), 21.
- 10 Yao Chia-Wen's wife, Chou Ching-yu, ran for a seat in the National Assembly in 1980 and was elected with the highest number of votes – thereby vindicating her husband. Other relatives of "Kaoshiung" defendants, such as Mrs. Hsu Jung-shu and Mrs. Huang T'ien-fu, also won their respective races for a seat in the Legislative Yuan. Chuo explained that her husband's arrest incited her to become more politically active. The *Tangwai* agreed to the formation of the DPP in her house in September 1986. She fondly tells of the story of her taking the DPP's flag to her husband in jail when the party was formed.
- 11 Dr. N.T. Wu said that the student movement emerged with the establishment of the *New Tide* and *Alliance of Tangwai* Writers and Editors. He characterized members as young, ideological and intellectual. Many have since become successful DPP politicians.
- 12 The mobilization of the then *Tangwai* provides interesting foreshadowing. To this end, Peng Ming-min described the current factions within the DPP as "survivors" of the KMT regime. He noted that while they are undisciplined, they can quickly unify under pressure.
- 13 Rong Fu-Tien spoke about the interesting role of the media during this time. The *Formosa Incident* had diminished the government's confidence and made it more attentive to the public's perception of the KMT. Thus began an inter-play of members of the *Tangwai* and KMT elites through the media. Rong said that journalists were sympathetic to the *Tangwai* and used their voice in articles, albeit in KMT friendly wording; CCK was reportedly read the newspapers every morning. In turn, CCK began floating ideas to the public through the newspapers to test support. Rong argued that the media exerted its own function of enlightened democracy despite being under tight control.
- 14 Taiwan's democratization was influenced by a variety of factors; perceptions of Lee's role vary. Dr. Bih-jaw Lin served as deputy secretary general of the National Security Council and in the president's office under Lee. He suggested Lee provided the direction for Taiwan's transition to a democracy. Bih-jaw said that Lee's emphasis was human rights and gradual democratization. By contrast, others are more critical of Lee. W.S. "Peter" Huang credits Lee and the KMT with controlling the direction and speed of changes, but argues that they were merely responding to the pressures of uncontrollable popular forces. Dr. N.T. Wu added that he was critical of the KMT's contribution as well, since they had "ruined" Taiwan for over 40 years.
- 15 Chou Ching-yu advocated for reform to the National Assembly even prior to her election. She claimed that it was illegitimate that members elected in 1947 were allowed to serve for life. Chou compiled records on the election of these members; some had won just over a handful of votes. The ailing health of members and poor attendance raised the prospects for change.
- 16 Jen-ran Chen described the *Tangwai* and DPP as diverse in opinions and tactics. Peng Ming-min added party members are not unified by any issues, but lack the independence streak to split into different parties. By contrast, the governing KMT was fractured by the formation of the New Party and People's First Party in 1993 and 2000 respectively.
- 17 Chou Ching-yu, the DPP's Commissioner on Women's Rights, suggested that the DPP has always been attractive to women because of its emphasis on social welfare issues. She said that one-third of DPP party members and seat holders are women.
- 18 See Cal Clark's "Lee Teng-Hui and the emergence of a competitive party system in Taiwan".
- 19 Bih-jaw Lin noted that Taiwan's withdrawal from the United Nations, the establishment of the DPP and Lee's succession of Chiang Ching-kuo were watershed moments in Taiwan's democratization. He said that Lee ordered the completion of Taiwan's democratization. Bih-jaw noted that Lee asked his administration to prepare for a regime change in January 2000 when it seemed possible that KMT candidate Lien Chan might not win.