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Credit for the creation of the Graduate Students' Classical Conference at Queen's University rightfully belongs to Janet Collins and Amy Vail, Conference Co-ordinators for May/88, who saw a need for a forum, in which Graduate Students in Classics from various universities might have the opportunity to present papers on all aspects of Classics and to meet and establish friendships. Weekly or monthly seminars organized within a department to provide Graduate Students in all disciplines with the occasion to present and discuss their current research among their peers have been relatively common in North America, but few opportunities have existed for Classics Graduate Students to gather as a group, either nationally or internationally, and share their ideas. This was the intention behind holding the first G.S.C.C. on May 6-8, 1988. That Conference and its Second Annual meeting held on May 5-7, 1989 were both entirely student run ventures in the hope that its primary benefit would be for Graduate Students.

We were very pleased at the response to this Conference and promptly decided that holding it as an annual event was a goal toward which we should aim, and that an attempt to publish successive year's papers in a small journal would also be worthwhile. It was out of the Second Annual G.S.C.C. that the papers contained herein originated, and I am pleased to announce that a future Vol. II of Ceres will contain the papers delivered at the Third Annual G.S.C. Conference to be held May 4-5, 1990.

Many people have been involved in the planning and production of the conference and this journal and they have been named in the Acknowledgements, but added thanks are also due to Richard Levis for his valuable assistance in ensuring that this journal made its appearance.

Paul A. Young
Editor
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The following people must be recognized as the *sine quibus non* of this publication: Paul Young, whose editorial work the readers now hold in their hands; Janet Collins, who co-ordinated this year's conference and indeed created the first Graduate Students' Classical Conference in May, 1988; Carol Merriam and Mary Young for assisting with the technical aspects of this publication; David Marko for the design and creation of the cover; Bobbi Pentland for her assistance in the organization of the conference; Meryn Scott who put the final touches on the editing of this journal; all the Graduate Students at Queen's who help make Graduate Studies at Queen's the dynamic and stimulating experience that it is; and, Professor Kilpatrick who, as Head of the Department, gave this endeavour his full support.

The Graduate Students' Classical Conference Committee would also like to express their gratitude for financial support from the School of Graduate Studies and Research at Queen's; the Ontario Classical Association; and, the Graduate Student Society at Queen's.

Finally, the Graduate Students of the Classics Department at Queen's would like to give especial thanks to all the people who made the effort to present a paper in this year's conference and share their scholastic insights with us.

Richard Levis
Co-ordinator for May/90
The AGON of Self-Consciousness: Ajax, Odysseus and Heroic KLEOS

"Homer is the element in which the Greek world lives, as man does in the air."¹

Introduction.

After the death of Achilles towards the end of the Trojan War, Ajax and Odysseus engage in a contest to determine who is fit to bear the arms of Achilles. The armour Achilles primarily wears is the epithet "best of the Achaean," and the contest for the arms is really the contest to determine who shall rightly bear the title aristos Achaion; it is, in other words, an issue of determining who shall count as representing what it means to be Achaean.² What follows is a reflection on one dimension of the significance of the contest between Ajax and Odysseus for the arms of Achilles. This reflection will use an account of the nature of self-consciousness to explain why it is that Ajax loses the contest to Odysseus—why he has to lose—and in so doing to illuminate something of the relationship between the stories told in writings like the Iliad and these writings themselves.³ In a way which will be clarified through the consideration of Odysseus, I take the epic story of the Trojan War to be the story of the emergence of humanity, and it is in the context of this overarching theme that I read the contest for the arms. My claim is that the story of Ajax, the hero who sieges, is the story of a failed attempt at self-consciousness; while the story of


² This title is applied widely within the Iliad, (see 1.91, 5.103, 5.414, 13.313, 7.50, 1.244, 1.412, 16.274), but I take the theme of the book to be the proper use of the name; thus, Achilles' wrath stems from his not getting this recognition, and the application of the term to other heroes comes in the context of attempting to provide substitutes for Achilles when he is absent from battle.

Odysseus, the hero who leaves the siege to return home, is the story of memory and writing; my argument is that Ajax must lose because he embodies a primitive self-consciousness and thus would represent the Achaeans as animals, while Odysseus wins because he embodies the form of self-consciousness which represents the Achaeans as human. I will begin with a portrait of Ajax and then proceed to consider the nature of self-consciousness in order to provide interpretations of Ajax's loss and Odysseus's victory.

1. Ajax and the Siege.

In the *Iliad*, Ajax is the figure of siege and destruction; yet the master of the siege is, according to the *Iliad*, Achilles. It is, in fact, important to consider the two together. There are a number of ways in which Ajax is in fact paired with Achilles in the *Iliad*, and four in particular are worth noting. The first three can be discussed together.

First, Achilles is best by far of the Achaeans, but Ajax is "best after Achilles." That Ajax deserves this epithet of being the second first man is borne out by his contest with Hector, and this, the relation to Hector, is the second point of comparison. The third point of comparison relates, in fact, to the arms of Achilles, for, while Hector possesses Achilles' armour, Achilles claims that the only Achaean armour he could substitute would be the shield of Ajax, (and, in fact, the focus on the shield is not simply innocent).

Achilles is, of course, defined by his relation to Hector. Hector is his mirror image in that their deaths are linked, but the mirroring is also played out in the *Iliad* through having Hector lead the siege of the Achaean walls, through having Hector dress in Achilles' armour, through having Achilles block Hector's entry in Troy, and so on. Achilles and Hector are equals. When the offer is made to decide the war through single combat of Hector with one Achaean champion, Ajax is chosen. As Ajax is proud to note in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, the Achaeans are relieved that he is chosen, justifying the claim that he is best after Achilles. And they should be relieved, for Ajax lives up to

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4 See, for example, *Iliad*, 18.105-106.

5 *Iliad*, 2.768-769.


7 And in Sophocles' *Ajax* (11 441-444) he claims that Achilles would have granted him victory in his contest with Odysseus. For Ovid's account, see *Metamorphoses*, 13.82-89; see note 16 below. The Achaeans were pleased that he was chosen: *Iliad*, 7.175-183.
Achilles' definition: he proves to be the equal of Hector.\(^8\) Further, the pairing of the deaths of Achilles and Hector is also present in the story of the relation of Ajax and Hector, for the deaths of each of these heroes are connected with the gifts which they exchange as symbols of their equality\(^8\): it is by the belt given Hector by Ajax that Achilles drags Hector around the city, and it is upon the sword given Ajax by Hector that Ajax impales himself.\(^9\) Finally, Ajax is identified through his famous shield, and it is this armour which is symbolic of Ajax himself which Achilles claims could substitute for his own armour. The symbolic equivalence of the hero and his armour is already suggested by the stories of the use of the armour of Achilles by Patroclus and Hector, by the exchange of gifts of Hector and Ajax, and by the story of the contest for the arms of Achilles,\(^11\) so it suggests a strong identity of character for Achilles to identify his arms with those of Ajax. In these respects, then, Ajax seems to be a repetition of Achilles, and what each represents is "siege" or destruction of what is other.

The fourth point of comparison is based on comparing the Iliad with this paper, and it is simply this: throughout the Iliad, Achilles is likened to an animal\(^12\); my argument is that Ajax embodies animality. In fact, my argument is precisely that it is because each lives to besiege its other that each is an animal. Let me turn now to self-consciousness in order to explicate this point.

2. Self-Consciousness.

Like Descartes' *ego cogito*,\(^13\) Athena springs fully armed from the head of Zeus. In contrast, the story of the contest of Ajax and Odysseus suggests that, more in keeping with Aristotle's account of the self,\(^14\) self-consciousness is not so easily and

\[^8\] In fact, he would have done Achilles' job of killing Hector if Apollo had not intervened, (see Iliad 7.268-272).

\[^9\] Iliad, 7.303-305.

\[^10\] According to Sophocles' Ajax, 11 815-822, 1024-1033.

\[^11\] And see also Iliad, 16.69-71.

\[^12\] See Iliad, 22.164-175, 24.33-54 (esp. 41-43), 18.318-322, 22.346-347, 24.207. Other fighters are compared to animals; see 3.23, 5.161, 5.299, 11.113, 12.42, etc.

\[^13\] Meditations on First Philosophy, second meditation.

\[^14\] De Anima, Book III, Chapter 4; Metaphysics, Book L, Chapters 7 and 9.
immediately achieved, but is a prize to be won through a struggle—an intersubjective struggle—and can only be won by a successful and cunning return from a siege. Let me sketch out a model of the dynamics of the struggle for self-consciousness.

Two features which characterize selfhood are i) independence, and ii) being a centre. The form that these two characteristics take differs with different ways in which an agent is self-conscious. I will consider two different forms: one in which what is "other" to the self is treated as an object of desire and is consumed or destroyed, and the one in which the "other" is treated as an object of respect; the first form I will call animal self-consciousness, and the second, human self-consciousness. First we must consider how the animal self is independent, and how it is a centre.

For the animal, the whole world is at its disposal: the whole world, that is, is "for it." The animal itself provides the pivot or point of orientation according to which the significance of all things is measured; it is, thus, the "centre" of its world. Equally, the animal self remains the self-sufficient and self-moving essence of its world, while things within the world have only an accidental and contingent existence: the self is the independent centre which determines the value of things, whereas things are the dependent periphery and have their value determined by the self. Thus, the animal eats, and, in destroying what is other to it, it proves that its being (and its being a self) did not depend on that other, while that other's being did depend on it. The life of this self-moving consumer is the perpetual repetition of this same logic: each "other" it encounters appears as a challenge to its independent centrality, and it constantly reconfirms its sense of selfhood through its acts of dominating its world. This then is the conceptual story of the animal self: it feels its independence, but its certainty of its selfhood is based on its ability to define this independence through the destruction of its other. In order to move on to human self-consciousness, I will first consider a situation in which the animal self meets its limit, in order to show how the logic upon which its certainty of itself rests leads the self either to an infinite inability to satisfy itself or to a self-contradiction.

The presence of a second self within the self's world presents a more sophisticated challenge to the self's centrality than do those inanimate things which can barely resist the self's

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15 Athena, Odysseus and Ajax are the three main players in Sophocles' Ajax, it would be interesting to use this account of self-consciousness to interpret this drama in terms of the relations of these three. In this paper, I am treating Ajax as if it were an interpretation of older myths, (see note 10, above), that is, Sophocles' play brings to the fore certain themes that are latent in the archaic myths.
domination, for the second self not only refuses to automatically conform to the first self's will, but, further, it, in turn, wants the first self to conform to its will. These two selves, consequently, must struggle, and struggle to the death, and this for two reasons. First, to show its own absolute independence, each self must risk its own life, in order to prove that maintaining its own natural existence is not something it depends on. Second, in order to show the other's dependence, it must destroy this other's claim to being the centre—it must destroy the other. Success in this struggle, however, does not bring about fulfillment.

The victorious self has not really succeeded in confirming its selfhood against its challenge, for what really challenged this self's centrality was not the physical presence of the other, but the selfhood of the other, that is, this rival other actually claimed to be the real centre, and it was this other's self-consciousness which was the real challenge. But this challenger has not been defeated through death but has merely gone: the other's life was defeated, but the challenge came from the other's self-consciousness, (which, by the victorious self's own logic is not equatable with the life); the death of the other, in other words, does not overcome the challenge of other selves but merely removes its actual presence for the time being while always leaving the issue open. Consequently, the killing of other selves will have to be indefinitely repeated, like eating, which means always making a temporary solution while always deferring the real confrontation. The desire for selfhood which treats its other according to the same logic as hunger treats what it will eat is a selfhood operating on an animal logic, and this is a self-certainty which can never really be confirmed because it demands the infinite repetition of the confrontation with the object. By reconsidering what is really required for success in the confrontation of another self we can now make the transition to human self-consciousness.

The only way the first self can really substantiate its claim to centrality when challenged by another self-consciousness is for that other self to recognize the centrality of the first, that is, the other centre must sacrifice its own claim to centrality—only the other's self-surrender or self-subordination can really make the first self the centre. But notice, furthermore, what is required for this self-surrender to be effective: in order for the surrender—which is the choice of the second self—to be definitive of the centrality of the first, the first self must already have recognized the centrality of the second, that is, the first depends on the choice—the self-determination—of the second. In other words, to want the other's recognition is already to have granted recognition to that other. Recognition, then, can only be effective in a setting where both participants have recognized each other. In terms of the relation to otherness, then, the confirmation of one's selfhood which is won through recognition of the other is one which
acknowledges its dependence on the maintenance of that other: one can only be recognized by an other which one respects. Let me conclude my account of the dynamics of self-consciousness by noting something about what is achieved through recognition.

The story of the animal self was premised on the notion that the self was the independent centre, but here, with the dialogue of mutual recognition, it may seem that the opposite is achieved: mutual recognition can only result in a situation wherein each self is dependent on the other and recognizes its own dependence. Yet there is something else achieved here—a third thing over and above the two individual selves, but which is constituted in and through the maintenance of their relation. This third thing is in fact the real independent self which maintains itself, in which both parties participate, but to which each, as a separate individual, is subordinated. It is the free or respectful community or social identity. Within the community established through a dialogue of recognition every self involved must respect its other, rather than destroy it, and, furthermore, the new social or interpersonal "self" which is constructed must itself recognize and respect its "otherness," namely, those individual selves out of which it has been cunningly constructed. With this account of what is required for a human, i.e., communal self-consciousness, (a "we"), we can return

16 This is the ideal "we," but this larger self which exists in and through the intercourse of finite selves is also always present in less perfect relations. Let us reconsider the animal relation.

In the animal relation, it is really not true that the object is really subordinated to the self as the self-certain animal believes; in the absence of the other, the self cannot be. The animal's whole self is the destroying of the other and the transformation of it into itself (consumption), and thus it is defined by that other. No doubt in eating the self shows it can overpower food, but, without food to overpower, the self cannot exist. The animal self does not recognize that it really does depend on its life, and that without this it is nothing. But note what is the real essence of the animal.

The self which is maintained in and through the subordination of its otherness is not the self that eats—it is still dependent; likewise, it is true that what is eaten reveals its own lack of independence. What is maintained, however, is the whole relation of eating. The interdependent interaction of animal self and animal object maintains a relationship, and it really is the logic of this relationship which dictates how its components will behave. In and through the actions of the apparent self on its apparent other, the stable system maintains itself; it has, as it were, the cunning to get its tasks performed by others who do not even realize they are working for it. It is this self which is the real independent centre.
to the contest, and consider two reasons why Ajax has to lose. My argument will be that Ajax's is the story of a failed attempt at self-consciousness.

3. Ajax’s Failure.

According to Ovid’s story, (in which both contestants make speeches to the Achaean chieftains), Ajax's case is based on his ability at siegecraft and destruction. 17 He argues that he is the best heir to Achilles' arms because he is really another Achilles, and, as I have suggested, this claim is well-founded. Now Achaean think of themselves as human beings. 18 The point of

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17 Here and in my account of Odysseus below I will be relying on Ovid’s account of the contest in Metamorphoses, 12.612 – 13.398. This and all the other accounts should, in fact, be kept separate and treated independently, for it is not at all obvious that they tell the same story, and this is especially true when one jumps all the way from archaic Greek to Augustan Roman, and I am here ignoring these differences only in the interests of brevity. This difference is best illustrated by Ovid’s portrayal of the contestants as making speeches: this, as it were, already decides the question since language is the element of Odysseus—Ajax is a man of the deed, Odysseus a man of the word; I take the archaic Greek story to be much better represented by Pindar in his 8th Nemean wherein Ajax is portrayed as speechless. As with Sophocles, (see note 15, above), I treat Ovid as an interpreter of ancient stories, who makes manifest themes that are latent in the traditional myths. Let me, however, note one Greek source which I could have used to make a similar argument to the one I will make based on Ovid.

Although Pindar (8th Nemean, 26f.) supports Ovid's claim that the Achaean judged the contest, Homer (Odyssey, 11.542ff) makes the Trojans the judges. It seems, however, (according to the scholiast on Aristophanes' Knights, 1056) that Lesches, in The Little Iliad, united both these accounts by having Achaean spies pass judgment after returning from overhearing Trojan girls argue over the case. A first girl chose Ajax, because he carried Achilles' dead body from Troy. The second girl, with whom the Achaean sided, countered (with the "pronoia of Athena") that, "even a woman can carry a load once a man has put it on her back." This argument has essentially the same logical form as the one which Odysseus uses against Ajax in Ovid's account.

18 Note, for example, Iliad, 3.1-9 where the Trojans are compared to birds; see Walter Leaf’s note to 3.8 in his critical text (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1900-02). The Greeks like to define themselves against others, a comparison often connected with language as in this and other critiques of the Trojans and also,
my first section, however, was to show why besieging and
destroying the other is the mark of an animal self-consciousness,
so by basing his claim to be best of the Achaeans on his
animality, Ajax has mistaken the Achaeans for animals. That this
is the truth of this affair is borne out by the consequences of
his losing the contest as they are portrayed by Sophocles.
According to Sophocles' Ajax, when Ajax fails to win the
recognition of his peers he is outraged and goes on to slaughter
and torture sheep which he apparently believes to be the Achaean
chieftains and finally to commit suicide by falling on the sword
given to him by Hector. Reading this in the context of my
account of self-consciousness allows us to say three things about
this.
First, his turning to the sheep bears out the claim that the
import of his speech is to mistake the Achaeans for animals: he
cannot recognize (note the word) what it means to be human. But,
second, it shows why he is doomed. By entering into the
competition he has already shown that he needs the recognition of
his peers—he has already acknowledged his dependence on their
recognition of him. He needs what I above referred to as the
self-surrender of the centrality of the others, and by turning to
sheep he rules out the possibility of winning this human
recognition. He tries to torture surrender out of the sheep, but
this just demonstrates further his failure to recognize that a
show of force over the other's body can never win what can only
be given by the self-determined bending of the other's will. His
peers will not recognize him, and sheep cannot; further, the
possibility of self-consciousness depends on free others, and this
dependence is indeed the risk involved in trying to be a human
self, but Ajax tries to win by removing the risk, that is, by
trying to force recognition through torture, but this, again,
removes the very possibility of success by not recognizing the
humanity, that is, the free self-hood, of the other. He has
staked his own selfhood on the recognition of other selves, but his
inability to distinguish an animal from a human self ensures that
he can never win the prize of human self-consciousness which can
only come through participation in a community of mutual
recognition. Since his selfhood depends on human recognition, he
cannot win through torturing sheep, but since his inadequacies
limit him to this route, his failure to be a self is fated; in
other words, his suicide is simply a conclusion which has been
implied from the start, that is, by ruling out the possibility of
being recognized as a self by others, Ajax loses the possibility
of recognizing himself; hence, his suicide. The first reason for
his failure, then, is that, as an animal who sieges his other,

for example, in Agamemnon. See also Iliad, 2.803-805.

19 Like Antigone, the Sophoclean Ajax is committed to something
at the same time as he rejects it.
Ajax is not capable of existing within a human world.

The second reason for his failure is again based on his identity with Achilles. I will only note this point here, however, for to make it fully really depends on the account of what winning the contest means, and this will be the story of Odysseus. The point is simply this: Ajax really is another Achilles, but that is not what is needed. Like the repeated meals the animal eats, or the repeated struggles to the death which can never win a real confirmation of the self, to elect Ajax as best of the Achaeans would just be to engage in the infinite repetition of the empty immediacy of a consumptive life. Even Achilles knows the folly of this, however, for he knows that it is for the sake of his kleos that he must sacrifice his life. 20 It is Odysseus who knows that the Greeks must return to preserve kleos, and this is why he must win out over Ajax. Let me now turn to Odysseus to develop the story of the hero who returns rather than the hero who sieges.

4. Odysseus and the Return.

First, let us consider Odysseus's relation to battles, and also what things count as threats to Odysseus's self, in order to clarify my claim that Odysseus is the hero who returns. The proper story of Odysseus—the Odyssey—is framed by two sieges: Odysseus exists between the siege of Troy and the siege of Penelope. Thus, unlike Ajax and Achilles who are primarily defined as participants in a siege, that is, they are de-fined by the other whom they besiege, Odysseus "overarches" sieges—he always exists in relation to sieges, without being contained by them.

20 Note here that Achilles' old armour is usable interchangeably by Achilles, Patroclus, and Hector and, as noted above, that Achilles and Ajax can interchange armour. As long as siege is primary, we stay in an infinitely unsatisfying cycle of contest and death (for note that all these heroes die at Troy); it is only with the change of Achilles' armour that we make an advance: once his arms change, that which shields Achilles—what he depends on—is precisely kleos, that is, the re-presentation of life, for his shield is not just ox-hide like that of Ajax, but is also a work of art which represents the entire cosmos (Iliad, 18.478-607). In Section 5 it will be clear that Achilles is the supreme hero because he is the hero who must die, and who is defined by this fate: Achilles knows he must die for kleos, and this crucial transition is marked by the presentation to him of his new armour; this is also why Odysseus justly replaces Achilles as "best of the Achaeans": in beating Ajax he beats Achilles. The contest for the arms of Achilles is really the same story as the story of Achilles' armour, (and the inability of Hector's weapon to damage Achilles' armour is the same story as Ajax's inability to fight Odysseus).
This, furthermore, is the theme repeated throughout the Odyssey, namely, that Odysseus breaks out of the boundaries which limit others—he is, so to speak, apeiron. Let us consider some of the limited situations which are not able to contain Odysseus.

In the Odyssey, Odysseus's "medium" is the sea which both provides him with access to various lands, and provides him a way out. A brief reflection on some of the situations he enters and exits will reveal to us what it is which threatens Odysseus. The Lotus-Eaters, Circe, the Sirens and Calypso all offer participants a pleasurable immersion in immediacy. The challenge to Odysseus is in each case to enter into contact with immediacy, but not to be taken up by it: immediacy always threatens to absorb him who would return, but this hero is himself only through his ability to "step back" or disengage himself from the immediate intercourse and address the total situation without simply being defined by his participation in it. Odysseus always enters the fray, but he does not rest within it; Tiresias even tells us that he will not be able to rest at home after he ends the siege of Penelope. This definitive ability of Odysseus not to be trapped as only one side in a conflict is, of course, what is portrayed in his passage through Scylla and Charybdis. This theme of the Odyssey is likewise present in Ulysses' speech in Ovid's portrayal of the contest for the arms.

In his speech, Ulysses rests his claim, not on the great deeds he performed in the Trojan War, but on the deeds others performed. Since he brought Achilles to the war, he argues, he is responsible for all Achilles achieved. In other words, he characterizes himself as the kind that wins victory "on the backs of" others: he is the overarching unity which is constituted in and through the deeds of its participant others. He goes on to describe his other deeds, and these, too, amount to ways in which he entered into a siege in which he is not one of the defining members, but which he is able to overcome. He entered the existing contest of Diana and Agamemnon at Aulis, and ended it by having Iphigenia sacrificed. He forestalled the contest of Clytaemnestra and Agamemnon by his cunning deception of Clytaemnestra. He really won the agon of the Greeks and the Trojans by providing Achilles and by devising the plan for the horse. Here again, he defines his self by his ability to enter

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21 Odyssey, 11.119-125; note also 11.134-135.

22 See note 17, above, for an equivalent argument in the Greek sources. Apropos of the issue of self-consciousness, the point could also be made here that this argument invokes the same logic as that by which the human act of saying "I" works: when one becomes self-conscious of one's deeds, one says "I did that," thereby "retroactively" placing oneself at the beginning of the action as pronoia or "cunning" and as cause. On this point, compare Iliad 19.215-219, especially 219.
into the immediate contest without allowing himself to be defined by it. Odysseus, then, is not defined by an other which he besieges; he, rather, stands in relation to the entirety of the contest, and he is defined by his ability to return to his own world from the agon: he is not contained by the contest, but rather, contains the contest.\textsuperscript{23} We can turn, now, to the significance of this return from immediacy.

5. Writing and Victory.

In the struggle to the death of two selves, the defeated self cannot acclaim the victory of the victor, and this was indicated above as one of the reasons for the inadequacy of this approach to self-definition. Without justifying it by a further analysis of the dynamics of self-consciousness, I want to indicate one measure which could be introduced in an attempt to find a substitute (a pharmakos/pharmakon) for the recognition by the defeated other. This substitute would be the recognition of others who did not enter the fight.\textsuperscript{24} It is, in fact, kleos which the heroes seek, and for which Achilles exchanges his life.\textsuperscript{25} Achilles and the others will die for kleos, but their death is in vain in the absence of an audience. Odysseus knows that sieges are really for glory, and he has the wisdom to know the necessity of the return home from the siege. As the hero who returns, Odysseus thus represents memory, or the re-presentation of the immediacy of life, but there is also a second side to the idea of returning which more directly recalls the earlier account of self-consciousness.

In the account of the community of mutual recognition which is established through a dialogue of peers, I characterized the "real" independent "self" as the "we" which is established in and through the actions of the participant individuals. The real self, in other words, is not one of the distinct participants within the intercourse—it is neither one nor the other, and is

\textsuperscript{23} Ajax/Achilles may be the master of the siege, but Odysseus is the master of the contest.

\textsuperscript{24} This cannot really succeed, since these others have not proved their worth by risking their lives in the struggle with the first self, but if they are themselves great fighters, they are at least equivalents. Compare Nietzsche on "good and bad": this is the mutual admiration we see among all the fighters, Achaean and Trojan, in contrast to the contempt for those who beg for mercy, (compare Nietzsche, "good and evil").

\textsuperscript{25} Although compare Odyssey 11.488-491, where the proud animal self-certainty of Achilles has been replaced by the slave consciousness which recognizes its dependence on its own natural life.
The AGON of Self-Consciousness

not defined by its exclusion of and relation to the other. It achieves its goals on the backs of the participants, and its home is thus outside the immediacy of the intercourse of the lives of these discrete individuals. The individuals work out their own personal and interpersonal projects, but the real results return home from this immediacy. I want to consider Odysseus's return in both these senses, that is, as the victory won "on the backs of" or "in and through the intercourse of" the discrete individuals involved in the immediacy of siege, and also as the memory which transcribes the immediacy of the siege into a public kleos. In particular, I want to consider the idea of writing in order to show that the "return" of community really depends upon the "return" of memory, and to argue that it is only with writing that the human self-consciousness can begin.

If we can recall the above account of the emergence of human self-consciousness, we will note three features which are essential. First, each participant in the struggle to the death must choose to give up its goal of killing the other: as long as this goal has not changed—and changed for both of them—the fight will necessarily continue until one dies. Second, these choices must be communicated, that is, each must be aware of both its own and the other's choice in order for the struggle to stop. Further, the recognition of the other's choice must be expressed. Each must choose and recognize the other's choice, and both these acts must be expressed. What this last point means, then, is that public expression is essential to forming the community of mutual recognition.

We must consider what expression could be in this context. In general, expression will be some way of using the aisthetikos dimension of something over which the self has control in order to signify something; expression can only begin with the institution of a sign, that is, the creation of a sensible unit which refers beyond its immediate self to some meaning. It means using something immediately sensible to articulate something other than its own immediacy. To recognize a sign as a sign means to step outside the immediate relation to its sensibility, and to recognize that it functions by separating itself off from its own immediate relations and offering itself as a mediating agency to give access to some other significance. Community, then, and the communication it requires, means instituting a system of writing, which means disengaging from their immediate relations oneself and what one senses. Thus the return from immediacy which is community is itself achieved in and through the return from immediacy which is writing, and, equally, the return which is writing can only be achieved through the return which institutes community.

Finally, what is this writing but memory? Unlike a siege, the return from immediacy cannot destroy its other, that is, it cannot destroy that from which it returns, for that which is constituted by the return only is in and through the immediate intercourse which founds it. The return must preserve its point
of departure in order to be able to be as a return. Writing disengages from the fray only in order to acknowledge and save that which it expresses. Writing is essentially the glorification of that from which it is a return. Writing is essentially kleos.

But note, then, that in the absence of writing, immediacy is forever consigned to oblivion; writing is that upon which immediacy depends for its possibility of counting for anything. We thus see here a reversal; the return which initially appears to be dependent on the siege for its being turns out to be that upon which the siege depends. Likewise, Odysseus, who wins his victories through the efforts of other heroes, turns out to be the one through whom all the others are able to be heroes. The contest for the arms of Achilles, of course, makes precisely this point, for, just as Achilles is ultimately protected by the shield which is a work of art—a sign—the hero who sieges (Ajax) is shown to ultimately be subordinate to the hero who returns.

Conclusion.

Through a consideration of the logical dynamics of the concepts of self-consciousness and of writing, it has been possible to invest the story of the contest for the arms of Achilles with the significance of being the story of the emergence of human community through language. We might note further that we already knew the outcome of the struggle when we started reading the Iliad, for the Iliad is itself nothing other than the writing of the kleos of Achilles which, through remembering the struggles, founds the Greek community; the Iliad was always already the story of Odysseus.26

University of Toronto

John Russon

26 I would like to thank Patricia Fagan, Richard Kidder, Abe Schoener and H. S. Harris for thought-provoking discussions and other help, and W. McLeod for providing me with photocopies of important Greek sources for the story of the contest and for his critical remarks on an earlier draft, some of which I hope I have been able to address. I would like to thank Janet C. Collins, Paul Young and Richard Levis, the Queen's University Classics Department, and all the GSCC participants for a stimulating conference. An SSHRCC Doctoral Fellowship made it possible for me to write this paper and participate in the conference.
THE LIVING STREAM:
WATER IMAGERY IN VERSIL'S AENEID, BOOK II

Aeneas, Anchises, and the young Ascanius (Julus) with their sacra and Patrili Penates surviving the destruction of Troy is Vergil's theme in the Aeneid Book II. Through the entire Book -- the Trojan reaction to the horse, the deceit of Sinon, Laocoön's death, the night of war in Troy, Priam's death, Aeneas' escape, and finally, the Trojan survivors gathering at the temple of Ceres -- Vergil reinforces and dramatizes his theme by the repetition of tension and release, potential followed by action. Even Dido and her Carthaginians, to whom Aeneas is about to recite his tale, are pictured in the first line as a silent audience, held intent with anticipation for release of the story of Troy: Conticuere omnes intentique ora tenebant (II: 1). Vergil then expands this initial play of tension and release when he combines it with the imagery of water -- both the retention of water by man-made devices, and water in all its force flowing freely.

A different approach to the reading of Book II has been taken by Bernard Knox. His article, "The Serpent and the Flame", carefully binds together various elements of the Book through the underlying concepts of deception, destruction, and rebirth that are symbolized in the imagery of the snake and fire. He illustrates, for example, how "the principal instruments of the Trojan downfall, the Trojan fear, the horse, the Greek fleet, the deep sleep, the fire, have all been linked with the image of the serpent" (p.133). Recognition of the omnipresent serpent is, of course, central to an understanding of the Book. However, the destruction of a city needs more than treachery and deceit, it requires force, a great surging force that can burst into buildings and overwhelm armed men. To this purpose Vergil has employed the destructive power of water that is bound, as I have said before, to the concept of tension and release.

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1 All subsequent line numbers refer to Book II unless otherwise specified.


3 Similar examples of water imagery and military force are found throughout the Aeneid. In books VI-XII the metaphor of water for armed force is present although less emphasized. Water similes also continue to appear but are less prevalent, examples include: VII: 528-530, the gathering troops and their glittering armour are compared to the swelling of a storm at sea; IX:30-32, the parade of forces is compared to the Ganges and the Nile.
The Living Stream

Three similes direct our attention to the importance of water as a motif in the imagery of Book II. The first is a torrent flooding from above that demolishes crops and forests:

... aut rapidus montano flumine torrens sternit agros, sternit sata laeta boumque labores praecipitisque trahit silvas; (305-307)

... or a torrent from a mountain stream that plunders and flattens the fields, it flattens the fruitful crops, the toil of cattle, and drags along the fallen trees.

The second water simile is the storm and swell from the depths of the foaming sea:

stridunt silvae saevitque tridenti spumeus atque imo Nereus ciet aequora fundo.

(418-419)

the woods howl and foaming Nereus rages with his trident and swells the sea from its depths.

The third image of water portrays the destruction of crops and herds, again from above, only this time it is a swollen river that breaks its embankments and destroys the man-made devices of retention (moles) in its way:

non sic, aggeribus ruptis cum spumeus amnis exit oppositasque evicit gurgite moles, (496-497)

With less force than a foaming river when, its banks ruptured, it overflows and overcomes the opposing structures with its flood.

In addition to these three similes, the text also reveals an abundance of verbs that easily invoke the images of water destroying, filling, flowing around, bursting, and flattening -- eruere (5), compleverunt (20), fluere (169), circumfundimur (383), fudimus (421), perrumpit (480), sternit (603), adfluxisse (796), to mention only a few. In conjunction with this onslaught of vocabulary is the emphasis on height -- et monstrum infelix sacrae sistimus arce (245), "and in our misfortune we set the beast on the sanctified height," as well as ruit alto a culmine Troia (290), "Troy falls from its height" -- coupled with the image of the restraining dam that is connected to the horse by means of the word moles.

The word moles specifically means a large mass. A secondary meaning that Vergil exploits in Book II, however, is the concept of moles signifying a structure that retains water or obstructs its passage. We can go to Caesar or Lucretius to find
Androgeos and his troops off-guard, overwhelm and surround their captives with arms, inruimus densis et circumfundimur armis (383). But the Trojan victory is only a temporary surge, for the Greeks eventually fight back, angry because of the loss of Cassandra whom they had dragged from the temple of Minerva. Vergil illustrates this Greek counter-attack with the simile of flood water swelling from the sea: spumeus atque Nereus ciet aequora fundo (419), "and foaming Nereus swells the depths of the sea." It is as if the original inundation witnessed by Aeneas flooding down from above, having ebbed in response to the counter-attack of the Trojans, now, like the sea, is flowing back again. Moreover, those same Greeks whom Aeneas and his band had routed earlier (fudimus: 421) reappear, and immediately the Trojans are overwhelmed -- ilicet obruimus numero (424).

fit via vi (494)

Force breaks an entrance.

The third flooding simile, and perhaps the one with the strongest implications for Troy's fate, is associated with the scene of entrance to Priam's palace. Pyrrhus, on the very threshold of the palace, breaks through (perrumpit: 480) the door and tears away the posts. Furthermore, Pyrrhus, like a flood, is insistent, he presses on (instat: 491) until finally the Greeks burst (rumpunt: 494) an entrance and fill the wide vestibule (milite complemt: 495) with soldiers. The portrayal of this rapid current of events is then reinforced by the simile of a foaming river breaking its banks and restraints: oppositasque evicit gurgite moles (497) "and [the foaming river] overcomes the opposing structures with its flood."

The word moles, in the simile, and the phrase milite complemt, referring to the vestibule, vividly remind us of the horse filled with men. In fact, milite complemt is an exact repetition of the description of the horse in Line 20. This time, however, it is the horse that has burst its destructive power, overwhelmed the opposing obstacles, and poured into the heart of Troy, Priam's palace. The Greeks, as if they were water itself, have captured whatever is not on fire: tenent Danai qua deficit ignis (505). The climactic accumulation of this deadly water image then culminates in the death of Priam -- the symbolic end of Troy -- when true to this analogy he lies dead, a nameless and headless trunk that has been overwhelmed by the Greek torrent and is now washed up on the shore -- a shore that Aeneas subsequently describes in the 'Helen passage' as (sudarit sanguine: 582) drenched with blood.

\(^6\) (II: 383) circumfundimur is middle, as noted by all commentators.
We now come to Vergil's contrastive application of water imagery. This is the image of water, not as a force of death, but as a source of life and renewal. Clearly, Vergil has to show that the father of the Roman race leaves Troy not only under good auspices, but also with the promise of hope for the future. One method of accomplishing this change in mood is to change the connotations of words that directly or indirectly suggest water. Venus, we remember, removes the mist that dims Aeneas' sight. He is consequently able to see that the storm is over, that Neptune's Troy has sunk in flames. Venus alludes to Troy as a shattered mass (disiectas moles: 608), a phrase which again recalls the horse, only this is the horse that has achieved its purpose, that has spent its torrential force and devastated Troy.

The explicit change in the mood of Book II appears at the same time as the portent that makes Anchises change his mind and agree to escape Troy with his son. Julius' hair glows with the light of sacred fires and the verb fundere (683) is used again, only this time it is not a pouring forth of armed men (fundit equus: 329), but a diffusion of divine light. Furthermore, this fire is harmless as it washes (lambere: 684) Julius' head with flames. The direct reference to spring water (fontibus: 686) in this scene immediately calls to mind an origin or beginning. The idea of water as a source of life is then reiterated by Aeneas' own words. Aeneas is unable to touch the sacred objects of Troy that must accompany his flight until he has purified himself from the pollution of the battle in a living stream, donec me flumine vivo / ablueo (719-20). A stream not unlike the Lydian Tiber that Creusa's apparition subsequently predicts will be discovered by Aeneas upon arrival at his long-sought destination where arva/inter opima virum leni fluit agmine (781/2), "it flows among the rich fields of men on a gentle course"; or a stream like the one that Aeneas presently seeks with the crowd of refugees who have flowed together (adfluxisse: 796) in his escape to the mountains, the mountains where he would find the source of his living stream.

Queen's University

Richard Levis

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7 The fact that this is an unfinished line may further underscore Vergil's conscious shift in the implications of his water imagery. A comparable scene in Homer depicts Hektor telling Hekabe that he cannot pour a libation to Zeus because he is polluted by the battle, but the method of purification is not emphasized (Il. VI: 264-268).
Aristotle's Treatment of the Infinite

The subject of the science of nature, according to Aristotle, is the world of sensible substances which have within themselves a principle of motion and rest. In his Physics, he is particularly concerned with explaining what the nature of motion or change (kinesis/metabole) is, specifically in the categories of quantity, quality, place, and substance. In Book III of the treatise, Aristotle introduces his definition of motion, then, straightaway he enters into a discussion concerning infinity, time, place and void. Somehow, the phenomenon of motion cannot be properly studied without an understanding of these other concepts.

The notion of infinity first appears in discussions of the continuous--and motion has the characteristic of continuity. The theoreticians and physicists who preceded Aristotle considered the infinite to be, in some sense, actual because of the nature of what would later be described as continuous phenomena: of time, which stretches endlessly into the past and into the future; of magnitudes, described by mathematicians as infinitely divisible; of generation, which recurs without fail; of limitation, for everything seems to be limited by something else. There is also an inexhaustability in thought whereby one can always conceive of a greater magnitude, a higher number, and endless extension beyond the outermost sphere of the heavens. If there were infinite space or void beyond "the All", i.e. the universe as Aristotle knew it, there might be an infinity of worlds, as some thinkers believed, or infinite body since any void implies the existence of a body to


2 Aristotle, Physica, III, 1. 201a 4-9. Substantial change is given a fuller treatment in Aristotle's De Caelo.


fill it.\textsuperscript{6}

Aristotle's predecessors differed in their particular accounts of the infinite, but they agreed that it was a principle of the natural world. Moreover, they believed that the infinite must be without source or end, that it must contain and govern all things while being itself neither contained nor limited in any way, that it must be divine.\textsuperscript{7} It is clear to Aristotle, as he considers the principles of nature, that the infinite has been and is a problem for the natural scientist who must consider whether and in what sense it exists. It is particularly important to consider whether or not there is an infinite sensible substance from which the visible world emerges for such a substance would be a natural body, a proper object of the science of nature.\textsuperscript{8}

A considerable portion of Aristotle's treatment of the infinite is given to establishing that there is no actual, substantial infinite either in the sense of an intellectual entity or a corporeal one. This is a crucial preamble to the revelation of substance (ousia) as the primary category of the natural world. Before discussing the nature of motion in the world of extended substance, Aristotle wishes to demonstrate that the cause of ongoing generation and corruption among sensible objects is not an infinite supply of "stuff" from which things are forever being fashioned, and, in general, that motion in no way presupposes an actual infinite. In order to explain the sublunary world as moved and moving through the dynamic relation of form and matter, act and potency, an account must be given which eliminates the infinite as a principle which has real bearing on motion and change. If it can be proven that the infinite is no such principle, Aristotle can answer the challenge to the existence of motion raised by Zeno the Eleatic and proceed to develop his own conception of motion as, "The actuality of what exists potentially insofar as it exists


\textsuperscript{7} Aristotle, \textit{Physica III}, 4. 203b 1-5.

\textsuperscript{8} Thomas Aquinas, St., \textit{In Octos Libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio} (Rome: Marietti, 1954), par. 343.
potentially".  

Aristotle puts the notions of his forbears to the test. First, he confronts the Platonic and Pythagorean doctrines which posit an infinite which is separate from sensible objects and exists per se.  

To think of the infinite in this way is to place it in the category of substance rather than that of quantity. This means that it must be indivisible; only as such can it be neither number nor magnitude. Yet, there is a problem inherent in such a conception of infinity. Infinity has been seen to be related to the continuous and the inexhaustible. These notions imply division and numbering. Therefore, it is logically impossible to conceive of an infinite which simply exists apart from the category of quantity—and it cannot be at once substance and quantity. Magnitude and number, as an attribute of attributes—is thoroughly incidental, not substantial.  

In treating the Pythagorean and Platonic doctrines of the infinite, Aristotle deals with a conception of the intelligible as being distinct from the sensible. In the argument that follows, the systems of natural philosophers such as Thales, Heraclitus and Empedocles are implicitly or explicitly scrutinized. Their consideration of the natural world predated a distinction between sensible and intelligible reality. Thus, in considering their approach to the philosophy of nature, Aristotle deals exclusively with sensible entities.  

The first question concerns whether or not there can be a corporeal substance which is infinite in the direction of increase. The "logical" answer to this question is "No." The concept of corporeality implies that a thing is limited by definite boundaries.  

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11 *ibid.*, III, 1. 200b 15-200; III, 4. 204a 3-7.  
12 *ibid.*, III, 5. 204a 18-19.  
13 *ibid.*, III, 5. 204b 1-3.  
15 Aristotle, *Physica* III, 5. 204b 5-10. In what seems to be a departure from his consideration of sensible substance, Aristotle also brings up the question of infinite number and discards the notion on the grounds that number, as numerable, is traversable. *ibid.*, III, 5. 204b 7-10. Thomas Aquinas, St., *Physicorum*
A "physical"\textsuperscript{16} approach to the question of infinite body demonstrates that such a notion cannot be borne out by a consideration of the nature of the elements and of compositions thereof.\textsuperscript{17} Aristotle describes the sublunar world as ultimately reducible to the elements earth, air, fire, and water. These have an intrinsic contrariety whereby each of them tends to a place proper to it. Fire and air, being light, move to the outer limits of the universe while water and earth have weight and tend naturally toward the earth's centre. Sensible objects composed of the elements tend toward places proper to them in accordance with that element which is dominant in their composition. This is how the natural world is observed to be composed and to behave; an infinite body, if it exists, must conform to these observations.

It turns out that an infinite sensible body, whether compound or simple, cannot contain the contrariety of the sensible world. In a compound body, the contraries cannot co-exist being all or some of them infinite.\textsuperscript{18} One infinite element should extinguish and displace the others. Moreover, a single infinite source of the elements is neither observed in nature nor could produce the contraries out of itself.\textsuperscript{19}

An infinite body, simple or compound, cannot have a place proper to it such as sensible bodies are observed to have. To accommodate such a body there must be an infinite place, an infinity of places, or the body must rest in itself. The notion of an homogeneous object occupying an infinite place implies that each single part of that body is either always at rest or in motion.\textsuperscript{20} This is not the way of the natural world: objects sometimes move toward their proper places and sometimes rest in them, or in intervening places.\textsuperscript{21} Neither motion nor rest is constant in any fragment of an elemental body. A composite object could not occupy an infinity of places: the sensible world has a

\textbf{Aristotelis Expositio}, par. 351.

\textsuperscript{16} cf. Randall, \textit{Aristotle}, p. 192.

\textsuperscript{17} There is an exposition of Aristotle's theory of the elements in his \textit{De Caelo} III, IV.

\textsuperscript{18} Aristotle, \textit{Physica} III, 5. 204b 12-20.

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{ibid.}, III, 5. 204b 22-205a 7.

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{ibid.}, III, 5. 205a 12-15.

finite number of dimensions and directions.\textsuperscript{22} Positing an infinite variety of places expands and diversifies the universe beyond recognition.\textsuperscript{23} Moreover, the idea is relative to an infinity of species, the existence of which Aristotle has disproved in the first book of the Physics.\textsuperscript{24} The infinite composite of a finite number of species has been discredited already,\textsuperscript{25} and Aristotle's criticism of this notion is more or less reiterated in the discussion of bodies in place.\textsuperscript{26} The behaviour of the elements implies that "the All" is limited: there are points of reference which give meaning to the designations "up", "down", "right" and "left" in conjunction with the movement of the elements, and such designations are not mere distortions of a human perspective.\textsuperscript{27} Anaxagoras proposed that the infinite rested in itself because nothing else could contain it.\textsuperscript{28} This hypothesis is not successful in accounting for itself, let alone for the phenomena of the natural world. Anaxagoras neither proves that the infinite body naturally does rest in itself, nor explains why it should; the infinity of the body cannot itself serve to explain this.\textsuperscript{29}

Having shown that there are no grounds for positing the existence of a substantial and corporeal infinite, Aristotle concludes that the infinite does not actually exist.\textsuperscript{30}

However, numerous difficulties arise from a complete elimination of the infinite.\textsuperscript{31} The problems raised earlier regarding time, magnitude, number and generation and corruption all remain unsolved. The attribute of continuity which belongs to these requires that the infinite exist in some sense. Therefore,

\textsuperscript{22} ibid.

\textsuperscript{23} The relevant passages in Aristotle are: \textit{Physica} III, 5. 2055a 19-20. 205a 28-39.


\textsuperscript{25} Aristotle, \textit{Physica} III, 5. 204b 10-21.

\textsuperscript{26} ibid., III, 5. 205a 12-25.

\textsuperscript{27} ibid., III, 5. 205b 32-35.

\textsuperscript{28} ibid., III, 5. 205b 1-5.

\textsuperscript{29} ibid., 5. 205b 19-24.

\textsuperscript{30} ibid., III, 5. 206a 7.

\textsuperscript{31} ibid., III, 6. 206a 8-14.
Aristotle claims that the infinite exists, but that its existence is potential: it is nothing by itself, only a capacity relative to something else. It exists in the same sense as "the day of the Olympic games" exists, or in the same sense as "morning" exists: as a series of particulars which are always finite and always different and are produced in succession over time. It is this succession which is not ever finally "gone through". The succession does not exist as one thing in one time, it is continually made manifest by the appearance of particulars. Therefore, the infinite is a different kind of potency than the potency of a block of marble to be a statue. While the potential statue is one day an actual statue and attains to a certain fixed state, the infinite is continually being actualized but is never static and determined. Whereas in a relative sense the potentiality is never overcome.

The actualization of the potential infinite occurs in two ways. As one thing always coming to be and always passing away, the infinity of time and of generation is actualized. The infinity of magnitude lies in a process of division which is never fully realized but always possible: unlike the processes of generation and corruption and the passage of time, the particular manifestations of this potentially endless process survive the process.

Magnitude can be thought of as infinite either by addition or division. As potentially containing an infinity of dimensionless positions, a magnitude can always be bisected and its remaining sections further bisected; by a kind of inverse operation, consistently decreasing ratios of the magnitude can be added together without traversing the whole. This conception that a magnitude is potentially infinitely divisible is different from an assertion that a line is composed of points. Points do not

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32 ibid., III, 6. 206a 30-35.


34 ibid., III 6. 206a 18,ff.

35 I am indebted to Dr. J.P. Atherton for this comment.

36 ibid., III, 6. 206a 1-3.

37 ibid.

38 Although one might never actually succeed in dividing a sensible object ad infinitum.

actually exist in a line, according to Aristotle, until the line
has been divided by being cut, broken, or by a moving object coming
to rest at some portion of it. Hence, when Zeno argues that
Achilles can never catch up with and overtake the tortoise because
of the impossibility of traversing the number of half-magnitudes
which separate the two runners, Aristotle answers that none of
these half magnitudes exist unless Achilles slows down or stops.
If his motion is one and continuous, he will beat the tortoise to
the finish line.\(^{40}\)

The numbering of successive bisections of a magnitude
could, like the process of bisection itself, theoretically go on
without end. Hence, number can conceivably go on infinitely in the
direction of increase, but only as a numbering of serial
divisions.\(^{41}\) Once again, there is no actually infinite number, only
number relative to the appearance of the numerable.\(^{42}\) The infinite
by addition is different than an infinite which exceeds every
assignable magnitude. If this infinite were thought of as a
potential existence, it would also have to attain to some actual
existence, but it has been seen that an actual infinite with
respect to size does not exist.\(^{43}\) Plato posited two infinites, the
Great and the Small, and thereby indicated that infinity could be
construed both in the direction of decrease and of increase — but
Aristotle claims that he did not make use of these principles as
infinite.\(^{44}\)

The infinity of extended substance is matter.\(^{45}\) Matter has
magnitude and is therefore infinitely divisible. It can also be
pure potentiality; but matter does not exist independently of the
form which contains and limits it.\(^{46}\) Its infinity lies in an
inexhaustible capacity to be defined and delimited. Matter can

\(^{40}\) cf. Miller, "Aristotle Against the Atomists", p.97.

\(^{41}\) ibid., III, 7. 207a 32-207b 14.

\(^{42}\) While thus number could go on infinitely in the direction of
increase, Aristotle does not believe that the unit in number can
be divided, therefore he says that number is finite in the
direction of decrease. Magnitude, conversely, is infinite in the
direction of decrease but finite in the direction of increase.


\(^{44}\) ibid., III, 6. 206b 28-32,

\(^{45}\) ibid., III, 7. 207b 35.

\(^{46}\) The relevant passage seems to apply equally to matter and to the
universe (the "All"). ibid., III, 6. 207a 22,ff.
only be whole or complete in relation to the form which contains and defines it, and makes it "a this".

The infinity of matter means that it is not, by itself, whole or complete: not subject to any boundary, composed in any ratio, distinguished by any difference or presented in any shape. If the universe is any of these things, then the universe is not infinite. Those who have claimed that the universe is both infinite and whole have erred by attributing to the infinite a dignity whereby it ought to contain and govern. In fact what can contain and govern must be finite. The infinite, as formless matter, is itself unseen and unknowable. The enterprise of intellectually grasping the natural world, the universe which houses it, and the first principle of its existence presupposes that each is, in its actuality, finite.

Time and motion have an infinity not unlike that of number. Time, as it were, numbers motion, and motion numbers magnitude. Just as any number can conceivably be increased by a unit, so too can time be increased by a moment or even a second, and motion, by further distance traversed. Unlike the increment of number, the increments of time and magnitude are infinitely divisible. This infinity by addition is described by Brehier as the capacity of something to always assume a greater size than it already has.

The latter portion of Aristotle's treatment of the infinite is a brief reply to three ways, mentioned at the outset, in which an actual infinite has been posited. First, the Stagirite argues that an infinite sensible body is not necessary to ongoing generation if it is the case that the passing of one thing is the generation of another — e.g., if air comes to be as water or fire pass away. There need not be some infinite material source upon which nature must draw in order to bring things into being. There is a kind of conversion more radical than alteration constantly taking place in the finite and unseen prime matter of the natural world. Second, Aristotle explains that there is no eternal

47 ibid., III, 7. 207b 35.
48 ibid., III, 6. 207a 25.
49 Randall, Aristotle, p. 194.
52 Aristotle, Physica, III, 8. 208a 7-10.
limiting of one object by another. The objects of the natural world are limited absolutely, in their own right, and not in relation to something which limits them. Contact, or "touching" is the way in which some objects may be related to one another, but this characteristic is not present among all objects and is not infinite. Finally, there is no actuality for the infinite in thought; for thought has no necessary relation to the objects of the natural world: you can imagine a man to be fifteen feet tall, but this does not mean that you could ever meet such a man at the market.

Aristotle demonstrates that the natural world is not contained or governed by an actual, substantial infinite. He shows that infinity is a derivative of nature, a potency that lies within it. The primary category of the natural world is substance; infinity is a mere aspect of extension and matter which depend on the composite nature of sensible substance for existence. The source of nature's activity is the incompleteness of individual substances which sets them in motion. Infinity is secondary to this activity, existing as a capacity implicit in it. Thus, Aristotle "demystifies" the infinite, and provides an intellectually satisfying rebuttal to the Eleatic denial of motion.

Dalhousie University

Mary Gordon

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53 ibid., III, 8. 208a 11-14.

54 ibid., III, 8. 208a 15-19.

55 Once again, I thank Dr. Atherton for this terminology.
The Ablative Absolute: A Transformational Account

Introduction

I would like to discuss the ablative absolute from the point of view of Transformational Generative Grammar (by which I mean the school of linguistics developed by Noam Chomsky and his followers from the 1950's until now); I believe this approach may be of interest in several ways. The ablative absolute is an unusual construction, as its subject is in the ablative case, which is not the usual case for subjects, and this case is being used to mark a certain kind of subordination, which is not a typical use of case. Perhaps to a student of elementary Latin the ablative absolute is an odd phenomenon, but the sense of strangeness may be lost after years of reading Latin, and one may not now realize how unusual it is.

Further, as far as I know, absolute constructions have received little attention in transformational-generative linguistics. Costello\(^1\) is an exception, but he uses an older version of Transformational-Generative Grammar (TGG) which is quite different from TGG as it is currently practiced. I shall treat the ablative absolute from the perspective of Government-Binding (GB) Theory, as in Chomsky\(^2\), which is the most recent version of TGG, with the addition of the account of multiple case marking in Libert\(^3\). However, I shall not assume knowledge of this framework or the theoretical mechanisms deriving from it, and so hope to make this paper as accessible as possible to the non-linguist (and in particular to the classicist). In the interest of brevity and clarity, I shall present or explain only those parts of the theory relevant to this topic; for more information see the references given. In fact, very little of the machinery of these frameworks will be necessary here, nevertheless, the reader should be aware of the theoretical context of this work.

This work is part of a general effort to treat phenomena of the Classical languages in a modern linguistic framework, as

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advocated by Libert and Shaer. Both Shaer and I are graduate students in linguistics with undergraduate degrees in Classics, and from our experiences we have noticed that, in general, classicists seem to know very little about current developments in (transformational-generative) linguistics, while (transformational-generative) linguists are lacking in knowledge of Classical languages. This is not to say that there is no modern linguistic work being done on Greek and Latin, for there is, e.g. Lakoff and papers in Pinkster, but there is still not enough contact between the two disciplines. This is unfortunate, for we believe that there are several ways in which the two fields can be of assistance to each other. I would hope that this paper may be an example of the kind of work that can be done by drawing upon transformational-generative linguistics and Classics.

Kayardild

I would like to look briefly at a language which is completely unrelated to Latin, the Australian language Kayardild (of the Tangkic group of languages). Its relevance should become clear later. Kayardild is a "case language"; it has a fair number of cases by Indo-European standards, e.g. nominative, genitive, instrumental, allative. Unlike typical IE languages, Kayardild, at first glance at least, seems to allow nouns to bear more than one case ending per noun (imagine how ungrammatical a Latin or Greek noun with both an accusative and a genitive ending would seem; indeed, it would be uninterpretable). In fact, Kayardild nouns can bear sequences of what appear to be four case endings. If we say that these are case endings, we shall have to expand our notion of what a case ending is, and what it can do. For example, some of these cases are modal cases, which agree in some sense with the tense/mood of the verb. Another unusual type of case is complementizing case, which marks some finite subordinate clauses.


There are two conditions under which complementizing case in Kayardild is marked; "when the pivot NP is not subject of both clauses"\(^8\) i.e. the main and subordinate clauses (pivot being the topic of a complex construction)\(^9\) or when the subordinate clause is an argument of the main predicator.\(^10\) An example of complementizing case marking under the first condition is shown in (1a), and an example under the second condition is shown in (1b). Note that this case marking appears on all the words of the clause, even the verb.

(1) a. jina-a bijarrb [dangka-ntha raa-jarra-nth]
where-NOM dugong(NOM) man-COBLCOBLS spear-PST-COBLCOBLS

Where is the dugong, (which) the man speared?\(^11\)

b. ngada munmudawa-th [ngijin-inja thabuju-ntha thaa-thuu-nth]
I:NOM rejoice-ACT my-COBLCOBLS older br-COBLCOBLS return-FUT-COBLCOBLS

I am glad that my big brother is coming back.\(^12\)
(COBL=complementizing oblique case)

Complementizing case can also appear on main clauses under certain conditions, for example if the clause functions as an argument to an ellipsed main clause verb, as shown in (2).

(2) [dan-kurrka ri-in-kurrka dali-jurrka budubudu-nth]
here-LOC.COBLCOBLS east-from-LOC.COBLCOBLS come-IMMED.COBLCOBLS boat-COBLCOBLS

(I can hear) the boat coming from the east.\(^13\)

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\(^8\) N. Evans, Kayardild, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Australian National University.


\(^10\) N. Evans (1985) p.73.


\(^12\) N. Evans (1985) p.73.

There are two complementizing cases in Kayardild, the oblique and the locative. The former is used if the subject of the clause is third person or first person exclusive, while the latter is used with first person inclusive, as shown in (3a). When the subject is second person, the choice of case depends on whether the speaker wants to express some sort of solidarity with the listener, if so, then the complementizing locative (CLOC) is used, otherwise the oblique is chosen.

(3) a. jina-a bijarrb [nga-ku-rr-a/nga-ku-l-da
   where-NOM dugong(NOM) l-INC-DU-NOM/l-INC-PLU-NOM
   kurulu-tharra-y] Where is the dugong, which you and me speared?
   kill-PST-CLOC

   b. jina-a bijarrb [nyingka
   where-NOM dugong(NOM) kurulu-tharra-y
   you:NOM kill-PST-CLOC

   c. jina-a bijarrb [ngumba-a
   where-NOM dugong(NOM) kurulu-tharra-nth
   you:COBL kill-PST-COBL

   Where is the dugong, which you killed?^{14}

(NB. There is a constraint prohibiting CLOC from being marked on pronoun subjects, which is why you in (b) does not bear that case ending).

Now one can see how nouns in Kayardild can bear so many case affixes simultaneously. An example of a noun with the highest possible degree of piling up of cases is contained in the sentence in (4).

(4) maku-ntha yalawu-jarra-ntha yakuri-naa-ntha
   woman-COBL catch-PST-COBL fish-MABL-COBL

   dangka-karra-nguni-naa-ntha mijil-nguni-naa-nth
   man-GEN-INSTR-MABL-COBL net-INSTR-MABL-COBL

   The woman must have caught fish with the man's net.^{15}


The word for man bears a genitive affix to mark it as the possessor of the net, and instrumental marker to agree in case with the word for net, a modal ablative to agree with the past tense of the verb, and a complementizing oblique case to indicate that the sentence in which it is contained is construed as a subordinate clause.

One may argue that complementizing cases (and the other non-standard cases of Kayardild) are not really cases, but there are grounds for considering them to be cases. First, the complementizing cases have the same form (allowing for phonological and morphological variation) as the corresponding "normal" (relational) cases, e.g. the locative marking location is the same phonetically as the complementizing locative. Second, complementizing cases are subject to the same morphological rules as other case markers. For example, there is a rule that when a locative marker (of any sort) is followed by an oblique marker (of any sort), the sequence -kurkra results. This is true whether a modal, associating, or complementizing oblique is involved. In any case, even if complementizing cases are not regarded as true cases, the proposal to be put forward here will still be viable.

On Case Assignment

At this point let us consider how the complementizing (and other) cases "get there". In GB theory, (certain) cases are seen as being assigned to a noun phrase by some constituent governing it. This may not seem so different from traditional grammatical notions, but the difference lies in the fact that the case which is assigned is an abstract case, which may or may not show up as an overt case marker (depending on the language). Thus even in languages with little or no overt, morphological case, such as English and French, we would say that cases are assigned. In fact, there is a general constraint on syntactic representations, the Case Filter, which states that at a certain level all phonetically realized noun phrases must bear case. The case of the direct object is assigned by the verb, which would not be so foreign an idea to traditional linguists. What would be more striking is the statement that the case of the subject is assigned by the verbal inflection of the sentence (INFL) which in TGG is a constituent of syntactic structure. In (5) is given a simplified syntactic representation (at one level) of a simple English sentence, showing the case assignment processes that I have just mentioned. The same general structure and processes would apply to Latin and other languages (leaving aside minor differences such as word order).
GB-theory has not yet developed a way of accounting for how complementizing cases are marked, probably because complementizing case does not occur in languages that have undergone close examination in the framework. This is related to adjectival agreement in Greek and Latin, where an adjective must agree in case with a noun which it modifies; words is a kind of feature transmission or case copying from the complementizer constituent (which need not be overt) of the subordinate clause onto the elements of that clause. An illustration of this is given in (6), showing the complementizing case marking process which takes place in the subordinate clause of (1a). (Here, and in general in this section, many details have been left out.)
Now let us imagine that case in Latin works in somewhat the same way as in Kayardild, i.e. that Latin also has complementizing case. The ablative, when it is used in the ablative absolute, is a complementizing case, i.e. it is copied from the (null) complementizer position of the subordinate clause and performs the same function as the complementizing oblique and locative of Kayardild, namely it indicates a kind of subordinate clause and indicates its subject. This is somewhat different from Kayardild, because Kayardild has complementizing case on more than just the subject and the verb of the subordinate clause. Latin, unlike Kayardild, only allows one case marker per noun, even if the case markers are of different sorts (i.e. even a combination of one typical case and one complementizing case is forbidden). Thus we could account for why Latin objects and other non-subject nouns in ablative absolute constructions are not also in the ablative by saying that the ablative can not be marked on them, as they already bear some other case (e.g. accusative, dative). However, one might also say that this should be true of the subject, which does have an ablative marker. How could it receive an ablative marker, when presumably it also has already received a case marker (namely nominative)?

It would perhaps be better to say that languages differ as to which constituents are marked for complementizing case, and that in Latin only the subject and the participle indicating the verbal
action receive it. The fact that Latin allows only one case marker per noun still comes into play, for it explains why the subject of ablative absolutes does not also bear the nominative case typical of subjects—given the fact that it has (or will receive) ablative complementizing case, assignment of nominative case would cause it to have two cases. An illustration of how case marking in an ablative absolute would apply is given in (7).

(7)

Note that I am assuming that there is an INFL position in such clauses and that it can assign case to the subject: I believe that this may be necessary for absolute constructions, but it might be contested.

In our discussion of the restrictions on the number of cases which may be borne by nouns we have been glossing over the question of whether this restriction applies to abstract or morphological cases. Clearly, in Latin there can not be more than one morphological case marker per noun, but does this mean that there can not only be one abstract case per noun as well? I believe that this is in fact the correct analysis, for theoretical reasons which may be too technical to discuss here (for example that we do not expect nouns bearing only complementizing case to be able to pass the Case Filter). If this is so, then the diagram in (7) is not accurate: it is not that assignment of nominative case to the subject of an ablative absolute is blocked; rather, (abstract) nominative case is assigned, and so is present at a syntactic level, but may not coexist with the complementizing ablative at the surface phonetic level. The ablative "wins out" over the

\[\text{V. DENCH and N. EVANS (1988) for other possibilities for complementizing case marking, e.g. only on the verb, on all non-subject constituents.}\]
nominative in the competition for the single permissible overt case slot.

We might say that in later Latin, where a nominative absolute exists, it is the nominative case which wins out, that is, the case indicating the grammatical function of the noun takes precedence over the case indicating membership in a subordinate clause. It will have been noted that in Kayardild, subjects which have complementizing case do not have a nominative case marker. This is not a result of a parameter determining which type of case may be marked on a noun, rather it derives from a rule relating specifically to the nominative case, namely that "the nominative in Kayardild is essentially an elsewhere case, appearing where no other relational, modal, associating or complementizing case has been assigned." 18

If we continue with such a line of thought, we might conclude that complementizing case exists abstractly in all languages, but that in many languages it never is morphologically realized because such languages have restrictions on the number of cases a noun can overtly bear, and because their one permissible case position is filled by a grammatical function case. We can thus classify languages into three types based on the surface appearance of complementizing case. 1) those languages which allow nouns to have more than one case marker (e.g. Kayardild), in these languages complementizing cases appear along with any other case(s) a noun may happen to have. 2) those languages which allow only one case marker per noun, subdivided into 2a) languages where a complementizing case affix will be the single permissible case marker (e.g. Classical Latin), preventing other cases from being overtly realized, and 2b) languages where the complementizing case is not the case which occurs in the single case slot, and so never appears as a surface marker.

It is a language-specific choice which case is taken as the marker of subordination, i.e., which case "agrees" with the subordinating complementizer: in Latin it is the ablative, in Kayardild the oblique and locative, in Greek, the genitive, and so on. Of course there might be languages without complementizing case, e.g. English and French. Some languages have a single complementizing case while others (e.g. Kayardild) have several, the choice being determined by various factors, Greek has two complementizing cases, but the choice (between genitive absolute and accusative absolute) is based on a factor different than that of Kayardild.

The conditions under which complementizing case is marked also differ across languages. One of the crucial conditions for

Latin is that the subject of the subordinate clause not be the subject of the main clause (cf. the conditions for assignment of complementizing case in Kayardild, one of which is based on a similar type of criterion). This can be accounted for by having a mechanism of coindexing which blocks assignment of complementizing case. Identical indices are assigned to all coreferential noun phrases, including the null subjects of participles. A subject of a participial construction (and its participle) must bear an index different from that of the subject of the main clause if it is to receive complementizing case. Coindexing is a standard device of GB-Theory, used in the description of unrelated phenomena such as the determination of reference of pronouns.

Another condition for the assignment of complementizing case in Latin is that the subordinate clause must be non-finite, more specifically it must be participial. This might make one suspect that the ablative absolute is not a kind of complementizing case, but note that the function of the ablative is the same as that of complementizing cases of Kayardild and other languages, namely to identify a noun as an argument of a subordinate clause. The subject of an ablative absolute can not be interpreted as a subject of a main clause, since main clause subjects can not be in the ablative case, just as nouns bearing complementizing case in Kayardild are clearly marked as not belonging to a main clause.

Conclusion

Working in a version of Transformational Generative Grammar, we have described the ablative absolute as a type of complementizing case marking, and so placed this construction in a typological context, related it to similar constructions in other languages. Using independently necessary mechanisms, we have begun an account for the assignment of ablative case to the subjects of absolute constructions, as well as for the lack of nominative marking on those subjects. Informally speaking, we have explained where the ablative of the ablative absolute "comes from", namely the subordinate clause's COMP position. Finally, it is hoped that this work has showed the value of Transformational Generative Grammar in accounting for phenomena of the Classical languages.
Homeric Circe

Myriad studies confirm the primacy of Homer's *Odyssey* as one of civilization's monumental achievements. Its narrative level, compelling to both younger and older readers, has been a favourite subject for scholars and literary critics for many centuries. In analyses, the *Odyssey* is a work which has been viewed as universal in its sweep of the human situation, although this 'universality' has changed throughout time because interpretations of the narrative are always made in accordance to the constructs of the critic's era. Apart from its use in the application of interpretive theories, the *Odyssey* is viewed as an important work of literature because the myths and fables presented throughout the narrative have provided an important framework of perspective for the modern world. As Mary Lefkowitz says in *Heroines and Hysterics*, whether we are aware of it or not, our perception of reality continues to be defined by the 'Greek experience'.

Before we examine any part of the *Odyssey*, we should have a better understanding of the conventions of the epic in order that we may have an idea of the limitations in narrative structure for this particular genre. Traditionally, it is believed that the texts of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are versions of epics in the bardic custom, written by a man named Homer in the 8th century B.C. In all probability, the Greek epic was originally sung by bards in improvised lays, ruled by the traditional formulae of the art. Foremost among the traditional literary devices of the epic are similes, repeated lines and passages, conventional epithets and stock characters. Since the composition was intended to be heard, rather than read, these devices aided the bard in the expedition of the plot. For instance, the bard would develop descriptive phrases of a specific metrical length which could be used throughout any composition to complete a sentence; consider phrases often found in the *Odyssey* such as 'wine-dark sea' or 'swift-footed Achilles'. The epic narrative was often long, but divided into shorter episodes and concerned with the deeds of a traditional hero, such as Achilles, Hector or Odysseus. In the *Odyssey* we

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2 Let us acknowledge, but not critique, the mountains of scholarly research investigating the validity of this claim. The questions of authorship and date are highly problematical. What is important for our discussion is that the *Odyssey* grew out of a bardic oral tradition and that the work was standardized during the 8th century.

encounter the hero Odysseus, making his long journey home after the Trojan war. We hear of his great deeds during the war and during his wanderings throughout the Aegean, and we also hear about the many mysterious characters he met while travelling.

The epic conventions noted above create limits, or boundaries, in which the possibilities of narrative variations are defined for the genre. For the Greeks, the concept of limitations was a most important principle which defined a society ruled by boundaries. Man and the gods were both subordinate to a higher boundary called 'moira', with the inference of boundaries in its root meaning of lot, share or portion. The implied presence of boundaries permeates the Odyssey and established one of the work's fundamental purposes: to inculcate the life of balance, temperance or moderation as integral to human happiness. R. Robert Joly explains that the concept of boundaries is not limited to the Greeks, but that it is a property "congenial to all myth through which Man seeks reconciliation to cosmic forces often found paradoxical." In his concept of boundaries, he sees harmonization as one of the purposes of mythic function. We can apply this concept of harmonization to our examination of the function of the Homeric narrative structure. The characters in the Odyssey must not offend, cross a boundary, or exceed a periphery. In every dimension of the narrative there exists a limit, inhibiting all, even the gods, like a forbidden tree or a box to be left unopened.

One of the primary portions of the Odyssey which has served in helping to define modern Western reality is the Circe episode (books X - XII). The concept of boundaries and the construction of a particular perception of reality (such as the 'Greek experience') in a narrative is expedited throughout the pattern, or structure, of the narrative. While a narrative must be composed according to the conventions of a particular genre, its structure is also influenced by the perspectives of the author's era. For instance, we may explore the importance of structure in the Circe episode of the Odyssey with the hope that we may come to a better

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5 This suggests that all mythic codes which formulate boundary have the rational corollary of balance -- that Man should pursue the middle way in behaviour, avoiding the extremes. In this fashion, Odysseus was admired repeatedly for his all-aroundedness and resourcefulness, his integrity as a 'hero for all seasons.' He was an example of the consummation of virtue which the Greeks called 'arete'. He is the essence of man developed to the highest potential. In this role, Odysseus was not an individual in the modern sense, but a representative of the qualities his culture admired.
understanding of how the perspectives of Homeric times manipulated the conventions of the epic to create this particular narrative structure. The Circe episode is important because the readers of the Odyssey have seen Circe as a most interesting character, and the Circe episode in Homer has created an entire body of mythologies for the Western world. It is the purpose of our examination to consider how the construction of this narrative influences a reader's understanding of the passage, and specifically how the narrative works to define the character of Circe.

We can see how a reader can interpret the passage differently when we consider the more popular interpretations of this episode. Variant interpretations occur throughout the ages because the mythological framework of the Homeric epic is not integral to modern (i.e., post-Homeric) culture. These changes in perspective have led to a great number of interesting interpretations of the Circe episode. Some of the more popular interpretations view the Circe story as an allegorical episode in the cycle of the sun, as a warning, predating temperance, or as an alchemical demonstration. The most prevalent scholarship concerning the Circe episode identifies Circe with sensual, sexual temptation. Her weapons, or modes of temptation, are the sexual symbols of the wand and the bowl. Many scholars have seen Circe as being a type of prostitute (perhaps thanks to the work of Ovid). Throughout antiquity and the Renaissance -- especially during the Renaissance, when Odysseus was specifically presented as a man with rational and temperate powers to abstain from the sensual, sexual seductions of Circe, the great female temptress -- the interpretations of the Circe episode contributed greatly to the image of woman as the root of sexual temptation.

The image of woman as temptress has greatly influenced modern perceptions of Circe. In "In Defence of Circe", Yvonne Rodax explores the transformation of Circe in literature throughout the ages -- how her reputation has been changed by different male authors, from Ovid and Vergil to Spenser and Milton. Rodax presents her own reading of the episode and creates, for her reader, yet another view of Circe. She urges readers to remember that the great female figures of literature are cemented in "decades or centuries of traditions -- concocted (almost all of it) by men." Keeping this theory in mind, Rodax explains that Circe was a lone female, and had to rely on her own wits and talents to survive. She only transformed her visitors because they demonstrated that men act like beasts frequently. It was only Odysseus, with the help of Hermes, who could placate Circe and calm her aggressive protectiveness of her house and herself. With the

aid of Hermes, Odysseus aggressively asserts himself, and, in a sense, overpowers Circe with his masculinity. Circe has no choice but to yield to the representative of patriarchy. Rodax's contemporary reading reinforces her thesis that Circe's reputation constantly changes throughout time because each successive audience views Circe according to its own cultural standards. As Rodax demonstrates, the image of Circe has been influenced by the image of woman as seductress, and it is difficult to view her outside of this framework.

While cultural perspectives influence the audience's perception of a character, the interpretation of a character is also influenced by the ways in which the character moves within a scene. Movement, or action, by a character is determined by particular narrative strategies. In considering the Circe episode in the Odyssey, we may note that three narrative strategies prevail throughout the scene which typify the epic treatment of character: the conventions of the oral tradition, the presentation of narrative action, and the externalization of character.

Since the conventions of oral tradition shaped the construction of Homer's work, these conventions are important in shaping the audience's perception of his characters. For instance, the characters in the epics were familiar to the ancient audience. We must always keep in mind that Odysseus, Circe, Helios, Perse and Aeetes were characters with histories and relationships which were well known to the ancients; they were integral to the culture of that time. By telling the listener where Odysseus is and with whom, Homer framed the tale within a body of familiar folklore themes for the ancient audience. For the epic audience, familiarity with the characters meant that the characters didn't need to be presented in depth. The focus of the story was not character development, but the action of the familiar story. The epic is not focussed on the ways characters struggle to come to terms with their environments, because their environments are not open to change. In the epic, the struggle is presented and unfolds for the audience as a known truth or reality, the course of which is not open to change. The conventions of the oral tradition determine the possibilities of action for the characters.

What, then, motivates the actions of the characters? Since epic characters were externalized, the epic could not rely completely on rational causes or psychological justifications to give relevancy to the action. Instead, the epic relies upon magic to create a sense of purpose for its characters. 'Magic', as defined by the ancients, is very different from modern, stylized conceptions of magic which include witches in black pointed hats reciting incantations over a cauldron. For the ancients, the inexplicable was 'magic'. Magic created a relationship between individual, nature and the sacred in a world not ruled by 'rational science'. Magic manipulates the external world, and the gods are
in control of this world. However, there are certain characters, such as Circe and Odysseus, who do have access to magic; although there is no rational (in the modern sense) explanation of their magical powers. Magic serves as an exemplar for the absence of rational explicability in the ancient world. Just as the ancients were unable to rationalize the reasons for the presence of a comet or a solar eclipse, magic was not explicable; woman's power to entice men was not explicable; Odysseus's power to resist Circe's magic was not explicable.

All actions in a narrative were accepted as truth for that narrative. For instance, for the ancients, Circe was defined as a character only by her presence in their oral traditions. In these oral traditions, Circe was defined as a witch, skilled in the use of drugs. By virtue of her magical powers, Circe was a personification of rational inexplicability in the ancient world. Her portrayal as a witch in the epic traditions allowed the ancient audience to construct an explanation for a situation which they didn't understand. For instance, how were Odysseus's men turned into pigs? For the ancients, an explanation was that Circe had been granted supernatural powers by the forces in control (the gods), and these powers justify an otherwise inexplicable series of events on Aea. For a more modern audience, which has come to rationalize magical powers, explanations of the transformation scene are different. In modern readings, Circe is often presented not as a personification of magical powers, but as a personification of female seductiveness, which seems to be less understood by modern culture than the concept of magic. In the epic, character serves as a means of explaining what the ancient world could not rationalize. In a similar manner, when a modern reader views the epic, he or she regularly views character as a means for explaining what he or she is unable (or unwilling) to rationalize, which often centres around the theme of the powers of female seductiveness.

The audience's view of character is also influenced by a second epic strategy, the presentation of action within the episode. The expedition of action is important to the audience's understanding of the plot and the characters who move within the plot. In the Homeric text, Circe is first introduced to the audience by the bard, speaking as Odysseus, in a first person narrative. This strategy gives both immediacy and authority to the account. The first person narration is very important for the epic, as the epic is concerned with the story of a hero and how he constructs his world. When we encounter the narrative unfolding through the eyes of Odysseus, we see justification for his actions because we know that he must make the story end in a certain way. Its ending predetermined (the triumph of the hero), the epic constructs limits for the presentation of the action. Each action in the epic should be read as a step towards the already known end
of the story and not as a result of introspection or change by the character.

For instance, when Odysseus introduces Circe, he defines her according to what the audience already knew about her (X.135-9):

And we came to the island of Aeaea, where dwelt fair tressed Circe, a dread goddess of human speech, own sister of Aeetes of baneful mind; and both are sprung from Helios, who gives light to mortals, and from Perse, their mother whom Oceanus begot.

In this passage, Odysseus, with true Greek priorities, presents Circe to his audience by immediately defining her according to her relationships with others. The information about Circe's lineage points out a cultural convention of Homeric times. In a time when man was defined not by his deeds, but by his heritage, a mythological character was also necessarily defined by her heritage. In addition, the mention of Circe's genealogy would instantly remind the ancient audience who Circe was and how she functions in epic tradition. The genealogy also reinforces the inevitability of action within the story; the fixed genealogy constructs a fixed world for the expedition of the story. The important genealogical information serves to foreshadow the perilous situation Odysseus and his men would encounter on her island. Foreshadowing was significant in the construction of the epic. It is a strategy by which the ancient audience was reminded of a story which was already familiar to them. They didn't need to question what would happen, for that was pre-defined by tradition. What would have been interesting for them is how the action was presented.

For instance, we can examine how the identification of Circe by Odysseus was made within the structure of the plot. When we read the Circe episode, we wonder when Odysseus learned that he had landed on Circe's island. Surely he did not immediately know that he had landed on Circe's island, for why then would he have set off from the harbour alone, looking for the "works of men" (X.147)? During this exploration of the island, he does find Circe's house and names it, but we must remember that he is adding knowledge to the narrative that he did not gain until later. It is not until X.275-6 that the audience learns how Odysseus came to know about Circe. In this passage we discover that it is Hermes, meeting Odysseus in disguise as a young man, who told Odysseus all about Circe, the fate of his men, and how to act when he encountered her. It is curious that the text notes Hermes was disguised as a young man while Odysseus at the same point in the narrative calls him Hermes. How does Odysseus know the young man is Hermes? It is convenient to say that it is a Homeric or epic convention that gods
often visited men in disguise, so the wise Odysseus could ‘see through’ the disguise. However, the identification of the god disguised as a man can be accounted for in more external terms: later (X.330-3) Circe herself tells Odysseus that Hermes had warned her that Odysseus would visit her on his way home from Troy. More importantly, this is a bit of staging within the narrative to establish Odysseus as clever.

What this juxtaposition of sequence does for the reader’s perception of the narrative is place the power of knowledge in the hands of the audience. Homer assumes his audience will recognize Circe as the witch famous for her transformations. Reading the episode with this information, we want to yell, "Watch out! Be careful, she’s up to something!" when Odysseus’ men first meet Circe. There must be a conscious effort by the reader not to judge the actions of Odysseus’ men, who are unsure of whom they are meeting, when the reader knows what the inevitable outcome of the encounter will be. The ultimate effect of this desire to warn is that it makes the audience aware that Homer constructed for them an illusion of having power. While they may have had a desire to warn, the ancient audience would have known the outcome of the encounter had already been fated, and any warning would be in vain. For the modern audience, this concept is even more pertinent, since they are viewing a written (rather than oral) story whose plot cannot be changed.

In the same way as the action of the plot was ruled by certain epic strategies, the description of a character was ruled by epic strategies of characterization. Odysseus describes Circe in X.220 as "the fair-tressed goddess" and tells us that she is singing and weaving. When Odysseus’ men call out to her, she comes to the doors of her house and lets them in, but there is no description of her at this point. Even when Odysseus goes to her house to search for his men there is no further description of her. Odysseus had been told by Hermes that Circe was a goddess skilled in the use of potions. Knowing this, was Odysseus surprised by her beauty, or by the lack of it, or was he surprised by her youth or age? We are never told. While this may frustrate the expectations of a modern audience, accustomed to hearing the 'complete story', the importance of the absence of information is that the absence would not have been annoying to the ancient audience. They viewed the characters differently than we do now; Circe and Odysseus were not rational characters, with internalized ambitions and desires to question. They are instead static representations of cultural ideals. Odysseus’ and Circe’s functions within the text are to present certain ideals (power of magic, resourcefulness, seductiveness, heroism) to the audience which were important in the creation of the epic hero’s culture.

Moving quickly through the text, we notice that Circe is not ever described outside traditional epithets such as "fair-tressed
goddess." In X.543-5, Odysseus describes what she is wearing when he left her island for Hades, but there is no mention of her physical attributes. What can we make of the lack of description? First, for an ancient audience a complete description of Circe would have been unnecessary and even inappropriate. She was a goddess, and thus defined for the epic audience by the attributes given to her by her heritage and location of her birth. This definition limits the possibilities for character development, so a more complete description of character is not necessary. It is only a more modern audience, who does not view the myth of Circe as part of its culture, which will demand a more complete description. Because of this difference in the concept of character, the temporal sequence of the episode seems fragmented, since the modern reader breaks the sequence to ask questions inappropriate to the epic.

Epic fragmentation and juxtaposition of sequence contribute to the modern audience's view that the Circe episode is disjointed and lacking unity. However, we must remember that most of the questions that a modern reader has about the structure of the Circe narrative would not have been questions for the ancient audience. Listeners to the Odyssey took it for granted that they knew the fuller story of which the epic was an abbreviated version.

It is this importance in the difference in perspective for the ancient and modern audiences which brings us to the third epic narrative strategy: externalization of characters. In much the same way as oral traditions and temporal sequence affect the ways in which any audience views the narrative, the presentation of an externalized character affects the understanding of the passage in which he or she is present.

Our understanding of a passage is created by the narration of the events of the episode. These events are scrupulously externalized in the Homeric epic. Within all parts of the Odyssey there is room and time for orderly, well-articulated descriptions of objects, persons and actions. As Eric Auerbach' writes, "clearly outlined, brightly and uniformly illuminated, men and things stand out in a realm where everything is visible." He sees the strategy of externalization as necessary for Homeric style; the narrative has a need to leave nothing half in darkness and unexternalized. This is why, as we have seen, Circe is not merely mentioned, but formally introduced and defined by her lineage. Thus defined, she exists only in the present of the narrative, and only as she is presented by the narrative. Because the character Circe is so strictly defined by the narrative, it is as if she doesn't exist outside of the Homeric epic. The strictness in definition is paralleled by a strictness in structure, with the

7 Eric Auerbach, "Odysseus' Scar," Mimesis (1973) 3-5.
result that the audience is consumed by the immediate action --
there is no concern for the past or future. Actions and motives
for actions are given to the audience (if only because the
character must move according to oral traditions). While complex
in form, linguistics and syntax, the Odyssey presents a relatively
simple picture of its characters. Characters (such as Circe) move
through the narrative in order to embody the ideals of a culture
which they describe in general. They are not distinct individuals,
but reflections of cultural values. Consider Odysseus -- clever
and foresighted -- and Achilles -- honourable and a great warrior.
Throughout the epic, each is described in detail, his emotions are
brought out in direct discourse, yet the characters have no
development. Odysseus, having spent so much time at war,
travelling, and encountering different situations, still does not
show any development; he returns to Ithaca the same as when he left
it nearly two decades earlier. Because of this lack of character
development, the modern critic cannot interpret the text to find
the second hidden meaning which answers the question "Why?".
Instead, each action and character can be analyzed to discover how
a character works within the plot. The answer to "Why?" is that
the characters act according to convention, and any attempt at
interpreting an action leads only to allegorizing. Allegorical
readings of the Circe episode are forced and foreign to the
narrative. By definition, the epic resists such treatment.
Defined characters and actions exist within an immediate 'real'
world into which the audience is lured. Any attempt to interpret
the narrative, to attribute internal thoughts and feelings to
characters destroys this 'real' world. The attempt at
interpretation destroys the constructed reality and immediacy of
the epic. Odysseus moved in his defined world in ways which were
appropriate to the definition. He visited Circe and rescued his
men from existence as pigs simply because that is what oral
traditions, developed over hundreds of years, said he would do.

Transferring this principle of externalization to Circe, we
see that our modern view of her as seductress is inappropriate to
the constraints of the epic because it violates the narrative
strategy of externalization. We cannot allegorize the episode as
a demonstration of female sexuality, for instance, and keep the
principle of externalization intact. In order to create such an
interpretation, we must transcend the strategy of externalization
so prevalent in the epic -- the externalized character must be
thought of as internalized. It is at this point that most analyses
of the Circe episode fail -- in the attempt to interpret an
external character by applying internalized motives to her actions.
For instance, we can see that the most significant reason why many
of the interpretations of the Circe episode have emphasized the
allegory of Circe as sensual temptation is that modern critics view
her as a human character in the narrative. Circe is, for them, a
character with internalized thoughts, feelings and motives. It is
this internalization of events by the character which allows the
narrative to be read as a demonstration of the anxiety-provoking sexual dimensions of female desire. The concept of internalization is applied from outside the narrative itself; it is foreign to the Homeric epic that a character internalize the events of the narrative. Circe does not act because she has personal motives to act in a certain way; she acts only so that the narrative may continue. It is as if she may act only according to the conventions of the Homeric epic structure. These conventions mandate how action is continued, and how a certain character may move within the plot, always in accordance with his or her own specific mythologies.

In order to understand Circe, to analyze the plot of the Circe episode, we must view her as an external character. Homer provided genealogical history for a specific reason: it shows how she received her magical powers. She was viewed as a witch because she was the daughter of Helios and Perse, not because she was 'evil' or 'psychologically deviant'. For this reason, we must consider the narrative itself very carefully. Circe is defined by Homer as a representative of a certain type of character, of a specific reality present in the oral traditions of the time. When we view Homeric Circe we must try not to step outside the bounds of the strategy of externalization and view her as a modern character.

As we have seen, the use of an externalized character within the narrative influences the ways in which we interpret that narrative. How we view Circe is affected by our desire to see her as having internalized thoughts and feelings. The modern audience rationalizes magical powers with 'scientific' explanations and, in a quest for the meaning of a character like Circe, constructs her as the representative of the seductiveness of female sexuality.

What happens to the interpretation of the Circe episode when we step outside of the bounds of the three epic narrative strategies discussed above? Can the Homeric Circe episode be read as a modern narrative? I firmly believe that the Circe episode can be read as a modern narrative. In fact, most of the scholarly interpretations of the Circe episode which I read while researching Homer's presentation of Circe were modern (to the critic's era) readings. While these articles represent well-developed theories about the meaning of the Circe episode, I feel that they fail miserably in their intent to provide a Homeric interpretation of the scene. Modern readings tend to deny the complexity of the Homeric world and the complexity of the Homeric narrative structure, and the result is a poor interpretation of Homeric intent. In contrast, what I propose to do is to develop my own reading of the Homeric Circe episode, and to present to my reader an interpretation which transcends the intentions of the original author, Homer. I will construct a contemporary reading of a text that I feel holds as much meaning for a modern audience as it did for an ancient one.
I read the entire Circe episode (books X - XII) as a demonstration of female seductive powers. Before I present my reading, I must note two points. First, I must clarify that by the words 'seductive powers' I am not merely referring to the power of a female to seduce others in sexual encounters; my discussion of seduction will go beyond this narrow definition. Second, my interpretation depends on viewing Circe not as a specific human character, but as a representation, or personification of a certain perspective of conflict between contemporary gender roles.

The Circe episode can be read as an exploration of opposing gender roles in the contemporary world because throughout the narrative the reader is presented with opposing forces: Circe and Odysseus, male and female, mortal and divine, human and porcine, inside and outside. These oppositions serve to illustrate the modern woman's frustration with the cultural imposition of standards of acceptable behaviours based upon the concept of gender roles. For instance, instead of being a witch living alone in the woods, Circe could just as well be a female executive facing a boardroom full of male executives. In order to ensure her own survival, will the female executive have to "turn the men into pigs"? As Circe had to decide how to treat Odysseus and his men, how must a modern woman pattern her reactions to specific situations? When she confronts men on their terms and wins, will she be called a 'witch'?

I term the Circe episode as a demonstration of female seductive powers because the story shows how Circe seduced Odysseus into seeing her world as she defined it. By seduction I do not intend that Circe tricked Odysseus into submission, but rather that she was tricky. For instance, when she meets Odysseus (X.308sgq), she is on the threshold of her house. In this position, she has control of the meeting. Inside the house is her domain, and the outdoors is Odysseus'. Positioned between these two points, Circe could maintain the power of her domain, while at the same time appearing to meet Odysseus in his realm, the outdoors. This whole scene functions to seduce Odysseus into a false sense of power. While he may think that he won entrance to Circe's abode through his impressive presence at her gate, the truth is that she let him come inside.

With a sense of power comes a sense of control, and looking at the text it seems as though Odysseus was sure he was in control. He narrates the tale in a way which makes everything Circe does a reaction to his own actions. I would argue that Circe allowed Odysseus to perpetuate this illusion of power and control because she thought he would be easier to deal with if he thought he was in control.
So what is Circe's relationship with Odysseus? I believe that she is an educator of Odysseus (and other men and women) into the presence of female perspective in the world. Seduced into thinking he was in control, Odysseus was educated during his year-long stay on Aeaea by a woman, in a woman's domain. During this time, Odysseus was removed from "man's world" and lived in 'woman's place'.

What did Odysseus learn? First, I like to think that Odysseus learned that sex is not a conquest. After Circe's attempt at transforming him into a pig had 'failed' (Did it fail? Had Odysseus really met Hermes in the woods, and had he been given a talisman for Circe's magic? Was the transformation attempt a ploy to flatter Odysseus?), and she had showered him with praises, she suggested to him that they should go to bed (X.321ggg). Circe offered to Odysseus what he probably would have taken anyway, and, in doing so, once again strengthened her position in their relationship. By freely giving Odysseus what he would have wanted to win, she made him see the benefits of asking, sharing and understanding the other party's perspective.

Second, I think that Odysseus learned that the exercise of physical strength is not always the best way to accomplish a goal. He learned from Circe the importance of subtlety of action -- in other words, seduction. For instance, Odysseus learned the importance of deterrence when he used the moly against Circe's magic in the transformation scene. Forewarned of what Circe would do to him, Odysseus conceivably could have easily barged into her house, forced her to restore his men to their human forms, and then killed her. Instead of resorting to this sort of action, Odysseus used the moly given to him and, by its success, hopefully learned the importance of subtlety of action.

Third, I think that Odysseus learned appreciation of skill, or expertise. Circe was an embodiment of what was unknown to Odysseus. Her magical powers were beyond the scope of his skill and I feel that he comes to respect Circe for her skills, and ability to use them appropriately. He knows that only Circe had the power to restore his men, so he approaches the issue of the restoration politely. He learns to value Circe's advice because he knows that she is a valuable source of information. Odysseus does not fight with Circe over the issue of going to the Underworld. After one year with Circe, Odysseus has learned that she is wiser than he in some areas, and it will be in his best interest to listen to her and learn from her. The appreciation of her skills grows into trust in her so Odysseus can approach the trip to the Underworld as an opportunity to learn.

The preceding three lessons just touch on Circe's role as educator of Odysseus. In all respects, I think Circe approached educating Odysseus as a seduction. Subtle in her methods, she
brings Odysseus into her world, not that he might live there, but so that he can leave Aeaea knowing that an 'other' existed. Circe is the 'other' and shows Odysseus a world which would otherwise have been unknown to him.

Circe's methods of education within the story have been termed a 'seduction' rather than 'magical' because I feel the term seduction is more appropriate for contemporary culture. In Homeric times, magical powers were inexplicable, and today many people feel that a woman's ability to demonstrate power is inexplicable, so it is termed a seduction. When a contemporary woman transcends the culturally defined 'woman's place' of her world, how does she do it? In a society where gender roles are only now becoming less strictly defined, how does a female compete with the male order and win her place in society? Like Circe, she must work within and outside of her male dominated world. However, when she is successful, her success is attributed to her ability to seduce, or bewitch those who are in control. For instance, consider the female executive mentioned earlier. How did she get her job? Is she successful because of her educational training, skill and excellent job performance, or was it because she had 'seduced' the boss (sexually, intellectually or emotionally)?

Modern woman, who often works outside of a defined role for females, many times is viewed as a Circe. She is thought to preserve herself only through the application of seduction. She, like Circe, is called a witch because she works in a way some don't understand. Ancient men feared that woman, if given any power, would be able to dominate them. As a result, they denied woman power. Circe, in this ancient culture, is a personification of female powers. She was at first feared and mistrusted by Odysseus, but ultimately he learned from her. His encounter with Circe (like the transformation of his men) was an enlightening experience. Odysseus didn't learn 'magic' during his stay on Aeaea, he learned an 'other' way -- he saw there was a world outside of his male world, and someone who worked outside his world wasn't a witch just because she saw things differently than he did. Circe lived her life under the rule of her own perspective, distinctly different than Odysseus' perspective. In this same manner, modern woman must approach situations in her world according to her own perspective. And, like Circe, instead of being applauded for her appropriate decisions and actions, she is feared and misunderstood because she uses her power.

Modern woman, like Circe, is struggling. She is aware that she has unique powers and abilities, but is frustrated by the misunderstandings that the use of her power creates. As the Circe episode demonstrates, the struggle for understanding is not a hopeless one, if approached in a appropriate manner. Circe shows the modern reader that the way towards understanding is not perpetuated through domination or through the denial of difference,
but through awareness that there is an 'other'. The awareness of the existence of an 'other' is only a small step towards the understanding of the 'other'. However, it is a very important step, for without it there can be no hope of understanding, only an increasing sense of frustration for the unrecognized.

University of Manitoba

Brenda Grover
Conflict of Voices in Horatian Satire

by

Matthew Clark

In this paper I will examine some of the satires of Horace in terms of two concepts, polyphony (roughly, the presence of more than one voice in a literary work) and carnival (roughly, the breakdown of social hierarchies), both elaborated by the Soviet theorist Mikhail Bakhtin. I will argue that Horace's satires typically include a variety of different voices, as lyric typically does not, and that the satires are therefore polyphonic— but only in a weak sense. Because the various voices are all controlled by the voice of the poet, the poems do not manifest a spirit of carnival and are not polyphonic in the strong sense. The voices in Horace's satires are used for the moral education of his audience, as his father used examples for Horace's moral education. I will end with a suggestion that there is some congruence between the way Horace manages the voices in his Satires and the way Augustus managed the voices in the restored Republic.

1 For Bakhtin's critical theory, I have used primarily Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, edited and translated by Caryl Emerson (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1984); also The Dialogic Imagination, edited by Michael Holquist, translated by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (University of Texas Press, Austin, 1981). I have found invaluable the critical biography, Mikhail Bakhtin, by Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1984). Of less use is Bakhtin: Essays and Dialogues on His Work, edited by Gary Saul Morson (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1986). Unless otherwise indicated, all quotes from Bakhtin are from Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics. Bakhtin was, of course, a theorist of widely ranging interests: "Some literary critics regard Bakhtin primarily as the author of ... a new theory of authorial point of view known as polyphony. Other literary critics, folklorists and anthropologists define Bakhtin ... as the theorist of carnival and the breakdown of social hierarchies. Still other literary critics, social theorists and intellectual historians appropriate Bakhtin for Marxist theory ... and for Anglophone critics Bakhtin emerges as the theorist of the novel ... Bakhtin did not view himself as primarily a literary theorist. The term he found closest to what he sought to do was philosophical anthropology." (Clark and Holquist, p. 3).

These two concepts, polyphony and carnival, enter into some of his most profound speculation. Followers of Bakhtin would no doubt find my usage of these concepts superficial; I would argue that although my usage does not exhaust what he means by the terms, it is certainly close to the core of his meaning.
Satire is by nature various, as the very name of the genre implies. I think that there is no need here to discuss in detail the etymology of the word; it is enough to note that, as Michael Coffey says, it is most likely an inflexion of the adjective sатур that has come to be used as a noun, a feminine singular with a feminine noun to be supplied . . . when the feminine satura came to be used alone for noun + satura, its meaning will to some extent have depended upon that of the noun omitted (11-12). Coffey goes on to quote the fourth century grammarian Diomedes, who offers four different possible etymologies, two of which Coffey rejects, leaving lanx satura, a full dish which was packed with a large number of varied fruits and offered among primitive people to the gods in a religious ritual and called satura from the abundance and fullness of the material. or perhaps "a certain kind of sausage which was filled with many ingredients and according to Varro called satura . . . ." (12-13). "Unless new literary or epigraphical material appears," Coffey goes on to say, "it is reasonable to accept, possibly with reservations, Diomedes' explanation that satura took its name from a full dish offered in solemn ritual or from a stuffed sausage" (23).

According to Coffey, the poet Ennius, who may have first used the term to designate a literary genre, probably referred to a collection of miscellaneous poems or a book as satura (sing.) and to the whole corpus of his satires as satura (plural). The use of satura to denote a single poem . . . is probably a later development when technical terminology had hardened (17).

And according to Niall Rudd, in the hands of Ennius, its first known exponent, literary satura was an informal medley in which the author moralized in various metres on various aspects of life and society. . . . [Lucilius] started off like Ennius by using iambic and trochaic metres as well as the dactylic hexameter, but after a few years experimentation he settled on the hexameter as being the most suitable vehicle for his purpose. This was an important decision for the future of the form.3

The transference of the name of the genre from the collection to the individual poem also involved some transference of meaning

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2 The following discussion of the name and nature of satire derives mostly from Michael Coffey, Roman Satire (Methuen and Company Ltd., London, 1976) 11-23. Coffey's view is supported by a similar discussion in Ulrich Knoche, Roman Satire (trans. by Edwin S. Ramage) (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1975) 7-16.

3 Niall Rudd, The Satires of Horace (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1966) 86. All further references to Rudd are to this work.
as well, so that the individual satiric poem, as well as (or even rather than) the collection, came to be seen as various in some sense. (Satire has other characteristics, of course, such as an informal style and a critical attitude, but these are less relevant for my present purpose.) This understanding of the law of the genre, for example, justifies the variety of subjects and rather swift transitions from subject to subject which we find in many satires. For example, in his discussion of Satire 1.1, Coffey notes It is sometimes stated that the two themes of discontent with one's lot in life and avarice are distinct and do not coalesce into a unified whole. But the central topic of avarice is developed discursively as the underlying cause of discontent. In any case, the rules of the conversation, the *sermo* and the dialogue do not demand the relentless pursuit of a single argument (70).

Another example of the generic variety, I believe, is the multitude of voices which can be heard in many satires. Some analysis of individual satires will demonstrate my point. (In the following comments, I will ignore the content of the satires for the most part and concentrate on the form.) For example, the first satire of Book One begins with the voice of the poet, ostensibly speaking to Maecenas. As soon as line 4, however, we hear a new voice, as the poet quotes the soldier: 'o fortunati mercatores!' gravis annis miles ait multo iam fractus membra labore. Then in line 7 we hear the merchant: 'militia est potior. quid enim concurririt: horae momento cita mors venit aut victoria laeta.' In the following few lines the lawyer and the farmer are quoted indirectly. Then in lines 15-19 the poet quotes what he supposes a god might say to these characters. So in the first twenty lines of the poem we have heard, directly or indirectly, the voices of five characters other than the poet.

The next section of the poem, lines 20-42, is all told in the voice of the poet, though even here other voices are implied by the *aiunt* in line 32. In lines 41-2, the poet asks what might be taken as a rhetorical question, except that it is answered by an unnamed interlocutor, in line 43. In lines 49-51, the poet asks another question and again is answered, presumably by the same interlocutor. In lines 55-6, the poet quotes a hypothetical speaker, whom he answers in the following four lines. In lines 61-2 he quotes what he asserts is the opinion of a good part of mankind: at bona pars hominum decepta cupidine falsa 'nil satis est' inquit 'quia tanti quantum habeas sit. In lines 66-7, the poet quotes the words of the Athenian miser, and then in lines 69 and following he responds to the laughter of the interlocutor.

The next ten or eleven lines are all in the voice of the poet, but in lines 80-83 the interlocutor speaks again:

*at si condoluit temptatum frigore corpus,*
*aut alius casus lecto te adfixit, habes qui*
adsidet, fomenta paret, medicum roget ut te
susicitet ac reddat gnatis carisque propinquis.

The poet answers in lines 84-91.

Down through line 100, we hear the assertions of the poet, and then in line 101, the interlocutor again, for the last time: quid mi.igitur suades? ut vivam Naevius aut sic ut Momentanus? The poet answers this last question in lines 108-21. Thus we have a wide variety of different speakers of various types, ranging from soldiers and misers to a hypothetical god, as well as what is most probably a relatively consistent interlocutor, but all clearly distinguished from the poet.

The second satire of Book One shows a similar variety of voices. Once again, the poem begins with the voice of the poet, but again quickly moves to another voice (questioned and then quoted indirectly) in lines 7-11:

hunc si perconteris, avi cur atque parentis
praecolaram ingrata stringat malus inlувie rem,
omnia conductis coemens obsonia nummis,
sordidus atque animi quod parvi nolit haberis,
respondet.

The poet adds a comment: laudatur ab his, culpatur ab illis.

In lines 12-7, the poet describes behaviour of the wealthy Fufidius, and then in lines 17-9 he quotes a hypothetical reaction: 'maxime' quis non 'Iuppiter!' exclamat simul atque audivit? 'at in se pro quaestu sumptum facit hic. In line 23 a hypothetical interlocutor questions the poet and the poet answers in the following lines: si quis nunc quaerat 'quo res haec pertinet?' illuc: dum vitant stulti vitia, in contraria currunt. Then in lines 31-6 the poet quotes Cato's reaction to seeing someone leave a brothel, and then Cupiennius' reaction to Cato's remark:

quidam notus homo cum exiret fornice, 'macte
virtute esto' inquit sententia dia Catonis,
'nam simul ac venas inflavit taetra libido,
huc iuvenes aequum est descendere, non alienas
permoleure uxores.' 'nolim laudarer' inquit
'sic me' mirator cunni Cupiennus albi.

The poet goes on to describe the tribulations which beset the adulterer, and in line 46 he gives both the general judgement on these and also the dissenting voice of Galba. In line 54 we hear the proud boast of Sallustius: matronam nullam ego tango. Next we hear from Marsaeus, in line 57: 'nil fuerit mi' inquit 'cum
uxoribus umquam alienis'. The poet presents a fanciful dialogue between Longarenus, the lover of Sulla's daughter, and his penis,
Conflict of Voices

in lines 68-72:

huic si mutonis verbis mala tanta videnti
diceret haec animus: 'quid vis tibi? numquid ego a te
magno prognatum deposco consule cunnun
velatumque stola mea cum conserbuit ira?'
quid responderet? 'magno patre nata puella est.'

In line 92 a lover exclaims at the finest features of his
girlfriend, only to be corrected by the poet. The lover compares
himself to a hunter, in lines 105-8:

‘leporem venator ut alta
in nive sectetur, positum sic tangere nolit!
cantat, et apponit 'meus est amor huic similis; nam
transvolat in medio posita et fugientia captat.'

In line 120, the poet quotes the unwilling woman's excuses,
and then quotes Philodemus' judgement of her. He continues with
a list of his own preferences, and ends the poem with a narration
of an adulterer caught when his lover's husband comes home. Even
at the very end there is a hint of another voice: deprendi miserum
est; Fabio vel judice vincam.

So again we note a multiplicity of voices in the poem. It
would be possible to go through all the satires in this way, and
I believe that reading them with an ear for polyphony is both
entertaining and instructive, but further analysis here would be
quickly tiring. It is perhaps more useful to note the exceptions.

Satires VII and VIII are somewhat untypical of Horace in many
ways, and most commentators are content to leave them almost
unnoticed. The first of these is just a brief anecdote, without
any polyphony; the second is the only poem of Book One which is
told in a voice other than that of the poet, but the poem is not
therefore polyphonic, since we hear only the voice of Priapus;
although Canidia and Sagana both play important roles, we really
don't hear them speak.

In most of the satires of Book One, the poet's voice is
dominant, but in most of the satires of Book Two, the poet's voice
has been more or less displaced by the voices of other speakers. Satire 2.1 is a dialogue between the poet and the lawyer Trebatius,
and the poet still has most of the lines; Satire 2.2 is mostly told
in the voice of the peasant Ofellus; Satire 2.3 is a dialogue,
dominated by Damasippus rather than by the poet; Satire 2.4 is told
almost exclusively in the voice of Catius, though the poet gets in
a few words; Satire 2.5 is a dialogue between Ulysses and Tiresias,
and the poet does not speak at all; in Satire 2.6, however, the
poet has almost the role he enjoyed in the satires of Book One,
though the final section is told in the voice of Cervius; Satire
2.7 is dominated by the poet's slave Davus; and Satire 2.8 takes the form of a story told to Horace by his friend Fundanius. Miall Rudd sees the difference in manner between the two books in social and political terms. By the time of publication of Book Two, Rudd says, the poet now enjoyed a position of esteem and security such as he had never known before, and as the gliding years carried him into his middle thirties he began to take a more detached view of his material. I do not mean that he became less sensitive to moral evil, but rather that he saw it in less personal terms. This tendency towards greater detachment can also be seen in the form of the poems; for instead of being delivered by Horace himself the sermons are in most cases put into the mouths of intermediate characters like Ofellus and Stertinius. The increase in dialogue is part of the same process (151).

Among the features which we noted as common to the diatribes of Book 1 was the fact that the poet spoke in propria persona and took direct responsibility for what he said. In the diatribes of Book 2 this is no longer the case. . . . Accordingly the nature of the impact is different. The first method is undoubtedly more incisive, but it is the method of one who, if not an outsider, is still not a member of the establishment. By 33 B.C., however, Horace was a more familiar figure in society and had numerous friends among the rich and powerful. As a result he seems to have felt unable to preach with his former directness. Perhaps we find this regrettable, and it may well be that in the end Horace's career as a satirist was destroyed by social success. But the later and subtler method should not be dismissed too quickly. Horace may have had reason to believe that he could get his message across more effectively in this way (195-6).

Certainly the difference in manner between the two books is interesting and important, but it should be noted that this change does not necessarily mean that the poems become monophonic. The dialogues are at least duets, and some are implicitly more, if one of the speakers is reporting the words of a third party, as in Satires 2.3, 2.4, and 2.7. In Satire 2.1 the poet is clearly the loudest voice, but his part responds to the voice of Trebatius. In some of the others the roles are reversed, as Catius, for example, in 2.4, has almost all of the lines, but the poet comments at the beginning and the end. Furthermore, and more to the point, a number of the poems are not just duets, but are polyphonic in the manner of Book One. Satire 2.3 is not only a dialogue between Damasippus and the poet; Damasippus quotes a multitude of voices in the course of his long sermon. In the first half of Satire 2.6, the poet is accosted by a number of people in Rome, and in the second half we hear the story of the town mouse and the country mouse, told not by the poet but by his neighbour Cervius.

The only real monologue is Satire 2.2, and even this, of course, is not told for the most part in the voice of the poet,
but is given over to Ofellus. Here a theoretical point is perhaps relevant. The strongest form of polyphony is a direct quotation; indirect quotation, while weaker, certainly still qualifies. One might ask, however, if the simple reporting of behaviour might also provide an effect not in principle different from polyphony. Certainly a poem which is concerned only with the poet’s actions or emotions is different from one which portrays the actions or emotions of other people. Even in the clearly polyphonic satires, the poet sometimes quotes a character and sometimes only reports behaviour, with no obvious difference of intent. If one accepts this argument, then Satire 2.2, too, is polyphonic. Although I think that there is an important distinction which should be maintained. Direct or indirect quotation tends to make the speaker a subject, whereas the simple reporting of behaviour leaves the actor as an object. Thus, a tripartite scheme seems appropriate: the poems which have a single subject, poems which have multiple objects, and poems which have multiple subjects. Only the last category is truly polyphonic.

I believe that I have demonstrated that the Satires of Horace are characteristically polyphonic. I will not bother to engage in any detailed analysis of the Odes of Horace, but even a quick glance will show that they are not typically polyphonic. This difference seems to me to constitute a generic distinction. It is not necessary to show that there are absolutely no monophonic satires and absolutely no polyphonic lyrics; the qualities which distinguish genres are like family resemblances, which, as Wittgenstein has shown, do not have to be universal. Polyphony for Mikhail Bakhtin, however, meant more than the mere presence of many voices in a literary work: the voices had to be not subordinated to a higher voice. He says, for example, that "Polyphony presumes a plurality of fully valid voices within the limits of a single work." The important words here are "fully valid". He speaks of a plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices . . . not a multitude of characters and fates in a single objective world, illuminated by a single authorial consciousness, with equal rights and each with its own world . . . not only objects of authorial discourse but also subjects of their own

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4 The first ode in Book One describes the behaviour of a variety of people, and therefore borders on polyphony, according to my scheme. Kenneth Quinn comments: "A poem to Horace's patron, introducing the collected edition of his poems -- a relaxed, discursive epistle (more in the manner of Horace's hexameter verse than that of the poems which follow) . . . ." (Horace: The Odes, edited with introduction, revised text and commentary by Kenneth Quinn, Macmillan, London, 1980, p.117).

5 Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, p.34.
directly signifying discourse.\(^6\)

It seems clear that Bakhtin's concept of polyphony is related to his concept of carnival. A complete discussion of the complex relationship between these two rich concepts is beyond the scope of this paper, but even a brief quotation will suggest the connection. Bakhtin says that in carnival, everyone is an active participant. The laws, prohibitions and restrictions that determine the structure and order of the ordinary, that is, non-carnival, life are suspended during carnival: what is suspended first of all is hierarchical structure and all forms of terror, reverence, piety and etiquette connected with it -- that is, everything resulting from socio-hierarchical inequality or any other form of inequality among people (including age).\(^7\)

Polyphony as Bakhtin defines it, the presence of "a plurality of fully valid voices within the limits of a single work," tends toward carnival because it tends to dismantle hierarchy, which distinguishes grades of validity.

The *Satires* of Horace, I believe, are not polyphonic in Bakhtin's sense; even though they involve a variety of voices, there is always a sense that the voice of the poet is superior to the other voices and controls them. When the poet quotes the soldier, the merchant, the lawyer and the client at the beginning of *Satire* 1.1, he does not intend to leave the voices unjudged; on the contrary, he wishes to guide the judgement of the reader. When the interlocutor argues in favour of avarice, the poet corrects him. When the poet tells the story of the Athenian miser, the reader knows what to think. These are not fully valid voices, but voices in a hierarchy, voices controlled by the poet. And this practice of judgement is essential to the manner of the *Satires*. Even in the satires of Book 2, where the voice of the poet is less audible, we usually know just what our judgements should be; any inability to judge (as perhaps in 2.4) is the result not of the author's intent, but of some failure -- on the part of the reader, the poet or the tradition. Horace's technique has become more subtle, and he is able, for the most part, to make his points clear without intruding his own voice, but the judgements are no less present.

The judgemental nature of Horatian satire is well known and understood. Niall Rudd, for example, distinguishes between, on the one hand, an "anarchic laughter", an "exuberant mockery of everyone who forms or perpetuates an influential pattern", and, on the other, Roman satire, which is a "social corrective", which has

\(^6\) Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics p.6-7.

\(^7\) Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, pp.122-3.
as its targets "those who deviate from an acceptable norm", which uses "its traditional weapons in defence of balance and restraint." (p.16)

I think that Horace has in fact given us a clear statement of his technique and its origin. In Satire 1.4, lines 103-11, he says:

\[\ldots \] liberius si
dixerò quid, si forte locosius, hoc mihi iuris
cum venia dabis: insuevit pater optimus hoc me,
ut fugerem exemplis vitiorum quaeque notando.
cum mihi hortaretur, parce, frugaliter, atque
viverem uti contentus eo quod mihi ipse parasset,
nonne vides Albi ut male vivat fillius, utque
Baius inops? magnum documentum ne patriam rem
perdere quis velit.

And he continues with further examples. Although the poet is critical of most of the other voices he quotes, he almost worships the figure he paints of his father, both in this satire and also in 1.6. Indeed, in this poem he assumes towards the reader the role his father played for him: that is, by giving examples of bad behaviour he hopes to turn the reader towards good behaviour: sic teneros animos aliena opprobria saepe absterrent vitiis (1.4.128-9).

It is worth stressing the point that Horatian satire does not manifest a spirit of carnival precisely because some critics seem to suggest that it does. Michael Andre' Bernstein, for example, notes that Diderot's Le Neveu de Rameau "opens with a citation from Horace's seventh Satire, and his whole discussion assumes that the seventh Satire is indeed carnivalistic." Bakhtin himself gives some basis for a judgement with his claim that Menippean satire is an important example of carnival literature." He may well be right about Menippean satire, but any extension of this claim to Roman verse satire is, I believe, quite wrong. Satire 2.7 and Satire 2.3 are the only ones which seem at all susceptible to such an interpretation, and even these, I would argue, in fact manifest a spirit of control and hierarchy. It is true that both of these occur during the Saturnalia, when social distinctions were relaxed,

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8 Michael Andre' Bernstein, "When the Carnival Turns Bitter: Preliminary Reflections Upon the Abject Hero," in Bakhtin: Essays and Dialogues on his Work, ed. Gary Saul Morson (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1986) pp.99-121. Diderot certainly was deeply indebted to Horace; the situation of Le Neveu de Rameau owes something to Satire 1.9, and the portrait of Rameau's nephew near the beginning is clearly based upon Horace's portrait of Tigellius.

9 Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, pp.108sgg.
and it is true that in both of these the poet is severely criticized. However, both critics are shown to be foolish, only parroting the words they have learned from others; and in both the poet at the end asserts his own superiority of judgement or power. The poet is attacked in almost the same language as he himself has used in earlier satires; the effect is to bring the poet himself into the world which is the object of his satire -- but he has already admitted that he is by no means free of faults. In Satire 1.3, lines 19-20, he says: \textit{nunc aliquis dicat mihi 'quid tu? nullane habes vitia?' immo alia et fortasse minora.} Again in Satire 1.4, lines 129-qqq, he admits his own faults; and, indeed, throughout the Satires he gives the reader opportunities for a little laugh against the poet. This gentle self-mockery is by no means anarchic, but is part of the poet's very subtle technique. As Niall Rudd notes, the essence of Horace's life, as of his style, will therefore be found in the idea of controlled variety. Because the limits are relatively narrow and the movement normally is controlled, the poet is in a position to mock the wild oscillations of Priscus and Tigellius. But he does not pretend that the control is infallible. He admits that, sometimes at least, there is a gap between his principles and his performance. And it is this faculty of wry self-criticism that makes him the most likeable of Roman moralists (p. 210).

Satires 2.3 and 2.7 are the extreme of the self-critical tendency in Horace, and they may indeed test the limits, but I believe that the poet is still ultimately in control. If he is to some extent a possible object of criticism, he is nonetheless the superordinate subject, always directing the reader's judgement.

In the final section of this paper I would like to suggest, very tentatively, that the management of voices in Horatian satire has some similarities to the management of opinion in the Augustan Principate. Augustus claimed, of course, to have re-established the institutions of the Republic.\footnote{The following discussion depends partly upon Res Gestae Divi Augusti, edited by P.A. Brunt and J.M. Moore (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1967).} In the Res Gestae (34-5) he says:

\begin{quote}
\textit{In consalatu sexto et septimo, postquam bella civilia exstinxeram, per consensum universorum potitus rerum omnium, rem publicam ex mea potestate in senatus populique Romani arbitrium transtuli . . . Post id tempus auctoritate omnibus praestiti, potestatis autem nihilo amplius habui quam ceteri qui mihi quoque in magistratu conlegae fuerunt. Tertium decimum consalatum cum gerebam, senatus et equester ordo populusque Romanus universus appellavit me patrem patriae. . . .}
\end{quote}
The claim that he re-established the Republic, of course, is a fraud, but it was an essential element of the settlement after the civil wars. As Brunt and Moore note, Augustus maintained that "he was unwilling to accept untraditional, i.e., unRepublican honours or powers," but they go on to call this claim "an example of clever propaganda writing: he naturally did not mention that there was no precedent for any one man holding so many different positions and powers at the same time." (p.5) According to Brunt and Moore, "the restoration of the Republic was widely referred to by writers of the Augustan age...." (p.9). They quote Vellius (II.89):

In the twentieth year civil wars were brought to an end, foreign wars buried, peace recalled; the frenzy of arms was everywhere lulled to sleep, the laws recovered their vigour, the courts their authority, the senate its majesty, the imperium of the magistrates was restored to its ancient extent...the pristine form of the Republic was recalled as of old.

I will not discuss at length the complex questions about the legalities of the powers of Augustus, which are essentially considered by Brunt and Moore (pp.8-16, 75-80). It is relevant to my point, however, to note that Augustus received the right to submit legislative 'bills' to the people, and to summon the senate, and put motions in that body also...his auctoritas was such that he could get others to propose what he wished to see enacted...Augustus needed and received the subsidiary right of putting the first motion at any meeting...the tribunician power included the right to veto...normally proposals would not be brought before the senate unless the emperor was known to approve; if they did get as far as the senate, they could usually be checked by a mere expression of opinion rather than a formal veto... (p.11).

Augustus wanted to maintain the forms and appearance of republican government while in fact holding supreme power. The constitutional arrangements were cleverly designed to perform both functions.

The loss of free political discourse was an inevitable aspect of the Augustan settlement. As Syme notes, Freedom of speech was an essential part of the republican virtue of libertas, to be regretted more than political freedom when both were abolished. For the sake of peace and the common good, all power had to pass to one man. That was not the worst feature of monarchy -- it was

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11 The following quotations are from Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, 1939).
the growth of servility and adulation (p.152).

Nonetheless, the illusion of free speech was essential. The traditional role and powers of the republican institutions had to be seen to function in order to support the claim that the Augustan settlement was a restoration of the Republic. The honours accorded to Augustus would have been worth nothing if they had not seemed voluntary and unforced, even though everyone may well have known the truth.

The final form of the settlement was the result of years of experiment, and it was not fully in place until many years after the composition of the Satires; nonetheless, the essential intent of the settlement was the same certainly from the time of the final defeat of the party of Antonius, and most probably from some years before. Syme notes, for example, that after the defeat of Sextus Pompeius, the Senate and People of Rome expressed their gratitude and accorded great honours to Octavian, including an inscription in the Forum to announce that, after prolonged disturbances, order had been restored by land and sea. The formulation, though not extravagant, was perhaps a little premature. But it contained a programme. Octavianus remitted debts and taxes; and he gave public expression to the hope that the Free State would soon be re-established. It only remained for his triumviral partner to perform his share and subdue the Parthians, when there would be no excuse for delay to restore the constitutional government. Few senators can have believed in the sincerity of such professions. That did not matter. Octavianus was already exploring the propaganda and the sentiments that might serve him later against Antonius, winning for personal domination the name and pretext of liberty (p.234)

Indeed, the last real freedom of political debate immediately preceded the final contest between Octavian and Antony. During the period of the Triumvirate, Syme notes, there had been a dearth of official documents, public manifestoes, and a silence of lampoon and abuse. Now came a sudden revival, heralded by the private correspondence of the dynasts, frank, free and acrimonious -- and designed for publicity. . . . Poets and pamphleteers took the field with alacrity. . . . Republican freedom of speech now revelled in a brief renascence -- as though it were not fettered to the policy of a military despot (pp.276-7).

After the defeat of Antony, of course, freedom of speech again disappeared, as Octavian developed his programme and the political settlement. But it was precisely during that period when Horace was writing the Satires that the political programme must have been taking shape in the minds of Octavian and his cronies, including Maecenas, Horace's patron, whose task was to guide opinion gently into acceptance of the monarchy, to prepare not merely for the contest that was imminent but for the peace that was to follow
victory in the last of all the civil wars (p.242).

The role of literature in Augustan propaganda has been widely noted, and there is no need for me to rehearse the subject here. If my argument is correct, however, the Satires of Horace support the Augustan propaganda programme not only in content, but also in form. In the restored Republic, Augustus had to maintain the sound of many voices, while in fact controlling those voices carefully. In the same way, Horace needed the sound of many voices in the Satires, while in fact standing above them, directing them, and judging them. Both the poet and the politician created an illusion of polyphony within what was in fact a clear hierarchy. I do not claim that the management of voices in Horace's Satires inspired the management of voices in the Augustan settlement nor that the plans and policies of Octavian inspired the form of the Satires. We do not have the sort of information to support either claim; moreover creativity, both poetic and political, is too complex to be thus crudely analyzed. But if one wonders why Horace accepted and supported the Augustan programme, and why the party of Octavian welcomed Horace, here may be part of the answer.

University of Toronto
Matthew Clark

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12 See, for example, H.H. Scullard, *From the Gracchi to Nero* (Methuen, London and New York, 1963), pp.263 sqq.
Titus Lucretius Carus:  
Excerptus Intervallis Insaniae

An observation was made 29 years ago that the 1945 bi-
millenium of Lucretius' death had passed uncommemorated and
obfuscated by the lurid twilight of nuclear fall-out, the atomic
theory of which plays such a vital role in Epicurean physics, and
by the haze of mystery surrounding the chronology of an author who,
despite all claims to greatness, has not been absorbed by the
European tradition.¹ For the great poem of Lucretius, De Rerum
Natura, a work of profound and extraordinary genius, stole into the
world all but unnoticed and throughout the subsequent centuries has
suffered an unsteady reputation.² Perhaps this is because
Lucretius' unique and individual style does not fit neatly into a
single tradition.³ Or perhaps this is because the doctrines of
Epicureanism are essentially too difficult, too austere, and too
unworldly for the ordinary human being.⁴

The basis of this problem to a great degree lies in the
dearth of secondary source material. Contrary to the statement of
Santayana, our ignorance of the life of Lucretius is much to be
regretted.⁵ In the De Rerum Natura, we find presented not merely
an account of the philosophical system of Epicurus, but a personal
statement of its poet. Every page, almost every line, gives an
impassioned yet disciplined utterance in a distinctive and
disturbing language and style, which is itself an expression of the
unique personality of the poet, to a profound and original version
of human life and destiny.⁶ Nevertheless, there is much which this
style renders puzzling or obscure, and in this obscurity has grown
up a body of scholarship which contains startling contradictions
and surprising conclusion.

¹ Wormell, D., "Lucretius: The Personality of the Poet,"
G & R 7 (1960) 54-5.


67(1973) 100.

⁴ Kenney, E., ed., Lucretius, De Rerum Natura: Book 3,
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971) 4.

Kenney (above, note 4) 6 sees no advantage either.

⁶ Wormell, D., (above, note 1) 54-5.
Taking a sample thereof, we find set forth in 1957 the idea that Lucretius was writing for the men of the municipia, those whom religious superstitions might truly torment. Six years later, we encounter a very different interpretation which holds that the audience Lucretius sought out was composed of Roman aristocrats.  

In another quarter, we discover noted in the text of the standard English edition of Lucretius that Books 5 and 6 are "on the nature of an appendix." Three decades later, we learn that "as an intellectual and imaginative achievement, Book 5 must be awarded the palm" and further that the former appendix theory "could not be a greater mistake." In this same time span, we find some scholars maintaining the "conservative" position, as it were, that Lucretius' genius lies solely in his poetry and then observe other scholars, who controvert this view with their debate as to whether Lucretius was levelling his philosophical attacks against the Peripatetics or the Stoics.  

Yet among the more astonishing explanations are those which the aforementioned paucity of biographical and ancillary material could easily settle. More information on Epicurean philosophy itself would solve those problems which concern the role and status of the Greco-Roman divinities and clarify theories of ataraxia, the idea that the gods only enjoy peace when removed from human

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10 Furley, D., (above, note 9) 614.  
affairs! A body of solid facts coupled with common sense could help prevent an idea from going beyond the realm of imaginative scholarship into a world of wild speculation. Among such an immoderate sort, we find Titus Pomponius Atticus, best friend of Cicero, credited with the authorship of the De Rerum Natura and Lucretius, himself, named as one whose ideas anticipated the invention of both television and motion pictures.

For these reasons, it is illuminating to examine how great an impact the only sketch of the life of Lucretius that has survived from ancient times has had upon the course of our scholarship. This is the well-known and well-debated statement found in the Chronological Tables for the year 95 B.C. of Eusebius Hieronymus, better known as Saint Jerome. In this work St. Jerome wrote:

Titus Lucretius Carus poeta nascitur. Postea amatorio poculo in fuorem versus, cum aliquot libros per intervalla insaniae conscribisset, quos postea Cicero emendavit, propria se manu interfecit anno aetatis XLIII. (Euseb. Chron. ad ann. Abr. 1922)

(Titus Lucretius Carus, the poet, is born; afterwards, he was driven insane by a love potion, and through periods of madness, when he had written several books, which Cicero later edited, he committed suicide in the forty-fourth year of his life.)

It is this statement of St. Jerome, brief and controversial though it may be, which has done much to set the tone of a considerable portion of subsequent Lucretian criticism. Since then, the whole question of the poet's mental stability has been discussed at enormous length and widely different diagnoses have been made, ranging from gentle melancholy to morbid depression. We even find the theory that Lucretius took his own life in shame.

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14 In addition we have the Life of Lucretius written by Girolamo Borgia in the early sixteenth century.

15 Dalzell, A., (above, note 3) 40.
and despair over the political disgrace in 54 B.C. of C. Memmius, to whom his didactic poem is thought to have been addressed.\textsuperscript{16}

Such reactions tell us that, while the biographical approach to literature is often hazardous, in the case of Lucretius, it is particularly so because it is biographical criticism without a biography.\textsuperscript{17} Indeed, one scholar has found evidence to support the thesis that Lucretius' psychological problems began when a syndrome of cannibalistic cravings arose and was then repressed during his childhood.\textsuperscript{18} It seems unlikely that this topic would have taken on such importance or even taken root in Lucretian criticism if the suggestion of insanity and suicide hadn't occurred in the work of St. Jerome and thus given rise to the seemingly endless scholarly quests to find elusive substantiations.\textsuperscript{19}

The problem becomes doubly compounded because scholars have tended to a great degree to include a passing reference \textit{obiter dicta} to the testimony of St. Jerome. This has created the misleading appearance that Lucretius' name was either mentioned by no other source or that there was a consensus among such sources.\textsuperscript{20} Moreover, on those occasions when this narrow scope is expanded to include the comments of Cicero and/or Vergil and Donatus, we find


\textsuperscript{18} Cavendish, A.P., "Lucretius: A Psychological Study," \textit{Ratio} (1963) 60-81.

\textsuperscript{19} For examples of the scholarship upon this subject, see Dalzell (above, note 3) 402-6.

the remarks of Cicero labelled at times as "the one contemporary reference." Such a stance completely contradicts the external evidence. Cicero was not the only contemporary witness. Cornelius Nepos, whose circle of friends included Cicero, Catullus and probably Memmius, noted that:

21 Kenney, E., "Lucretius," G & R: New Surveys in the Classics 11 (1977) 1, states "the silence is broken by one contemporary, Cicero..."; Wormell, D., (above, note 1) 55, writes "the one contemporary witness, Cicero's letters to his brother Quintus..."

22 Cicero's reference to Lucretius,

Lucretii poemata, ut scribis, ita sunt,
multis luminibus ingenii multae tamen artis.
(Ad O. Fr. 2.9.2)

(The poems of Lucretius are, as you say, marked by many flashes of genius and, all the same, by much skill.)

and Vergil's allusion to Lucretius,
Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causa atque metus omnis et inexorabile fatum subiecit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis avari.
(Georgics 2.490-3)

(Happy is he who was able to know the reason for things and has cast down under his feet all fear and stern fate and the howl of greedy Acheron.)

There is an interesting, and as far as I know, a heretofore unnoticed parallel between Cicero and Lucretius in the following lines:

"Haec non erant eius qui innumerabiles mundos infinitasque regiones, quorum nulla esset ora, nulla extremitas, "mente peragravisset." (De Fin. 2.31)

and

"Omne immensus peragravit mente animoque. (D.R.N. 1.74).

For further information on Lucretius and Cicero see E.H. Sihler, "Lucretius and Cicero," TAPA 28 (1897) 42-54.

23 It is well to remember that Nepos dedicated his biographies to Titus Pomponius Atticus, wrote a biography of Cicero with whom he corresponded, and was the person to whom Catullus dedicated his book of poems. That Memmius, too, moved in such a circle can be
L. Julium Calidum, quem post Lucretii Catullique mortem multo elegantissimum poetam nostram tulisse aetatem vere videor posse contendere.

(Vita Attici 12)

(It really seems to me that I can assert that L. Julius Calidus is by far the best poet to have lived in our time after the death of Lucretius and Catullus.)

Furthermore, between the first century B.C. and the fourth century A.D., the external evidence reveals that fourteen other writers from antiquity have included some direct reference to Lucretius in their writings.\(^2\) Therefore it seems both useful and appropriate that these statements be brought together. After all, the most important and reliable inferences that can properly be drawn about anyone are those based upon all the extant data.\(^2\)

...surmised from his mention in the letters of Cicero and from his term as the provincial governor of Bithynia in 57 B.C. when he counted Catullus a staff member. Since Laminus, Lucretius' "Memmius" has been identified with that corrupt and profligate politician, C. Memmius known to those men mentioned above.

\(^2\) The many literary echoes in theme and word of Lucretius do not fall within the scope of this paper. However, in addition to those writers mentioned in the text of this paper, Vergil, Horace, Lucan, Faliscus Grattius, Marcus Manlius, Juvenal, the author of the Aetna, Silius Italicus, Apuleius and Claudius Claudianus are not to be overlooked. There is also a group of grammarians who have examined the work of Lucretius. Beginning with M. Verrius Flaccus, the learned freedman of the Emperor Augustus, their number includes Aulus Gellius, Aelius Donatus, Nonius Marcellus, Servius, Macrobius, Priscian, Boethius, Cassiodorus and Isidore.

\(^2\) Gain, D., "The Life and Death of Lucretius," Latomus 28 (1969) 545-53 defends St. Jerome's account by setting forth his argument in a manner somewhat similar to this paper but is less comprehensive. Gain's stated purpose however is to refute K. Ziegler's article "Der Tod des Lucretius," Hermes 71 (1936) 421-40 which vigorously attacks the veracity of St. Jerome's account. Ziegler argues that St. Jerome's account was based upon false interpretations made in the late 4th century A.D. of certain passages in the De Rerum Natura, especially 3.828-9.
1. P. Ovidius Naso

Carmina sublimis tunc sunt peritura Lucreti exitio terras cum dabit una dies. (Amores 1.15.23)

(Then are the poems of the sublime Lucretius going to be destroyed, when comes the day that the earth is given over to ruin.)

Explicat ut causas rapidi Lucretius ignis, casurumque triplex vaticinatur opus. (Tristia 2.425)

(As Lucretius explains the reasons for the rushing fire and foretells the ruin of the three-fold universe.)

2. M. Vitruvius Pollio

Item plures post nostram memoriam nascentes cum Lucretio videbuntur velut coram de rerum natura disputare... (De Architectura, Intro.9.17)

(So, too, numbers born after our time will feel as if they were discussing nature face to face with Lucretius...)

3. Lucius Annaeus Seneca


(So man is a kind. It holds within itself racial nationalities: Greeks, Romans, Parthians. Colors: whites, blacks, yellows. It contains individuals: a Cato, a Cicero, a Lucretius.)

"Tangere enim et tangi nisi corpus nulla potest res," ut ait Lucretius. (Ep. 106.8)

("For nothing except body can touch and be touched," as Lucretius says.)

"Nam tibi de summa caeli ratione deumque dissere incipiam et rerum primordia pandam unde omnis Natura creet res auctet alatque, quove eadem rursum Natura perempta resolvat," ut ait Lucretius. (Ep. 95.11)
("For I shall begin to talk about the sublime system of heaven and of the gods, and I shall set forth the beginnings of things, whence nature makes everything and nourishes and increases them and how, when destroyed, into the same parts nature frees them," as Lucretius says.)

Talis est animorum nostrorum confusio qualis Lucretio visa est: "Nam veluti pueri trepidant atque omnia caecis in tenebris metuunt, ita nos in lucetimemus." (Ep. 110.6)

(The disorder of our souls is like that seen by Lucretius: "For just as boys shake and fear everything in dark shadows, thus do we in the light.")

Aliud ex alio iter suscipitur et spectaculis mutantur, ut ait Lucretius: "hoc se quisque modo semper fugit." (De Tranquillitate Animi 2.14)

(One trip after another is undertaken and sights are exchanged for other sights, as Lucretius says, "In this manner, each one is always fleeing himself.")

4. Velleius Paterculus

Quis enim ignorant direemptos gradibus aetatis flourisse hoc tempore Ciceronem, Hortensium, anteque Crassum, Cottam, Sulpiciunm moxque Brutum, Calidum, Caelium, Calvum et proximum Ciceroni Caesarem eorumque velut alumnos Corvinum ac Pollionem Asinium, aemulumque Thucydisi, Sallustium, auctoresque carminum Varro nem ac Lucretium... (Historiae Romanae 2.36.2)

(For who does not know that separated by the stages of time lived in this age Cicero, Hortensius, and before, Crassus, Cotta, Sulpicius and then Brutus, Calidus, Caelius, Calvus, and next best to Cicero, Caesar and their pupils, as it were, Corvinus and Asinius Pollio, and the rival of Thucydides, Sallust, and the poem writers, Varro and Lucretius.)

5. C. Plinius Secundus

26 It is interesting to note that Velleius Paterculus refers to the deaths of Lucretius and Catullus in the singular post mortem. If this is correct, it is probable that Lucretius and Catullus died in the same year.
Ex auctoribus: Manilio...T. Lucretio... Mamilio Sura. (Historia Naturalis 1.10, Intro. to Ornithology) (From these authorities: Manilius...Titus Lucretius...Mamilio Sura.)

6. C. Plinius Caecilius Secundus

Accedit hoc primum imbecillitate ingenii mei, deinde inopia ac potius, ut Lucretius ait, "egestate patrii sermonis," (Ep. 4.18.1)

(This happens first because of the weakness of my own talent and then, rather, as Lucretius says, "because of the deficiency of my native language.")

7. P. Papinius Statius

Cedet Musa rudis ferocis Enni et docti furor arduus Lucreti. (Silvae 2.7.75-6)

(The untutored Muse of high-spirited Ennius will yield and the lofty passion of learned Lucretius.)

8. M. Fabius Quintilianus

Nec ignara philosophiae, cum propter plurimos in omnibus fere carminibus locos ex intima naturalium quaestionum subtilitate repetitos, tum vel propter Empedocles in Graecis, Varronem ac Lucretium in Latinis, qui praecepita sapientiae versibus tradiderunt. (Institutiones Oratoriae 1.4.4)

(Nor can [grammatical training] be untrained in philosophy not only because of the many passages in almost every poem based upon the inner subtlety of natural questions, but also because among the Greeks there is Empedocles, and among the Latins are Varro and Lucretius, who have all set forth the precepts of their wisdom in verse.)

Qua ratione se Lucretius dicit praecepita philosophiae carmine esse complexum; namque hac, ut est notum, similitudine utitur:
Ac veluti pueris absinthia taetra medentes cum dare

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27 The influence of Lucretius upon Statius is greater than this single reference suggests. See D. Vessey, Statius and the Thebaid, (Cambridge, 1983) 47-8, 295ff; J. Duff, A Literary History of Rome in the Silver Age, (New York, 1927) 496.
conantur, prius oras pocula circum aspirant melis dulci flavoque liquore. (Institutiones Oratoriae 3.1.4)

(For the same reason Lucretius says that he has included the tenets of philosophy in a poem; for he uses this well-known simile:
"When doctors try to give foul wormwood to boys, first they dip their cups about their rims in the sweet, yellow liquid of honey.")

Tale Lucretii, "avia Pieridum peragro loca nullius ante trita solo." (Institutiones Oratoriae 8.6.45)

(Such from Lucretius, "I cross the remote regions of the Pierides trod by the foot of no other person.")

Nam Macer Lucretius legendi quidem, sed non ut phrasin, id est, corpus eloquentiae faciant elegantias in sua quisque materia sed alte humilis, alteri difficilis. (Institutiones Oratoriae 10.1.87)

(Indeed, Macer and Lucretius are worth reading but not for style, that is, as a body of eloquence. Both deal eloquently with their material but the former is shallow and the latter is difficult.)

Quin immo si hanc cogitationem homines habuissent, ut nemo se meliorum fore eo qui optimus fuissent, arbitraretur, ii ipsi, qui sunt optimi, non fuissent, neque post Lucretium ac Macrum Vergilius nec post Crassum Crassum et Hortensium Cicero, sed nec illi qui post eos fuerunt. (Institutiones Oratoriae 12.11.27)

(But indeed if men had the idea that no one would be thought better than the one who had been best, those very ones who are the best would not have been, not Vergil after Lucretius and Macer, nor Cicero after Crassus and Hortensius, nor those who were after them.)

9. Cornelius Tacitus

Sed voobis utique versantur ante oculos illi qui Lucilium pro Horatio et Lucretium pro Vergilio legunt. (Dialogus 23)

(But certainly those men hover before your eyes who read Lucilius and Lucretius rather than Horace and Vergil.)

10. Aulus Gellius
Sed in carminibus Lucreti invento usus est Vergilius non aspernatus auctoritatem poetae ingenio et facundia praecellentis. (Favorinus quoted in Noctes Atticae 1.21.5)

(But Vergil used the genius in the poems of Lucretius, not scorning the authority of a poet outstanding for his talent and eloquence.)

Quam definitionem significare volens Lucretius poeta ita scripsit, "tangere enim aut nisi corpus nulla potest res." (Noctes Atticae 5.15.4)

(The poet Lucretius wanted to show this definition, thus he wrote, "nothing except the body can touch or be touched.")

Versus Lucreti hi sunt:
Præterea radit vox fauces saepe, facitque asperiora foras gradiens arteria clamor.

(These are Lucretius' verses: Besides the voice often rubs the throat and the shout as it comes forth makes the wind-pipe rougher.)

Titus autem Lucretius in carmine suo "pro aedituis" "aedituentes" appellat. (Noctes Atticae 12.10.8)

(Moreover, in his poem Titus Lucretius uses "those who are keeping the temple" for "temple keepers".)

Lucretius aeque auribus inserviens funem feminio genere appellavit in hisce versibus:

"Haut, [ut] opinor, enim mortalia saecula superne aurea de caelo demisit funis in arva,"
cum dicere usitatius manete numero posset:
"aureus e caelo demisit funis in arva."
(Noctes Atticae 13.21.21)

(Lucretius, in a like manner obeying his ears, has endowed "rope" with a feminine gender in these verses: For I do not think that a golden rope has let down the generations of man from heaven into the fields, when he could in a more customary manner which keeps the meter say:
a golden rope has dropped down from the sky on to the fields.)
Aliter enim Lucretius vescum salm dicit exedendi intentione, aliter Lucilius vescum appellat cum edendi fastidio. (Noctes Atticae 16.5.7)

(At one point Lucretius says that the salt is "devouring" with the purpose of wearing away, at another point Lucilius calls something "devoured" with an aversion to eating.)

11. M. Cornelius Fronto

Quam ob rem rari admodum veterum scriptorvm in eum laborem studiumque et periculum verba industrious quae rendi sese comisere... poetas maxime Plautus, multo maxime Q. Ennius, eumque studiose amatus L. Coelius, nec non Naevius, Lucretius, Accius etiam, Caecilius, Laberius quoque. (Ep. 1.5)

(Because of this, few of our writers of old have given themselves over to the labor, the pursuit and the danger of seeking out words industriously...of the poets Plautus especially, and most especially Q. Ennius and his eager rival, L. Coelius, not to overlook Naevius and Lucretius, Accius also and Caecilius and Laberius.)

Etiam si qua Lucretii aut Ennius excerpta habes ετωνα <στ χυκ>α et sicubi θπυς μφαασεις... (Ep. 1.303)

If by some chance you have any excerpts from Lucretius or Ennius which are melodious and have some morality in them somewhere...)

In sole meridiano ut somno oboedires cubans, deinde Nigrum vocares, libros intro ferre iuberis, mox ut te studium legendi incessit, aut te Plauto expolires aut Accio expelere aut Lucretio delineres aut Ennio incenderes... (Ep. 2.5)

(Lying down, when you have taken an afternoon nap, then you would call Niger and order him to bring in books and as soon as the desire to read takes you, you would refine yourself with Plautus, or fill yourself with Accius, or soothe yourself with Lucretius...
In poetis autem quis ignorat ut gracilis sit Lucilius, Albucius aridus, sublimis Lucretius, mediocris Pacuvius, inaequales Accius, Ennius multiformis? (Ep. 2.49)

(Moreover, who does not know among the poets that Lucilius is simple, Albucius dry, Lucretius lofty, Accius uneven, and Ennius varied?)

Ennium deinde et Accium et Lucretium ampliore iam mugitu personantes tamen tolerant. (Ep. 2.74)

(Nevertheless they [those who shun eloquence] tolerate at last Ennius, Accius and Lucretius, who sound forth with a fuller rumble.)

12. Arnobius

Habet animus atque ardet, in chalcidicis illis magnis atque in palatiis caeli deos desasque conspicere intectis coporibus atque nudis, ab Iaccho Cericem, Musa ut praedicat Lucretia mammosan, Hellespontiacum Priapum inter deas virgines atque matres circumferentem res illas proeliorum semper in expeditionem paratas. (Adversus Nationes 3.10)

(The spirit yearns and desires to look into the great chalcidian halls and into the palaces of heaven and see gods and goddesses with their naked and uncovered bodies—Ceres, "full-breasted" as the muse of Lucretius says, "from Iacchus"; the Hellespontian Priapus among the virgin and mother goddesses, carrying about the things that are ever ready for the encounter of battles.)

13. L. Caecilius Firmianus Lactantius

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29 Ogilvie, (above, note 27) 15, says Lucretius was Lactantius' favorite poet. Excluding passages quoted more than once, the figures are 91 from Vergil, 62 from Lucretius. In the interests of expediency, I have chosen a small sample of those citations
Quod Lucretius queritur... quod si vel exiguam veritatis auram colligere potuisset nunquam diceret, aedes illum suas disturbare; cum ideo disturbet, quod sunt non suae.  
(Divinae Institutiones 3.17)

(Lucretius complains...but if he had been able to catch a small breath of the truth, he would never have said that he [god] disturbs his own seats; because he disturbs them since they are not his)

Quam multis coargui haec vanitas potest! Sed properat oratio. Hic est ille, qui genus humanum ungenio superavit et omnes restinxit stellas exortus ut aetherius sol. Quos equidem versus nunquam sine risu legere possum.  
(Divinae Institutiones 3.17)

(With how many words can this vanity be refuted! But the speech rushes on. This is that one, Who has surpassed the human race by his genius and quenched all as the sun rising out of the sky does the stars.

Indeed, I can never read those verses without laughing.)

Itaque poeta inanissimus leonis laudibus murem non ornavit, sed obruit et obtrivit.  
(Divinae Institutiones 3.17)

(And so the emptiest poet did not decorate a mouse with the praises of a lion, but overwhelmed and trampled it.)

14. Aelius Donatus


(In Cremona Vergil spent the beginnings of his life right up until he received his toga virilis on his fifteenth birthday; he had been born in the second consulship of Pompey and Crassus and it happened that on the same day the poet Lucretius died.)

which reveal Lactantius' disposition toward Lucretius. This measure of economy makes this evidence concerning Lucretius the only incomplete entry in this paper.
Thus we can see in these citations that Lactantius in his efforts to justify and promote Christianity was the first to incorporate in his work an attitude of mocking hostility toward Lucretius. His frequent use of the satiric technique of ridicule as a means to refute the argument of his opponent is in many ways reminiscent of Lucretius' own modus operandi. However, there is nowhere a mention of insanity or suicide even when such a detail would further his Christian polemic as does his reference to the suicide of Democritus, an act Lactantius deemed shameful.

Moreover, there remains the awkward fact that before St. Jerome there was no trace of the story. The noun, furor, used by Statius is a clear reference to poetic energy which when taken in its textual context does not connote mental instability, and if taken in a psychological sense at best affords a very tenuous proof. Furthermore, Donatus, Jerome's own grammaticus, mentioned none of the details provided in his pupil's account.

So it is that a solution must be sought in a closer examination of St. Jerome's own writings with reference to Lucretius. St. Jerome acknowledged his familiarity with Lucretius:

Puto quod puer...legeris...commentarios aliorum in alios, Plautum videlicet, Lucretium, Flaccum, Persium, atque Lucanum. (Apologia 1.16)

(I think that as a boy you would have read the commentaries of some writers concerning others especially Plautus, Lucretius, Horace, Persius and also Lucan.)

He wrote with acrimony and made a clear allusion to Lucretius with an obvious inversion of the words de natura rerum:

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30 Hadas, (above, note 19) 78, noted that in Christianity, the adjective "Epicurean" became synonymous with infidel.

31 It is not the purpose of this paper to examine the methods by which Lactantius and Lucretius refute their opponents. Nevertheless, there are striking similarities between the approaches of the two writers. Compare this small sample taken from Book I of the De Rerum Natura to the examples in the text of this paper: magno opere a vera lapsi ratione videntur, 1.636; stolidi, 1.641; peredelirum esse videtur, 1.692; aequa videtur enim dementia dicere, 1.704; magno opere a vero longe derresse videntur, 1.711.

32 Lactantius, Divinae Institutiones, 3.18.
Urges ut respondeam de natura rerum. Si esset locus, possem tibi vel Lucretii opiniones iuxta Epicurum vel Aristotelis iuxta peripateticos, vel Platonis atque Zenonis secundum academicos et stoicos dicere. (Epistula Adversus Rufinum 3.29)

(You ask that I discuss the nature of things. If there were a place for this I would be able to talk about the opinions of Lucretius in regard to Epicurus or about the ideas of Aristotle and the Peripatetics or about those of Plato and Zeno following the Academics and the Stoics.)

Yet the manner in which St. Jerome utilized direct citations from Lucretius is negative and derogatory. In every instance, St. Jerome quotes the verses of Lucretius to support the position that he himself opposed. In making an argument against deceptive and heretical writing, St. Jerome turned into a warning the familiar lines:

Ac veluti pueris absinthia taetra medentes cum dare conantur, prius oras pocula circum contingunt mellis dulci flavoque liquore (Ep. Ad. Ctesiphontem 132 from D.R.N. 1.936-8)

(As it is when doctors are trying to administer vile wormwood to boys, they first dip the rims of the cups in the sweet yellow liquid of honey.)

In directing the education of a young girl toward a life of virtue, St. Jerome completely recast this same simile. Here the honey disguises not medicine but poison:

Venena non dantur nisi melle circumlita et vitia non decipiunt nisi sub specie umbraque virtutum. (Ep. 107.6)

(Poisons are not given unless they are daubed with honey, they do not deceive unless under the cover and appearance of virtue.)

In describing his arch enemy and quondam friend, Rufinus, St. Jerome drew his metaphor directly from Lucretius' description of a fierce monster:

bestiam diceres esse compactum iuxta illud poeticam: prima leo, postrema draco, media ipsa chimaera. (Ep. 125.18 from D.R.N. 5.905)
(You would say a beast made up like that of which the poet tells: a lion in front, a dragon behind, and the Chimaera herself in the middle.)

In addition to these quotations is the knowledge that the Chronological Tables, in which St. Jerome wrote his biographical sketch of Lucretius, were written in carelessness and haste; made evident by their numerous errors in dating and translation.\(^{33}\) St. Jerome could not resist the temptation, after the mention of a person or an event of note to take on some irrelevant, gossipy detail.\(^{34}\) His assessment of individuals or movements was colored by his violent prejudices and he considered all opposition to his cherished principles as a personal insult to which he replied with violence.\(^{35}\)

This type of saeva indignatio, savage indignation, links St. Jerome to a chain of Christian satirists that stretches back to Tertullian, Arnobius and Arnobius’ pupil, Lactantius. All of these writers were involved in waging a Christian propaganda war begun in the early third century A.D. against their civic and religious opponents. None believed Lucretius’ assurances that he was not leading men into a life of crime and impious deeds. Nevertheless amid their theological and doctrinal pyrotechniques, one of these men took especial care to record, or perhaps actively seek out, a biographical sketch that rather neatly represented the sort of divine retribution which should be enacted against the wayward Epicurean. That man is St. Jerome who stands supreme among the masters of malignant vilification aimed at intellectual opponents.\(^{36}\) His account of the life of Lucretius is yet another assault against the enemies of the church, all of whom he took to be his own.\(^{37}\)

Boston University
Michelle Ronnick


\(^{34}\) Kelly, (above, note 33) 74.


\(^{36}\) Wiesen, (above, note 35) 166.

\(^{37}\) Wiesen, (above, note 36) 166-7.